United States and the Indochinese War by O'Connor, Beverly L.
'' 
THE UN;ITED STA',rES A.ND THE INDOCHINESE WAR 
By 
i3Jl:VERLI L. 9iCONNOR 
rj . I 
Ba,ehelor o£ Arts 
Brandeis University . 
'Waltham, Massachusetts 
Submitted-to the ;faoulty of th~ G:i,ad~te College 
· ot th, Oklahoma Sta tfl! Uni vers1 ty 
1n partial f'l.il.fillJrlent of ~he ttequ:1,rements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
July, 1967 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDOCH;rNESE WAR 
Thesis Approved: 






JAN 16 1968 
I should lik• to expi-ess my grat;l.t~de to Professor Sare, for his 
invaluable a,sutanoe and gu~qe 1n the pi-e:paration of thie thesis. 
. . . 
i should also like to ~nk Drs • · Ha;l:d.by and . Ponnell ·for theu- helpful 
oQ11111ients _and or.itio~sms and iq husba,n4 BiU for his suggestj.ons and 
endless patience. 
Mo.oh appreciation is-owed to Sue furchett for the arduous t~slc of 
typj,ng this thesis. 
35~97 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapt,er 
I •. INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . ·• . • • • • • • • 
J1,1$tifio-.tion 
MethQdology. 
• • • • •• • • • • •• • • 











Ea:rliest American Contacts wih th.$ Far East •••••• 
Economic :tnterests •· ·• • •1 • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 
Stra. tegic qonsidera tions • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 
Diploma.tic Rel& tiens • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • 
World War II Policies of the United States .••• • •• 
INDOCHINA: 1940•1950 AND.THE FAR.EASTERN SITUATION 
The Wartime Status of Indochina •· • ·• · •• , •.• 
Indochina at the Close of.World War II •••• 
Wartime Attitudes ,;rt the United Sta.tea toward 
• • • •• 
• • • • 
• • • • 
-·Indochina • •· •' •. • • ·• ., -.- •· • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Postwar Policies of the Uniteci States toward 
Indqcbina: 1945-1949 ~- • • • • • • • • •. • • • • • • 
The Re-evaluation of United States FS4:" Eastern 











J IV. UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARD INDOCHINA: 19.50 .. 19.54 • • • • 56 
Truman-Achef;Son Policies •• ; • • • •.• • • • • • • • • 58 
United S~tes .Aid to Indochina • • • • • • • • • • • • 65 
The QQ.estion of Military Involvement • • • • • • • • . • 67 
Eisenli,ower~Du.lles Polici,s ••••••• • ••• , • • 71 
'.rhe Nature of Re'PllbJAcan ~terest in !ndochina • • • • 72 
. The Navarre Plan • • • • . • • • • •· • • • • • • • • , • · 80 
The Nature of the War •r •· ; • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • 84 
The Question of Chinese Intervention in, Indochina. • • 87 
The Question of ?olitic~ Settlement ••• · • • • • • • 90 
. Cnsis Over Intervention -• • • • • •••••••• • • 95 
The Coup.de Grace -_Geneva •••••••••••••• 114 
V. · CONCWSIONS ........ - ............... . 118 




By-the middle of 1950, the.Unit.eel States was facing serious polit ... 
ioal problem::; in East and Southeast Asia. The oommunization of China 
,-----. 
~ the Korean War had gravely undermined. American policies in the 
Orient and necessitated a re-evaluation of these policies. In the 
oo~rse ot this re-ass~ssment, the United States reached the decision 
that it had a vital _interest in preve~ting communist-oriented forces 
·fl-om gaining political oontro0doohina.1 · 
. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature or .American 
interest in Indochina ande~i~~-~e;~e~-~~li~ies there during the· 
four critical years of the Indochinese War, 1950-19.54. These policies 
·wUl be examined in the context of the. traditional policies of the 
United States toward East Asia.. To understand the rels.ticmship between 
·· these.more recent policies pursued in Indochina and the traditional 
p~licies pursued. in Asia. it is neQessary to understand the nature and 
extent of the problems confronting the United States in Asia in 1950. 
The defeat or the Kuomintang ~d subsequent communization of China 
were uJor 'blows to the United states1• · ~ing the Second World War, 
she had heavily committed herself to ,a stro~ and unified China 
friendly to the United States and able to play a key role in the 
1Indoohina was u.de up of what a.re today the independent states of 
North and South Vietnam, I,.aos. and Cambodia. . 
l 
preservation of a 'balance of power~ the Far East. The establishment 
of a·oomunist regime in C$a meant, at the very least, that China 
2 
would not tulf1U the r0le oast(_!:_~-b;; ·by-·W United States-.· fu add1:-----A.~ ? 
. tion, it tilOOll caae to be realized tl°lat China's ver,y OOJDDiWl.ization would 
p;revent the realization of any~lance of p<>Wer favorable to the United 
States because it had created a power distribution quite inimical to 
United States interests in Asia. When the Korean War broke out, the 
. ' . . . 
United ,States recognized. that not only was the power distributi,on in 
7 . . . . . .. ' 
· ---·--Asia ~favorable to her interests, but also that forces were at .work 
---·------··-- - . - . 
,.,-/eeoui;lead • to~(3)Soviet do~ation of East and Soutl:least Asia. At 
f "1.;'Jt 
M-.. 7 
the same time, within Ind.oohina, the French were engaged in a war with 
a conummist-oriented nationalist movement. the oij.toome of which oo~d 
·oertain]J have great µitluence on the ·surrounding areas ef Southeast 
BT itselt, J;ndoohina posed. an unhappy dilemma for United States 
policy makers who were anxi~s to support inqependenee movements, yet 
. . . . . . . \ ' 
conce:rne~ With the communist orientation of Ho Chi Minh. . Viewed, - how-
ever, in tl:l.e largex,- oont¢ of the growing communist influenc,e in .U of 
·Asia, the Indochinese War .seemed. fraught with danger.to the United 
States and her allies. Thus, in. 1950, the oonoem ot the United States 
with her own deteriorat~ power p<>sition .in .Asia a.nd the gr~ in-
f"luenoe of communist forces led lier to re~xamine her po~icies toward 
the Far East and to focus new attention on Indochina.. The goal, of 
United States policies. toward ·rndoehina.'beoame the prevention of a 
'. : . ' . . .. · . . .· 
communist.takeover, because,.&:$ sha.llbe discussed, a co!IDl'lUllist victory 
. . . . 
would disturb the existing power relations in Asia in a. manner unfavor-
able to the United States. 
3 
This study jdll attempt an investigation of the hypothesis: Uni ed 
States policies in ~dochina during t~e last four years of the Indo-
chinese War represented a continuation of the traditiqnal policies of 
the United States in the Far East. It is suggested that there was a 
great deal of similarity between the goals of American policy in 
Indochina and the instruments of this policy, and the traditional pol-
icies and instruments of the United States in East Asia. The study will 
also investigate a second, but related,hypothesis: 
Dulles• policies toward Indochina .attempted to utilize Indochina as a 
ulcrum for a new balance of power in 4,sia. The Eisenhower .Administra-
tion sought to create a counterweight to Sino-Soviet power in the Far 
East, a counterweight which would contribute to the creation of a new 
balance of power. 
Justification 
Although the literature is replete with analyses of the ltldo-
chinese War, little has been devoted to '&?l analysis of United States 
pol:1,cies in Indochina during this period. Only four studies have fo-
' 
cused on this problem. Two, however, w~re written either during or 
immediately after the Indochinese War and lacked both resources and 
historical perspective.2 Three lack ·continuity because they were con-
. cerned only with United States policies for a selected period of the War.3 
2~..iriam Farley, United States Relations with Southeast Asia (New 
York, 19.5.5), and Frances Louise Johnson, American Post War Pollcy in 
Indochina (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California, 1951). 
>\Tiktor Bator, Vietnam: ! Diploma.tic Tragedy . (New York, 196.5). 
Also, Johnson, American Post War folioy in Indochina, and Melvin 
Gurtov, The First Vietnam Cri~.is New York, 1967). 
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None have attempted to analyze the historical antecedents of these pol= 
icieso Thusu there appears some justi:fica,tion for a study of this 
scope .. 
Methodology 
For the purposes of this study9 it is necessary to define certain 
terms which are frequently employed~ 
The 11trad;!,iona]. 11 ( olg) balance of _£ower in t,he Far East is defined 
as the equilibrium (n~t Btatic 9 however) which existed from the turn of 
the twentieth century up until World War IL 
The power distribution (or power struc1_~~ in the Far East at the 
end of 1949 was characterized by the end of the old balance of power 
with the Soviet Union and China holding the preponderance of powero 
The new ba1.!P~a of p~~ wbi0h the Eisenhower Administration 
appeared to be working for was a balance of power based on the strength 
of a Southeast Asian organization for collective defense which could 
11neutralize 11 Sino=Soviet power" At the same time 0 Japan in East Asia 
was also to figure prnr:dnently in the ,)ontairune:nt \Of Chi:na ,!,l,nd -the 
Soviet Union, This thesis is not c:oncerned 9 however,, with the Japanese 
role in the overall containment structu:r.eo 
', 
The Far East for the purposes of this study, is defined as ::L~elud= 
i.~g not only China, Japan9 Korea~ but also the entire area of what is 
commonly called Southeast Asia (Burmag Thailandv Indochina~ the 
Philippines 11 :Malaysia, Singapore# and Indonesia)., 
This study is based primarily on material gathered from official 
United States Government sources? particularly the Department of State 
Bullet::L~~ Foreign Relations 2£.. the !lr!.ited Statesp and the Public PaJ?§!rs 
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of the Presidents. Memoirs, wherever available, were utilized to pro-
vide additional insights into American policies. It should be noted 
that within the memoirs of the key public officials, conflicting mate-
rial often is found; some attempt will be made to reconcile or explain 
these contradictions. For the chapter on traditional American policy in 
the Far East, secondary sources which have come to be recognized as 
authoritative are utilized. 
Chapter II is devoted to a recapitulation of traditional American 
policy in the Far East. Chapter III contains background information on 
the Indochinese War and on early American policies toward Indochina, as 
well as a discussion of the problQms confronting the United States in 
the Far East in 1949-1J50~ In Chapter IV, United States policies toward 
Indochina from 1950 ... 19.54 are ~iscussed a;nd analyzed. In the final 
chapter, V, conclusions are presented and United States policies toward 
Indochina are evaluated.. 
. CHAPTER II 
THE TRADITION.AL FAR EASTERN POLICIES 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
The Fax- Eastern1 policies ot the United States developed slowly out 
of a body of preoedents la.id down in the nineteenth and the e&l'ly 
twentieth centuries and in response to new problems qreated by changing 
pattema of' political pQWer. The diplomat followed in the wake of the 
trader; the latter was a oritiea.J. factor during the geetation stage of' 
. . . 
American :policies. ·In this chapter, the basee of' these polioies •. as 
. . . . ' 
well as the policies themselves, will be examined. 
Earliest American Contacts with the Far East 
Earliest American c;,onta.cts with the Far East. were almost exelu-
,,... < 
sively. commercial in nature. In 1784. the Emmss !! China, carryj,.ng a 
~go of' ginseng, sailed on an e~oratory voyage to Canton. Before 
this, there we,.:.e not "more than one or two native 1:>ol'll .Amerioans who 
. . 
had ever been Oll the coasts of' .Asia, @cl:i.nl784, probably there were 
:not a.·. b.alf dozen people on all the Atlantic seabo~ who had any first ... 
band lmowledge whatsoever of' the ether side of the world."2 Although 
. . 
· only . modest. profits were. rea.1tzed by the. Em:press ~ . China, some 
. . 1:rn this chapter, the term Far·. East will be used to refer to 
China, Japan, Southeast Asia; and the surrounding islands. 




.Americans, predicting greater opportunities for trade with the Far East, 
soon agitated for tariff protection against East Asian goods carried 
on foreign ships.J In the Tariff Act of 1789, preferential duties were 
extended to Asian imports carried on .Alneriean ships. Most of this early 
trade was conducted by numerous small New Englarrl merchants, who had to 
ply a circuitous trade route $.lld, often, were required to pay for 
Eastern goods with cash. As a small agricultural nation with only 
incipient manufactures, the United States had little to exchange for 
Asian goods. 
The United States government, during these early days, seems to 
have taken little interest in the welfare of Americans in East Asia, 
probably because she did not have the means to protect their activities. 
As a result, early .American traders in the Far East were usually con-
ciliatory toward the local authorities and, without benefit of company 
warships or treaties, relied on their own bargaining skills and culti-
vated the friendship of native authorities to promote their interests. 
This developing commerce was interrupted by the War of 1812, but 
subsequent}.y, trade grew rapidly and by the late 1820 1s, the small mer-
chant had been replaced by a few large commercial firms having somewhat 
of a monopoly on the trade.4 These commercial firms gradually came to 
view China as a potentially unlimited market for .American :manufactured 
goods. Exports began to grow. In 1826, fifteen thousand dollars worth 
of cottons were exported; in 18J6, one hundred seventy thousand dollars · 
)Reportedly $37,727. Ibid,, p. 7. 
4Trade n~ver, however, exceeded a modest sum. Total trade from 
1817 to 18JJ was twelve and one-half million dollars and most of this 
represented Chinese imports. c. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China 
(New York, 1933), p. 242. ~ 
8 
worth of cottons were sold. By 1845, annual sales were well over two 
million dollars.5 Americans continued to pirchase more than they sold, 
"but the Americans had had a glimpse of Asia as a market for American 
manufactured goods, and that glimpse influenced t~e policy of Americans 
and guided the formation of the policy of their government. 116 
~ost all trade was with Canton, but Americans were interested in 
other Asiatic opportunities, especially in Japan. Japan was a closed 
society, however, with foreign commerce generally prohibited by Japanese 
law. A few Americans had had an occasion to visit Japan when, in 1798, 
the Dutch chartered the American ship the Eliza to carry Dutch produce 
to Nagasaki. The use of American ships became a regular practice. 
When the United States government began to show an interest in Japan, 
it was through Dutch sources and Americans employed by the Dutch that 
the Department of State received its information on Japan. 
During these early years of commercial intercourse, no official 
policy can be attributed to the United States government. As Tyler 
Dennett has emphaeized: "The early American policy in Asia, meaning 
merely the policy of Americans for thera was no other policy, was 
purely negative in its origins. It appeared only when there was oppo-
sition or obstruction to the trade. When trade was free, there was no 
policy. 117 Satisfied, in general, with their treatment by the Chinese, 
Americans fostered an atmosphere of harmony and friendship. "Relations 
between the Chinese and the American traders were, therefore, friendly, 
5Dennett, p. 73-74. 
6 Ibid., p. 74. 
?underlined by the author of this thesis for emphasis. Ibid., 
p. 69. 
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and on the whole not unsuccessful, though th~re were exceptions."8 
It was not until 1833 that the United States evinced an interest 
in establishing diplomatic relations with countries in the Far East. 
In that year, at the request of Andrew Jackson, Edmund Roberts was sent 
to East Asia in an attempt to establish official contacts with Cochin 
China, Japan, Muscat, and Siam. Roberts died before he could get to 
Japan and was unable to establish diplomatic ties with Cochin China. 
The official relations between the United States and China were post-
poned until after the Opium War. The British, as a result of the Opium 
War, were able to extort numerous trading privileges from the Chinese. 
American merchants at Canton hungrily eyed the concessions secured by 
the British, and petitioned their Government, in 1842, to send an 
emissary to China to negotiate a commercial treaty. Under pressure 
from this nascent "China Lobby", the Government ordered the Ea.st India 
Squadron, commanded by Commodore Kearny, to proceed to China in a show 
of force. Kearny obtained a verbal promise from the Governor of Canton 
that the United States would receive most-favored nation status, but 
Kearny thought a written treaty was necessary. At the same time, the 
House of Representatives initiated investigations into the desirability 
of establishing treaty relations with China, and asked the Executive to 
furnish it with information on China. President Tyler decided to act, 
and in 1843, he sent Caleb Cushing, a member of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, to China, with instructions which constituted the 
8samuel F1agg Bemis,!. Diplomatic History of the United States 
(New York, 1955), p. Y+5. 
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first official declaration of American policy in China.9 
Cushing succeeded in negotiating the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844. 
Under the terms of this treaty, the United States was granted most-
favored nation status and, in addition, privileges of extraterritori-
ality. This treaty established a precedent Americans were to adhere to 
throughout the nineteenth century: to insist, in negotiations with the 
Chinese, on privileges commensurate with those obtained by the British 
by force of arms. "It became ingloriously, yet very profitably, the 
role of the United States pacifically to follow England to China in the 
wake of war, and to profit greatly by the victories of British arms. 1110 
After the second Opium War of 1857-18.58, Americans again reaped the 
benefits of European arms. Although at no time during the nineteenth 
century did the United States involve herself in acts of war in China 
and although she hars};lly condemned the "gun-boat diplomacy" of the 
Europeans, she was always quick to exploit conditions created by others. 
Ten years after the first American treaty with China, the United 
States secured a treaty of friends~ip and restricted trade with Japan. 
This did not come about, however, until after several unsuccessful 
attempts had been made to "open up11 Japan.11 Finally, in 1853, 
Commodore Matthew c. Perry was sent to Japan to "persuade" the Japanese 
to open some of their ports to Americans for refueling, to make treaty 
9eushing's official instructions were "to secure the entry of 
.American ships and cargoes into these ports on terms as favorable as 
those which are enjoyed by English merchants." Quoted in Bemis, p. Y+5. 
10 Dennett, p. 159. 
11Roberts had been given instructions to make treaty arrangements 
with Japan, 'blt he never reached Japan, having died in Macao (1833). 
Subsequent missions by Biddle (1846), Glynn (1849), and Harris (18.56) 
were unsuccessful. 
11 
arrangements for American ships wrecked off the coast of Japan, and to 
secure a commercial treaty, if possible. The resulting treaty, the 
Treaty of Kanagawa, proved somewhat disappointing to the Americans, in 
part, because Perry had been no match for the wily Japanese politicians. 
Two ports were opened to .American citizens and arrangements were ma.de to 
repatriate shipwrecked sailors, put Americans were prohibited from tak-
ing up permanent residence in Japan and trade was limited to a cash and 
carry basis. The Treaty did, however, contain a most-favored nation 
clause which permitted the United States to share in concessions later 
gained by the more sophisticated European diplomats. Townshend Harris 
was appointed consul-general in 1855 and in 1857 he negotiated a more 
favorable commercial treaty with Japan which was later used as the 
pattern for Japanese commercial relations with other states. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, United States policies in the 
Far East were motivated primarily by commercial considerations. The 
principle means for the realization of American goals were: insistence 
on most-favored nation treatment for Americans and on equality of 
commercial opportunities. The United States never sought territorial 
concessions in the Far East, nor until 1898, did she seek naval bases in 
the Pacific. Since the American navy was still in a most rudimentary 
state of develo?J1ent, military measures could not be relied on to secure 
policy goals. Still, when propitiation of the Crq.nese authorities 
failed, and when the European powers managed to extort concessions by 
force, the United States, following in the wake of foreign navies, 
demanded privileges an:i rights equal to those obtained by the Europeans. 
Thus, early .American poli cy in East Asia was aggressive diplomatically, 
but unsupported by .American arms; its overriding concern was to 
12 
preserve and enhance commercial. opportunities for Americans in the Far 
East. 
Economic Interests 
Economic factors continued to influence .American Far Eastern pol-
icy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although 
.Amer!oan economic interests in the Far East never exceeded modest pro-
portions, in spite of the optimistic predictions of expansionistic 
people such as Lodge, Roosevelt, and l1a,han. Trade with China, for the 
four-year period 1926-1930, amounted to only 3 1/2 percent of the total 
United States imports and 2.3 percent of the total United States 
exports.12 Still, by 1936, the United States possessed the largest 
share of China's foreign trade. During the 1930 1s Japan purchased be-
tween 8 and 9 percent of the total of United States exports.13 
.American investments in the Far East were also somewhat limited. The 
total Far Eastern investment of the United States during the 1930 1s 
equalled three-quarters of a billion dollars, or between 5 and 6 per-
cent of the total of .American foreign investments. Slightly less than 
one-quarter of a billion dollars was invested in China, and a comparable 
amount in Japan.14 
Several factors may have been responsible for the modesty of actual 
.American commerce and investment in the Far East. The inability of the 
12Harold V. Sare, The United States and the Chinese Civil War 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis,Oklahoma State University, 1955), p. ~ 
13John King Fairbank, The United States and Cm,na (Cambridge, 
1965), p. 258. 
14Toid., p. 2.58. 
13 
Asj,an masses to buy foreign imports more than compensated for the osten-
sible vastness of the market. The subsistence level at which the major-
ity of people lived, combined with the anachronistic economic structure 
existing in so many East Asian nations, rendered these markets of only 
limited value. Under these oonditiQns, there were .limited profitable 
investment opportunities. Investors were also loathe to ris~ their 
capital in nations that were unwillµig or unable to guarantee the in-
vestments. The political instability prevalent in China and other 
Asian nations, along with the obvious inability of the United States 
government to protect .American interests by arms, if necessary, let po-
tential investors to shun the Far East. 
Interestingly enough, even when the Government attempted to spon-
sor increased .American economic involvement in the Far East, Americans 
were unwilling to take the risks involved. During the Taft .Admini-
stration, the United States government tried to increase American in-
~~r fluence in the Far East by augmenting American investments there. It 
lobbied the bankers to channel their money into Manchuria to build a 
railroad and subsequently, to extend their investments into railroad 
building throughout China. One plan, The Knox Neutralization Plan, 
called for the establishment of an international consortium to loan 
money to China. Although doll4!' diplomacy incurred the hostility of 
the Japanese and the Europeans by demanding equal opportunities for 
American capital investment in China, it was unsuccessful, because 
.American investors could not be convinced by their government of the 
wisdom of increased economic involvement in China. In fact, from 
14 
1908-1912, .American investments in China actually declined.15 
Governmental loans and economic aid were another aspect of .American 
economic involvement in the Far East. During the 19.30 1s, the United 
States undertook the stabilizing of the Chinese economy in the face of 
Ja,panese aggression against China. Money was loaned to China in 19.37 
and again in 19J8, to stabilize the Chinese currency. Credits for the 
purchase of United States agricultural products were ~xtended in 19.31, 
19;.3 and again in 19.38. By 1940, one hundred twenty million dollars 
had been allocated to China for the purchase of United States wheat. 
cotton, flour,,and other agri~tural and ms.nuf~etured goods.16 
Aside from oonimeroial interests in the Philippines, American eoo-
nomie interests in the rest of the Far East, exclusive of China and 
J~pan. were thinly spread and relatively insignifiQant. As mentioned 
previously, they ~otaled only one-quarter of a billion dollars during 
the 19.30 1s. 
It can be concluded then that although .American policies often 
were oriented toward encouraging economic ties with East Asia, these 
economic ties were always quite circumscribed and never f'uli'illed the 
expectations of the expansionists. Instead of economic considerations 
dictating the foreign po].icies of the United States in the Far East, 
t~e United States, during the Taft Administration, tried to promote 
commercial ties with the Far East, so that these might serve as a bul-
wark of foreign policies. That .American investment in and trade with 
l5Whi tney A. Griswold, Th! ill Eastern Policy 2£. ~ United States 
(New York, 19.38), p. 174.. · · 
16united ·states Department of Statet United States Relations~ 
China, Far Eastern Series JO (Washington, 1949), p • .32., 
,, 
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the Far Ea.st never attained the heights anticipated was always as much 
a disappointment to the government as it was to eager businessmen. 
Strategic Considerations 
By 1900, strategic, as well as commercial considerations had to be 
weighed in the formulation of .America's East Asian policies. Many years 
earlier, Perry had strongly reco111mended the procurement of bases and 
coaling stations in the Pacific, possibly through the occupation of 
Formosa, the Bonin Islands, or the Riyuku Islands, but his advice was 
not then heeded. The westward expansion of .Americans and the fulfill-
ment of Manifest Destiny, along with the expansionistie fever of the 
1890 1s, led many .Americans to look to the Far East as America's Far 
u)~~I>v,.1 , ,v1,,,Jt&.M"', Wes~ __ .iµid tc:,_9-,=b,~or for Paci.fie bases. Hawaii was annexed by the United 
4----'1~&.~c- -----
g''~ States ~~t'~~-~~2§1oc, after almost :forty ye<11,rs of agitation by the 
J:sfCt \ 
.,,..annexationists. Guam, Samoa, and the Philippine Islands were incor-
porated :5,n December of the same year. 
Truly, the acquisition of these distant possessions caused United 
States policies in tne Far East to take on a new urgency, and strategic 
eonsiderations--namely the defense of the Philippine Islands~-became a 
dominant theme in the years which followed. By this a]Jnost inadvertent 
departure from the mainstream of nineteenth century policies~-equa.lity 
of commercial opportunitr, most-favored nation status, no territorial. 
concessions or naval bases-•the United States dramatically increased 
her vested interests in the Far East, and burdened herself with the 
necessity for a more active role in Asian af;fairs. Strangely enough, 
the Philippine Islands had been acquired on the assumption they would 
further United States eonm,.ercial interests in China, by providing 
16 
fueling stations and naval protection for American shipping, yet United 
States policies in China soon came to be shaped by the need for 
Philippine security.17 
The Philippine Islands, under the sovereignty of the United 
States became a monument to American good works and good-
will. a model for colonial dominion and administration in 
the world. They also became a military and a diplomatic 
liability. They were the Achilles' heel of American de-
fense, a hostage to ~apan for American foreign policy in 
the Far East ••• time and again ••• .American diplomats had 
to make concessions to Japanese aggression on the Cont1nent 
of Asia in return for Japanese disavowai, either explicit 18 
or implicit, of aggressive intentions toward the Philippines. 
From 1900 on, strategic considerations, especially the defense of the 
Philippines, were a dominant theme in American Far Eastern policies. 
This hostage in foreign seas made it incumbent on the United States to 
try to preserve some sort of balance of power in the Far East. Insis-
tence on the maintenance of the Far Eastern balance of power became, 
then, one of the pervasive themes of .Am,erioa 1s Far Eastern policies. 
The United States hoped that by preventing any one nation from beooming ~-t;," .. 
. . ' _.· - _._,.,-, .... ·~"-'"···",--·-··- . . _c.,J]• .- .:( .· ·--1c_,' 
undisp.ited master of the Orient, it could most pars~~ously preserveft;,_01.,;.·'i;:,:;, 
'"·~ •.. -,.J .. 
its interests in the Pacific. The United States attempted to preserve 
this balance of power by bolstering any nation that happened to be the 
-~~'-""°'"·· ··e--
,,. - •··--~current Asian u?{cf;),dog. Thus, at the outbreak of the Ru.sso~a.panese 
'---·. 
<".~,--r•-··-·· 
War, Roosevelt initially supported Japan who was then the Asian un~~~-
dog, but by the end of the War, Japan's overwhelming victory over 
Russia. led Roosevelt to try to secure miJ.<i peace terms for the Russians. 
Soon, however, China tho~gh traditionally weak came to be the un~is-
, ... ,,.'\ 
-----·-puted un~~Hog, the sick man of A.sia, and Japan the major threat to the 
17Griswold, p. 145. 
18:sems, p. 475. 
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balance o:r Asian power. The Russo-Japanese War ~ well have m&l"ked the 
high water mark o:r American-Japanese relationsl\ips, fo:r thereafter, tlle 
United States embarked on a course o:r containing Japanese ambitions .in 
the Orient. Thus, American diplo:macy f':rom the early years o:r the 
tlfentieth cen"tµ.ry was oriented toward preserving the balance of power in 
the Far East. 
, Diplomatic Relations 
The military posture of the United States during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centu.ries demanded that Far Ea.stern poliQY goals be 
realized solely through diploutic instruments.· Rarely before World 
War II was the Urii ted States willing to commit American men or muni t1ons 
to the defense of any policy in the Far East. With the exception of the 
Roosevelt-ordered ~o~d the world cruise, even sabre-rattling was pre-
scribed as a means for the realization of American goals. Thus. in 
spite of the fact tbat after World War I the United State~ could easily 
have become the leading naval power in the Pacific, Amerioan antipathy 
to the use of foree, along with eeonom;v minded publics and administra-
tions, led the United States to deprive herself of ~e ability to de-
fend mUitarily her Far Eastern interests. 
By the rejection of military measures, the United States forced 
herself to depend heavily on the good will of other nations and on 
diplomatic.caveats, to preserve hf)r vital interests in Ea.st Asia. Dip..: 
lomatic ~vering--the sending of notes, the formulating of agreements, / . 
/ 
the c~ing of oonferenees-•was the major instrument of United States 
. / 
forej::gn policy in East Asia throughout the first part of the twentieth 
I . 
c,ntury. The United States could not at.ford to isolate herself 
/ .L.. ' . 
\i'J(JJ·\, ,_ .. ,:: ...• -1 ~,.("';;:-- \g e ce.,-t 
- '\\ l'. '-Ul '-9" 
nJ:'' f 0'- f_. \ } , \,.- f Ii"", -- e.{..."rlr~ ,J;l.._.~!!-...A..··.:l'f\\?'~.~ ~ 1€.,.,.~A"'-tr ~·f" '\.\.r0•\·~ t',•,,Jp,,,,,.·r';:;r"-:.,S~- t,J:'!.,,../~...,..,.n,, ;; w ""'""'-"-·N V - '). 
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diplomatioally from the affairs of Asia as she did in the case of 
Europe. if only beoa.use the strategic l:iability imposed by the posses-
sion of the Philippine Islands demanded some American participation. 
No administration, even had it desired, coul4 ignore the Asian situation. 
The dominant concern of .American foreign policy was to preserve 
the far Ea~tern balance of power. No nation was to be allowed to be-
come so dominant that it could threaten American ties with the 
Philippines. Neither China, Russia, nor Japan could be allowed to estab-
L.. re:, 
lish its own Monroe Doctrine for Asia. These beliefs guided American 
foreign policy until World War II. 6'upport of the Asian underdog be-
came a keynote of American foreign policy in .Asia.. Thus, when it be-
came apparent that China was the sick m,an of Asia, the United States 
9ommitted herself to the diplo~tic defense of the unity and territorial 
integrity of China, on the theory that the dismemberment of China could 
only jeopardize United States commercial interests in China and could, 
possibly, result in a disturbance of the balance of power in Asia. "The 
principal center of international rivalry and conflict in the Far East 
after the first Sino-Japanese War was China. 1119 Since the United States 
desired only a passive role in the ~intenance of the territorial inte-
grity of China and the balance of power in the Far East, it was neces-
sary to try to lineup other nations in such a way that they would serve 
United States goals. This the United States attempted to do, as early 
as 1898. 
In 1898, spurred on by the British who feared that the dismember-
111ent of China was imminent, the United States decided that her most-
19Harold M. Vina.eke, The United States and the Far Ea.st, ~-!2..21:. 
(Stanford, 1952), p. 12. ·.........,. · --- - -- -
favored nation status was in d~er and decided to issue what became 
known as the first of the Open Door Notes.20 
Although after 1900 we stood for the territorial integrity 
of China, usually without any re~ee upon. British 4iplo-
maoy, the faot remains that our traditional policy began 
as an :µiheritanee from the British who, as a trading nation 
at a great distance, wished to preserve China as an open 
market.21 
In the fall of 1899, Seoreta;ry of State John Hay announced the 
19 
principle of the Open Door, in identical notes to Great Britain, France, 
Russia, Ge:rmany, and Japan. These notes requested only equality of 
commercial opportunity for all nations throughout China. The recipient 
nations were requested to pledge themselves not to levy discriminatory 
tarit'fs against any nation within partiou.J.,ar spheres of influence and 
,,to agree that 'c~~s~ ~it'i's would apply equally to all nations; Hay's 
(t.:>:fu:C> notes, in addition, gave recognition to existing special interests. (}.;;;,, "'I 
f. 
i However, in these first notes, there was no mention of preserving the 
territorial integrity of China or of guaranteeing equality of invest-
ment opportunity within China, but these two demands came soon. In an 
interesting letter penned by William Rockhill (on whom Hay relied 
heavily in formulating the Open Door Notes), Rockhill ~ote: 
Of course, there is another side to the question, an~ that 
is that none of the European Powers interested in China would 
care, at the present moment at least, to openly oppose suoh 
a seemingzy very moderate request as that this Government 
has made, as it would put them in a very awkward position 
not only as regards each other, but as regards China. There 
is no doubt, however, that by these assurances, or rather by 
the acceptance by each of the European powers of the 
20The British, earlier, had. tried to convince the United States to 
issue a joint declaration along the lines of the Open Door0 
21Fairbank, p. 249. 
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declarations sought to be obtained from them by the United 
States, this country holds the balance of power in China.22 
The European powers accepted Hay's Notes, but witll reserva,tions. 
Hay, perhaps attempting to present these nations with a f'ait acoompli, 
announced publicly that sinoe all concerned had responded favorably to 
L fl fl !.tf') 
his Notes, the principles enunciated il). them could be regarded as bind- Lu ·t,,<...t~f\ : 
. ~/;:::.,,::··.-- .. ··-··:,- -------.,=·--······-···· .....•... , ... --- .. . .. . .a-,·.·:··· .~J ) I' 
ing on all. In spite of Hay's attempt a:t(. bluff• the adherence of these - !lo..,,,, t..~"1 
"·•·,-·/ I J 
-~~v-1.~Y· 




years, on world conditions, the power relationships among those in o ''"'"",~ s.:.L_Tu~ 
China, and on the good wishes of these nations, rather t~n on the 
United States, and it was not until 1922 that the United States suc-
ceeded in elevating the principle of the Open Poor to the level of a 
formal treaty, binding on all •. 
The second of the Open Door Notes followed on the heels of the 
Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent European intervention in China. It 
greatly enlarged the scope of the original Open Door Policy. Dispatched 
. I 
. in J~J.y, 1900, Hay's second oiroular called on all in,terested parties to A~,. I,, =· 
I\J,@/0 tu~,;l 
act in a concert so as to preserve the ~err!~"!"~~--int.egri.ty-and- a.a~- ~y\~,,~- i.,;. 
istrative unity of China. 23 This i~• in essence, ealled for a far~J1\.'.\o'V',.1 
\_,..,' ~ '-ei-..(;, tl:cQ \i 
mere oira'l)JQSpeot attitude toward China than that called for in the first }J\~~~'::.:7x,, 
circular. Basieally, it was a request by the United States that the 
22W:i,111amRoakhill to Alfred E. Hippisley, 1899. Quoted in 
Griswold, p. 76. 
23&.y wrote: "••• the polioy of the government of the United 
States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and 
peace to China, preserve Chinese territories and adrnjnistrative entity, 
. protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and inter-
national law, and sa.fegua.rd for the world the principle of equal a¢ im-
partial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." United States 
Department of State, Papers Relating ],2_ ~ Foreign Relations of 2 
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great p~fs of the world\!gree to su~tain and preserve China in her 
/ 
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then pr~sent boundaries. and abstain from dividtng China up into eolo-
/ 
nial s~pies. In later years, .American policy makers vacillated in 
their support of this latter principle, and, at times, interpreted the 
Open Door to mean only equality of commercial opportunity, while at 
24 other times the territorial integrity of China. Generally. however, 
as :f.'ar as the United States wa.s conoerned, the Open Do~r meant equality 
of eollllleroial opportunity and the territorial integrity Qf China. 
That the United States appointed herself to be the guardian of 
Chinese unity and territorial integrity cannot be credited with pre-
venting the dismemberment of the Chinese &pire. -"The Boer War, the 
German Navy, the maneuverings of the host~le European coalitions, the 
Czar, the Kaiser, Declasse and Salisbury .. these were the factors and 
a.gents that aal.1,ed the halt, not the diplo:macy of Jolm Hay. 1125 Again 
and again, the balance of power in the Far East was preserved no thanks 
to American diplomacy, but rather by the very nations most in a position 
.. ---- - -. - -- ·r~ 
to ,threaten the t~~y.ous equilibrium. 
() 
The balance of power remained precarious in the face of Russian a.m.-
bitions to detach Manehuria and absorb Korea. When the Russo-Japanese 
War broke out j,n 19o4, American sympathies were extended to the 
Japanese, then thought to be the underdog. Roosevelt II ••• was especially 
anxious to preserve the balance of power in the Far East between Russia 
a,nd Japan, for if either should become dominant--he particularly 
distru.sted Russia--there was reason to believe that the Open Door 
24As early as l903, Hay reverted to his original interpretation of 
the Qpe:p Door, when he recognized the Russian seizure of Manchuria. 
25Griswold, P• 82--83. 
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would be closed.u26 Roosevelt, however, quickly repented of his early 
championship of the Japanese, for the Japanese astonished the President, 
and indeed the world, by their successes over the Russian troops. 
But the President, like most of the world, had not counted 
on such an ove?Whelxning defeat as that administered to the 
foroes of the Czar. He had looked to the temporary e:xha.us-
t.lon of Russia.; now he feared her total collaps.e. As the 
-----"-~lrbaolysmic outcome began to appear inevitable, the Presi-
i{_~ dent's stratagem underwent two progressive changes. From 
the mere elimination of Russia from Manchuria, he turned 
. to the re-establishment of the balance of power between 
Russia. and Japan, and from that to the prevention of fui,-
ther territorial expansion by the latter.27 
Thus, when the Japanese sought the good offices of the President 
in negotiating a peace treaty with the Russians, Roosevelt deterred 
Japan from imposing a heavy indemnity on Russia. and from annexing all of 
Sakhalin. In so doing, he incurred the hostility of the Japanese who 
felt cheated of the booties of war. "The Russo-Japanese War marked both 
the high-water inark of Japa.nese-.American friendship and a sharp turning 
· point in our relations. n28 Thereafter, the T;t"eaty of Portsmouth, the 
immigration policies of the United States, and the expansionistic 
yearnings of the Japanese were to 9ast a pall over .American-Japanese 
relationships. 
The Japan which emerged from the Russo-Japanese War was a power 
with which any nation, concerned with the Far Eastern balance of power, 
had to reckon. The United States was determirled to preserve her inter-
ests in the Philippine Islands and found it necessary to secure 
26rhomas A. Baile~, .A Di::elomatic History of the .American People 
(New York, 1946), p. 566.- - -
27Griswold, P• 104-105. 
28Edwin o. Reisehauer, The United States and. Ja;en (Cambridget 
196.5), P• 20. 
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Japanese guarantees of her Philippine Islands possessions. In a seol'et 
executive aggreement of 1905, the United States sanctioned the Japanese 
takeover of Korea, and in return the Japanese promised to respect United 
States interests in the Philippines. Again, in 1908, it see:ms that the 
United States a.greed not to interfere with Japanese designs on Manchuria., 
in return for Japanese respect £or the Philippines.29 It seems then 
that the United States had to trade recognition of Japanese ambitions 
in the Orient for Japanese promises to respect United States sovereignty 
in the Ph~ppine Islands. 
Dllring the Taft .Administration, another method of preserving United 
States interests in Asia was underwritten. Efforts were made to increase 
the OODll!lercia.l and investment interests of the United States in China, 
on the asswnption that this would lead to a greater voice for the United 
States in Asian affairs. Ta.ft demanded that Americans be allowed equal 
investment opportunities in China. Bu.t American capital shunned China., 
and the unhappy results of the Taft policies were to solidify Russian-
Japanese relations and to incu:- .the hostility of the great powers. 
World War I upset the Asian balance of power. Japan, quick to take 
advantage of the preoccupation of Great ~tain and France with European 
affairs, sought to reduce China to the status of a Japanese protectorate. 
After seizing Shantung, Japan presented China. with the Twenty-One 
Demands, designed to establish Japanese economic and political supre-
macy within China. China was powerless to resist. The United States 
insisted on some modifications in the original Demands, but by then, 
wa.s so involved herself in European Affairs, that she was not in a 
29 Bemis, P• 490. 
position to defend China. Upon the Chine~e acceptanee of the Demands, 
the United. States issued a st.atement of nonrecognition of any agreement 
~iring United States rights in China., .the territorial integrity of 
C:qina, or the Open Door.3° The most that the United States would con-
o~e to Japan was :recognition that "Japan has special inte;r:oests in 
c~. partiow.arly 1n the part to which her possessions are contig-
31 · uous." At the same tiln.e, the United States atte:rnpted. to rest:r-ain 
~apa.ll.ese ambitions in the Orient. She insisted that Japanese capital 
work only through the new .four power consortiUlll., established in 1917. 
She refused to sanction Japanese DQ.litary intervention in Siberia. un ... 
_less it was to be an allied venture.which would include American troops. 
Japan, in spite.of her ambition to ~e over Siberia and northern 
Manchuria., had to acquiesce and at the close of World War I, United 
States forces entered Siberia along with the Japanese. She insisted 
that Sha.ntung be restored. to China, and, finally, that the principle of 
the Open Door be codified in treaty form. 
At the Peace Conference of. Versailles, "the United States fought 
32 a losing battle to defend China from the eno:roa.ohments of Japan." 
The United States had. to yield to Japan on almost all count~, rather 
than see Japan leave the peace conference. 
The calling of the Washington Conferences of 1921-1922111&rked. the 
United States response to the Japanese expansion of the War years. The 
TJnited States had survived World War I as the foremost naval poWE3r of 
JOGriswoµi, P• 19.5. 
31Ib1d., P• 216. 
32Ibid., p. 239. 
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the world. Unwilling to aqoept the ooijts ot a naval ar.maments raoe. 
convinoed that armaments led to war, and ,eeking to restrain Japan in 
the Far East, the United Stat~s deoi,ded to limit her own naval armaments 
-.nd to leave Japan essentially unQhallenged in the Far :s&st. in return 
tor Japanese promises of good will and adherence to a treaty codifying 
the Open Door. 
Three doouments came out o:r the Was~ngton Naval Conferences: the 
Four, Five. and Nine Power Treaties. In return for Japanese naval 
supremacy in the Pacific. Japan pledged to respect the integrity of the 
Philippines and to respect the administrative unity and territorial in-
tegrity of China. For the :first time the principle 0.f the Open Door 
.had been elevated from the level of moral commitment to that of formal 
international law. Yet, ~ the final analysis, there were no means 
provided for in these treaties for the enforcement of the treaty pro-
visions, and thus the Open Door continued to rest on the good will of 
·. nations and their sense of obligation und.er international law. By the 
Treaties of Washington, 
.. ,-- .· 
••• no power gained or lost much••• save in the nef6ui9us 
categories of ult::ima.te goals and logical consequences. 
They were primarily a recognition of existing, if brutal 
faQts, a consolidation ot the status guo. By them, the 
Pacific suffered. no peaceful change; it was only par-
tially frozen. 'the same was true of China. .Adnlitting 
these lilld.tations, 1;,he treaties constituted the. most 
dynamic and the most comprehensive attempt on the part of 
the United. States to uphold the terr~torial integrity of 
China and all that it believed to depend on it; to lllake 
the Open Door in China an enduring principle of inter-
national law; to obtain security for its Philipp~C.:fios.5-- -- """ 
tage to fortune, and to confine within barriers manu--.... ---
factur,~ in Washington the hungry expansionism of 
Japan. 
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For a time, the Washington Treaties seemed to stabilize the Far 
Eastern balance of power, and led to improved American-Japanese rela.-
tions. However, by 19~9. the balance of power was once a.gain threatened 
by the undeclared war between China and Japan. Diploma.tic pressures by 
the United States tailed to restoz,e the situation. When Japan overran 
Southern Manchuria. and establisheq the puppet state or Manchuckuo, the 
United states put ferth the nc;>w-tl;UllOus at.•o~",,D9-.-ct;r~e of Nonreoogn1 ... 
~~:;~---.- -i\-'!'-·-,· ,s: ... ;.::.z.::- ~:ffe""'J+ie't>; ..... :],~""~-~:r:.:~~~]l".\fi{~,i01,,~ 
.~_£).,,-Allci joined with the League of Nations in an investigation of the 
Ja~ese aggression. Diplomatic caveats were no lQnger sufficient to 
to,J ~-:::~~~,,.~~ ~~?~'"~: .. :er, however, and the United States was un-
1-r,-t;'CM'-e' willfug to adopt more st,~ent mea$Ures •. Thus, the 19.30 1s marked the 
'~ . brea.kdo~ of the balance of power in Asia. 
In 19.37, Japan.attacked Peld.ng. At first, the United States 
ottered only verbal recrinJinatiotis against Ja.p9.n. At the Brussels 
Conference of the same year, the United States opposed employing coer-
cive measures against Japan. However, Roosevelt d:,.d abstain 1'?'9111 in-
voking the Neutra.U,ty Resolution, thereby aiding China, by allowing arms 
shipments to China via Hong Kong. With the signing of the German-
Japanese Nonaggression Pact, the United States attitude tow~rd Japan be-
gan to ~en. A moral embargo was ;plac:,ed on arms $11,ipments to Japan, 
and late in 1940, such shipments were prohibited by la.w. China. was 
given add.iti,onal financial aid. When the American oommereial treaty 
with Japan expired, the United States did not renew it, and by July, 
1941, all trade with Japan had ceased and Japanese assets ;i.n the United 
States had been frozen. 
Until 1941, then, United States forej,.gn policy in the Far East 
relied priJnarily on diplomatic instruments. Its underl.¥1ng assumptions 
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were that support of the underdog in Asia would best protect .American 
interests there. That the balance of power had to be preserved in Ea.st 
Asia WAS accepted a.s the best way of preserv.tng United States strategic 
and commercial interests in the Far Ea.st. 
World War II Policies of the United States 
American entrance into World War II :marked the first sign1,fieant 
occasion when the United States was willing to defend its Asian inter-
ests militarily. One major consideration dictated American policies 
toward the Far East during the War: that the balance of power must be 
restored at the end of the War, so that once again the United States 
would be able to play a somewhat passive role in Asian affairs. =!£=-~ 
~--.!~~~1!:£~~~~~=~!l~=,,.{!:a~J,1fJtj~.,,~-~=c!~~§;l;~4,; but a Japanese military de-
feat would not guarantee that Japan would never again rear an aggres-
sive bead •. Thus, along with Japanese military defeat must go the 
destruction of the Japanese military ma.ehine--the dest~etion of the 
Japanese capacity to wage war, not merely then, but for the future as 
well. Japan, for United States policy makers, had to be demilitarized 
and demobilized, reduced to a second or third rate power in the Far 
East. 
China, once the War was over, was expected to serve as a ~ardian of 
United States interests in the Far East, and as the protector of the 
peace. All of the United States wartime policies were predicated on 
two assumptions: that China would be friendly to the United States and 
that Japan would be weak and demilitarized. "The United States was 
grooJJli,ng China to become a great power that would not only be able to 
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defend itself and its own existence, l:ru.t to assert a decisive influence 
in the Orient in support of the Un~t~d Nations. 1134 
However, China was beset 9y1 oivil war, incapable of defending her-
" ,.,,,-~,~::;_~------ // '-1 
self, let alone 8.l.\V ari~ici)>ated Asian peace. For United States policies 
in Asia to be realized, China would have to be strengthened and unified; 
China, in fact, had to enter the big power club. United States poli-
oies toward China during the War attempte1L:~..9--~.t~eng;th~Ji.C~a. Even 
prior to the entry of the United States into the War, a military lllis-
sion was sent to China, along with an air force :mission, to aid in the 
'7 
training of Chinese pilots. One and ~~ half-billion dollars, in mili..: · c"1 · 
tary and economic aid, was given to China during Wo;rld War rr.35 
General Stilwell and later Genex-al Wedemeye;t" were sent to China to try 
to modernize the Chinese arnzy- and to get the Chinese to fight Japan. 
Time and again, in diplomatic summit meetings, China was treated as if 
she were, in fact, a great power. The United States did all she could 
to promote this image. In January, 1943, a new t;t"eaty was signed be-
~~--=.,,,=~ .. ,,-"'-"'"'"""""-·~-------,-"-·""'·,.,·-e.~,.,.~--,--~.,c;.;..· 
tween the United States and China, by which the United States relin-
quished all rights of extraterritoriality in China. At the Cairo 
Conference, China was pro:mised the return of Formosa, Manchuria, and 
the Pesoadores Islands. The United States insisted that China be given 
a permanent seat on the anticipated Security Council as one of the big 
powers. Although at Yalta, Roosevelt made some concessions to the 
Russians in res:pect to Manchuria, he succeeded in obtaining a Russian 
pro:mise to support the Nationalist Government in China and Chinese 
34 . 
Sare, p. 27 •. 
35Fairbank, p. 260. 
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territorial integrity. 
However, the United States recognized that fqr China to take its 
place as a great power, she would first have to be united. Throughout 
the War, the United States then operated on the assUlllption that the 
Civil War between the Kuomintang and the CJlj.nese Communists could be 
settled and the United States tried to do just that. As early as 
August, 1944, General Patrick J. Hurley was sent to China as Roosevelt's 
personal representative. His task was to work out a political solution 
for China. At the close of the War, General Marshall was sent to China 
to try to bring about a political settlement between the K~omintang and 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
Thus, by the end of World War II, the United States had co:mmj,tted 
~-,-·· ,....c=<:;.JWOC..~,;ir,;:;;;;::;:::~::;•c:;i,?_,,., _.., ·-,sr.,i;s-·.y, >a;!;,. •ss· .... -···.·: __ :,::;_,\-~:::::s'"·•,-·.=,.,-C--~,-h.,,< :t:, .. e~~-,-h·,-· _ .;:,.~,--•.'.:;(a,-,,,,.·····.,.'-<·<~---- ,.'>_;;c·"z o .•. , .•.. .,,.:,c•,.C~-,::,"•~:.:'..""·-,_",:.' •o,2•;'-,--·--~;s,• ... " 
~elfto .thEt_r.~~tabliSfll":E;:l'l~ .. ~~~,11 ... ~+.l>\llC!!:L~f ,Po~el' ~ ~h~,.;Fai:,1e-6:~~.;. 
, a ~~.§J.1qe=.ot"':r;iqw~r,j:,~:!:, }'!91.lld d.epe?J,g,:t).eay;}J.y on. Clg.na. Unable to assess 
~--,...._.,...., · < -- - ,,.. •• ,~ ;"'""'"1 ,.1, -,,~. ·..->~~~~2: . .J:.,::,.:,_ : .. v-< 4¥?•1.,.-rn,.~.·::,~··~·;:,.:;.:c.~- · '---· --~~~ .. , .,_--- .. ~.--.- .... _ 
the seriousness of the Ch:i,nese situation, J2h~0 J.rB~l,:L§~!-,~c::i&_):>A>;?!;:,q_!~s 
!!}9:J..~~Ear~;Eas,~~;n,;pa,J:icy . 9A~.~v tlnii'.t~s ... 'ffi~:::~~~1:>:L13. g~nac, :t::rJ.~p(i_~¥ 2 ~;"tih,e 
~~<Lpta ~eJ3., ... ~, apd ... wi3=1:iA~t .. tQ p.~:r~,.°aj..th_ h!9r..t.9 . .Rr~~~rv~ .. !-E~=l)a~~l'l:~~A•~_f 
~pg~r~ 
The traditional Far Eastern policies of the United States thus 
relied on others to preserve the balance of power. China was a dominant 
consideration in these policies, first as the nation whose independenoe 
was essential to the balance of power, later, following World War II, 
as a nation significant t<;> the preservation of the balance of power. 
Were China to fail to realize United States hopes, the entire Far 
Eastern policy of the United States would be in jeopardy and the United 
States would be forced either to sacrifice he:r Asian interests or to 
develop a new strategy for their defense. This, in fact, is what 
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happened at the end of World War II. 
CHAPTER III 
INDOCHlNA: 1940-19.50 AND THE 
FAR EASTERN SITUATION 
Traditional foreign policies of the United States ignored. for the 
111ost pa.rt, Sol,ltbeast Asia. Up until World War II,. the involvement of 
the United States in SQutheast Asia, with the exception of~ 
Philippine Islands, was minimal; one searohes in vain the literature on 
American Fa:r Eastern policies tor any detailed di~oussion on United 
States po11cie$ toward this region •. Since most of So"Q.theast Asia. was -- . 
underoolonial dominion, the United States seel11$ to have regarded this 
area as a political extenision of Eu.rope and as "neutralrl as tar as the -r-~_., 
Far Eastern balance of pQWer was concerned. Until World War II, United Jt. 
. P\ · - - - - - - ---··· --· __ ~- - .-- ".'-: .":ti 1 '1 w, 
States · policies seem to have been pre,ic,'!-ed, on the as~tion. that _ )-~\ lJ~,lt~°hcQ,. 
-...:._./ 
SoutMast .A,sia, including I;ndoohina, could in no way a.£.feot the Far ~-~.t,Y~",:.: 
E&$tern balance of power, beca-g,1:Je of the_stability imposed on this area 
by tb,e ~ropean powers • 
. In this ohapte:r, the st~tus of Indoohinal during the Second World 
W~, along wit.h: United States policies toward Indochina during this 
period, will be di$ol,lssed. In addition, the internal situation in 
Ind.ochi.na subsequent to Worl,d War II will be described and analyzed, as 
lindoohina incl.udes Tonkin, Ann~, and Cochin China, whioh together 
. make up Vietnam.; Cambodia, and Laos. Most o! the Nationalist .ferment 
existed in Vietnam and most.· o.f the fighting during the Indochinese War 
was in and over Vietnam. Still, the War is. generally referred to as the 




well as United States policies toward Indochina prior to and imJnediately 
after the outbreak of the Indochinese War. It will be suggested that 
the immediate response of the United States to the Indoch~nese War was 
one of reiative disinterest, and that the United Sta:lttJLJiJ.~tJag,t=q~,2,,~~!,m 
vitally concerned with Indochina until after the defeat of the 
~==---::'.""~"C<".-'""'"'"P"'-.'.,."":>;:".:,t"'<>.'.)>..=-""'~""s-:'<".:;.:..-..,,,~,.~~-,,;..,.,s~..o;::..cc,,:..-:C.·~"'"':.-:t.;>~;._;..:,:AS,;,::a..,:~~;;,;-_'.,;,;:;""'"~"~;:;,.__,.,.,c;,us,:.,J,:.~...::;,:,;:;,..';:.;h;·.;1-~11;::;,,,.c-,-:v.:...:~,,_;~_;.-c;~;c-.;:,·~::fi".<!'i,:,-3~G)rfa'.ci-';;':..".;;~:,';;;9i, 
Nationalists in China and the o-qt~;i:_-e~,,Q;f' :we..r in Korea.. In order to 
~~~..:.;;·1?<,;£.,r;.;,,?P"''NV",.fi>'il_;,,,,,,. .• ,~·,J;;;-t,',m:X'.'l G.-r~{J°fy3lJ> ... : -,'l!(J..~v:·.~.s-~•H ·:M- f. ~-~,pal;;_:l ·JL/.-\,«·"'~·--·-"'·> .. <'4,·_,,µc\,y-
understand this shift in .American policies toward Indochina, it is 
. neoess~;,!,,.~,e.",!:~~ou~1t .... ie:r,;~t:l;r,,~,h~"'!!~Et!~!2~ .. ~Ml,wth~,, .. F~;:,,,:§~~!"~:t"tb:.!,~.,,~E.d 
of w~~l'!~! ... ,!±.! ... !!:~, .. e~£~~.t ... o;t,;t;.hecChiI}.es:e. ,l'Je..t49r,.~lista,.,,.J~.nci the re-
evaluation of U~ted States Far Ea.stern policies .which resulted from 
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the e~tablishment of the People's Republic of Ch:ina. and the commence-
. ment of the Korean War. 
The Wartime Status of Indochina 
On the eve of World War II, Japan was making plans tor the conquest 
of Indochina. and, subsequently, of all of Southeast Asia., as pa.rt of her 
dream of a Japanese "Co-Prosperity Sphere for Asia." Taking full advan-
tage of the French defeat by the Germans, the Japanese. on June 19, 1940, 
presented. the French Governor.-General of Indochina., Georges Catroux, 
with a.n ultimatum demanding the closing of·the·Indochinese frontiers, 
to prevent the export of war materials to China, and the establishment 
of a. Japanese oontrol commission to insure compliance with the order. 
Catroux complied, only to be dismissed by t4e Pita.in Government, and 
replaced by Jean Decoux. The French, however, had no alternative but 
to accede to Japanese demands and when, j,.n August, 1940, Japan dem.a.nded 
the right of transit through Indochina and the use of several airfields, 
Decoux was also co~pelled to bow to the ultimatum. It was agreed that 
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Haiphong would serve as a port of transit for the Japanese .Army- and that 
air bases in Tonkin would be turned over to the Japanese. In spite of 
this, Japan invaded Indochina 1n July, 1941, and for the rexnainder of 
the War, used Indoch:\na as a base for Japanese military operations 
against China.2 
Until Mareh of 1945, the Frenoh, represented by Jean Decoux, were 
allowed to retain nominal eontrol over Indochina, but, 1n fact, were 
only puppets serving at the pleasure of the Japanese. The Frenob,t~em-
...,~....:...:.. •. ,,._, •-s'.:"1 ..:'s-'0:.'L'_,.'•'.".~--.. ••,••:"'• 
~,~ .•. ,.~!~,~:r:ed, ... !~ ~t:l:.!,_.~.PE9J~;~~oll. .. to,,the~.,Jp.pan:~J~,,._J~~~,,,,Nh:1-nQ.ig,e,p911s, 
~~te~~~~cc.,~~~~g_,_""!~~,.f~~~A-,.'",)}Dc},a;:,. tl),~ •. l~~!1~.~B,.£t,,Jl~biux~ This 
I group, known as the Vietminh, 3 united Vietnamese :nationalists and 
coDlllltUlists in opposition to Japan and Vichy. It aided the Allies by 
conducting intelligence work, and, with aid given through the Office of 
Strategic Services in 1944, initi.a.ted guerrilla warfare against the 
Japanese. Its long range goals, however, were independ.ence and state-
hood fer Vietnam.4 
Toward tlle end of the War, Japan ousted the French from nominal 
eontrol and allowed the establishment of native governments in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam, hoping these governments would be more sympathetic 
to her after the War than the French. Annam, Tonkin, and Coc;hin China 
were united in the ind.ep;tndent state of Vtetnam, under the leader1,(bip 
of Bao Dai, fol'l1!er emperor of Annam. In Cambodia and Lao$ native rulers 
were fl,lso permitted to proclaim their independence. 
2E:11en J. Ha.llllner, The Struggle for Indochina. (Stanford, 19.54), 
P• 95. -- -
.3The League for Independence for Vietnam, formed May 1, 1941. 
4 Ibid. t p. 100. 
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Th,e Japanese occupation of Indochina failed to impose a Japanese 
·bx'al'ld. of colonialism on the Indochinese, bc.t it bad very significant 
consequences. Its net effect was to discredit further~ ~eady de-
tested French colonial administration and to stlmulate the Indochinese 
desire for independence. That French rule was without any substantial 
benefit was proven to the Indoolrl,nese by the inability of France to pro-
. te.ot Indochina from .external aggression. That Asian peoples were cap-
able ot sel:f'-government was pl'Oven to the Indo~ese by the Japanese 
successes against the "Westerners". "Japan's occupation of Southeast 
Asia during the Paeif:i,e War faile4 insofar as it sough,t to substitute 
one imperialism for another, bu.tit was success.t'ul in stimulating Asian 
nationalist movements and Asian self-confidence. 11.5 The close of the 
War saw the Indochinese seeking recognition from the rest of the world 
ot their right to independence. 
Indochina at the Close of World War II 
At the close of World War II, Indochina. was in a state of nation-
alist ferme:t:it• The Vietmµw. had been developing an organization through ... 
out the oountry$1Q.e and were oapitalizing on the antipathy felt by the 
pe.ople toward both the French and the Japanese. S~ortJ.y . after the news 
of tbre Japanese defeat, the Vietminh gained control of the northern 
part of Tonkin, moved. in around Hanoi, and sponsored a general uprising 
which, in August, 194.5, led to the al:;xiication of Bao Dai. A provisional 
government, controlled by the Vietminh, was establisp.ed with Ho Chi Minh 
as leader and Bao Dai as Vice-President. In September, 194.5, the 
.5virginia Thompson and Richard Adlo!f, Empire's~~ Southeast 
Asia (New York, 1949), p. 8. -- . 
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independent Democratic Republic ot Vietnam was proc4imed •. /The Vietminh 
were bent on securing independence for all of Vietnam, and having al-
ready obtained de facto control of ~rt of the area, hoped that by pre-
·senting a united front to the Allies, they would be allowed to retain 
their independence •. Bit the population was split into warring factions, 
a.n4 especially in the south, the control of the Vietminh was shaky. 
Most importantly, the Vietminh did ;not anticipate the determ.na.tion of 
the Frenc:;h to reassert sovereignty and the unwillingness of the Allies, 
espeoially the United States, to support the independence of Vietnam. 
The French quite early laid t~ foundations for a reassertion of 
their daminton. In ijarch, 1945, the French announced plans for the 
establisb,ment of an Indochinese Federation, to consist of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia; the Fed,eration was ta be allowed some autonoDzy" within the 
projected French Union. France completely rejected the concept of an 
:1,nternationa.l trusteeship for Indochina.6 To the French, national 
pride plu3 the preservation of the Frenoh Empire preoludec;i any eonsid-
. eration of an Indochina independent of french control. The plans of 
the French fell far short of the desil"SS of the Vietminh. 
The end of World War II saw the Chinese march into northern Indo~ 
· Qhina ta receive the Japanese surrender, while the British ocCllpied the 
southern ha+f. No sooner had the British occupied southern Indochina,· 
than they ousted the Vietnam.ese administrator~ from control of Saigon 
and turned the city ove::r;- to the French. Throughout their 00C11pation, 
the BJ-itish sym~thized with the French and did what they could to a.id 
them. 
6Russell H. Fifield, 1h,!. Diploma.ay 2'l. Southeast Asia.: 1945-1258 
(New York, 1958), p • .38. · · 
In the riorth, the situation was somewhat different. There the 
Vietminh were firmly in control of the political and administrative 
apparatus. The Chinese were unsympathetic to the French desires and 
allowed the Vietnamese to retain control of the countryside. So long 
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as the Chinese refused to allow the French to ooeupy northern Indochina 
and SQ long as the Vietminh retained control over the administrative 
apparatus, the likelihood of a reassertion of French sovereignty was 
slilll. Thu.s, for a time it appeared as it' an :independent state in Viet-
nam ?IQ.ght be allowed to exist. 
The Chinese, however, were more interested in us~g Indoehina. as a 
bargaining weapon vis a vis the Frenoh than they were in promoting the 
independence of·Indoohina. In February, 1946, China agreed to withdraw 
all of her troops from Indoehina. In return, France renounced rights 
of extraterritorial:;i.ty in China, as well as other privileges. She 
agreed to exempt Chinese ~rohandise shipped over the Haiphong-Kunming 
Railroad from customs ®ties, and to set up a f'ree zone for Chinese 
goods at Haipheng, .. as· well as to relinquisb railroad ownership rights 
iP. Cld.na,_and to guarantee the existµig pQsition of Chinese nationals 
i~ Indochina.? 
Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh had little option then bu.t to seeure 
the best deal they could from the French. With the Chinese gone, there 
· was · little to. stand in the way of a forceful. French reconquest of the 
north. In addition, there existed the danger that the French would 
sponsor a rival nationalist group and thereby deprive the Vietminh of 
the right to act as sole representative of the Vietnamese in bargaining 
?Hammel;', p. 147. 
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with the lil'ench. Thus, on March 6, 1946, Bo Chi Minh and Sa:1,nteny, the 
French Representative in Indochina, signed a prel:1mina.ry agreement by 
which the French recogniied the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as "a 
free .1tate :with its own government, parl;Lament, army, and finances, 
forming part of the Indochinese Federation and. the French Union. 118 The 
French prollli.sed to hold a referendum to determine whether or not Coohin 
China should be included. al,ong with Annam and Tonkin. In return, the 
Vietminh ag:reed to allow the return of the French Army- to Tonkin and 
Annam, and they permitted troop nU!llbers not to exceed 25,000, with 
the stipulation that by 19.52, the French were to withdraw all troops 
except those stationed at a few specified bases. 
Neither side acted in good.faith in respect to this agreement, al-
though the French were partiC1,1larly at fault. Ho Chi Minh was invited 
to Paris to draw up some final agre·ements, ~ t once there, wa.s not even 
received by the hi.gh French ;p~litio~ _officials. Meanwhile, with Ho 
an4. bis principle li~tenants out of the country, the French arbitrarily 
established the "autonomous republic" of Cochin China, without holding 
the prQmised re:f'erend:wu. 9. This was in ele,i!.r violation of the prelimi-
naey agreement. In Paris, the negotiations were unsuccessful, and Ho 
Chi Minh returned to Hanoi. Conditions continued, to deteriorate, while 
the political disoussions were stale!D&ted. ·rn December, 1946, the 
French, by way of reprisal against Vietnamese uncooperativeness, bombed 
civilians in the port of Haiphong, whereupon the VietlQinh retaliated 
by launching an attack against the French in Hanoi. Tlle Indochinese 
8 
Ibid., p. 153. 
9Den1s ~n~r. The Last Confucian (New York, 1963), p. 34. 
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War had begun. 
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Frenoh concentrated not only 
on trying to destroy . the Vietminh, but also on finding a more cooper- · 
ative nationalist movement which would recognize French sovereignty 
over Indoohina. Convinced that a military victory was possible, the 
F~nch made no further attempts at negotiation with the Vietminh. Many 
rival nationalist groups eJd.sted in the south, and it was to these that 
. the French looked to find a counterweight to Ho Chi Minh. Bao Dai, 
former emperor of Annam, appeared to be a promising possibility, but 
Bao Dai was unwilling to acquiesce in comp:j.ete French control over 
Indochina, and demanded that the French negotiate an agreement with 
him at least as favorable as that earlier accorded to the Vietminh. By 
1948, the French had no choice but to accede to bis demands, for what 
they had thought would be only a mopping-up operation in northern Tonkin 
had developed into a full-scale guerrilla war :l.n Tonkin and Annam, and 
a campaign of terro1-'ism in the south. Thus, in June, 1948, an agree-
ment was signed by Bao Dai and the French according·. to which the French 
· recognized Vietnam, as an lfindependent state" within the French Union •. 
. . . ., 
after the signing of the Elysee Agreements between ~o Dai and President 
Auriol of France. The French were loathe to grant even this mu.ch 
autonomy to the Vietnamese, however, and it was not until January, 1950, 
. . .~ 
that the Frenoh AsseDJ.bly ratified the Elysee Accords. Soon, however, 
the mnehwere forced to conclude similar agreements with Laos and 
Cambodia. 
Bao Dai was somewhat of an opportunist and inspired little popular 
support among bis people, many of whom regarded him as a Frenoh puppet; 
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at the sa.m.e time, the Vietminh continued to grow in strength. Although 
the V~etminh had not the means to defeat the French Army, neither were 
the French able to destroy the Vietminh. By the end of 1949, French 
casualties in Indochina approximated 100,000. Rice exports had fallen 
from the pre ... world War II figure of one million tons to less than one 
hundred thousand tons.10 It was a war of attrition, a war which the 
Vietminh were more capable of continuj,ng indefinitely than were the 
French for whom the war constituted an ill•afforded drain of men and 
money. The French, however, were still unwilling to give Bao Dai 
enough independence to lend credence to the independence of Vietnam and 
to rally popular support around him as a true nationalist leader. Bao 
Dai, on M.s part. was content to reside at Dalat, far from the field of 
military operations. He did little to win popular ba.o~g for his 
government. 
The Vietminh, meanwhile, continued to improve their position. The 
success of Mao's forces in China led to some changes in Vietminh 
strategy and tactics which rendered them a greater threat to the French 
than they had been. Vietminh forces were sent to China for training and 
the Vietminh began to study the strategy which had proved so successful 
for the communists in China. Early in 1949, perhaps in accordance with 
Chinese advice, the Vietminh switched from purely guerrilla to mobile 
warfare and began to establish regular army divisions.11 In addition, 
the Vietminh and Mao Tse-tung reciprocated reicognition of one another's 
regimes and, in tTanuary, 1950, the Vietminh received recognition from 
lOib.d 
. \]. • t p. 37. 
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the Soviet Union. 
Wartime Attitudes ~t..the United States toward Indochina 
The United States first evinqed an interest in Indochina when the 
Japanese commenced the execution of their plans for an ''Asian co .. 
Prosperity Sphere." Were the Japanese to occupy Indochina, the United 
States feared they would use it as a base of operations against China, 
the rest of Southeast Asia, and possibly the Philippine Islands. The 
Japanese acquisition of the raw materials of Southeast Asia would dis-
rupt the balance of power in the Far East and might endanger American 
interests in the Philippines. The United States was vitally concerned. 
Throughout 1941, she cautioned Japan against operations in Indochina 
and, in November, let it be known that unless Japan withdrew her troops 
from Indochina there could be no basis for settlement between her and 
the United States.12 
Following the ent;r-y of the United States into the War, Roosevelt 
frequently expressed very definite opinions on the future status of 
Indochina. He was appalled at the way the French had adxni,nistered 
Indoehina and opposed any reassertion of French sovereignty at the end 
. of the War. Cordell Hull reports that Roosevelt had strong views on 
the need for Indochina to become independent at the end of the Waro13 
12m a letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston.Churchill, 
November 24, 1941, Roosevelt wrote, in part: "It is also proposed to 
offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposaloooWhich will 
contain an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from Southern 
French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in 
Northern Indochina. uand not send additional troops to Indochina .. u · 
Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R. His Personal Letters (New York, 1950), p. 1245 
and 1246. 
l.3Cordell Hull. ~ Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), p ... J.59,5. 
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When Roosevelt met w:tth Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo in l94J, he raised the 
subject of Indochina. Chiang alle~edly expresl!Jed no interest in incor-
·porating Indochina ~tQ China. When Roosevelt broached t:tie idea of an 
. international trusteeship for Indochina, Chiang was agreeable. 
Stettinius reports ·the conversation as follows: 
The President said that the country is worse ~ff than 
it was a hundred years ago. The white man's rule there 
is nothing tobe proud of. The President said that a 
trusteeship is the only practical solution. When the 
President asked Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek what he 
thought, the General replied tha.t ••• he thought a trustee-
ship would be an ideal arrangement.14 
Again, this tue <luring a private conversation with Stalin,Roosevelt 
raised the subject of the future status of Indoebina. Stalin also 
expressed opposition to restoring Indochina. to the old. French colonial 
rule, and reportedly favored the trusteeship idea.l.5 So great was 
Roosevelt*s opposition to. ·the re-establishment of French sovereignty 
in Incloohina that in March, 1944, he warned against the use of French 
troops for any military operations there, lest this provide the French 
with the opportunity needed to reassert theinselves.16 
The British rejeeted the.idea. of trusteeship for Indochina., per-
haps in fear that they too might be invited to surrender some of their· 
· ·. 17 . 
territories to international trusteeship. Roosevelt believed the 
British opposed trusteeship because of the implications it might have 
14 · . 
. Ed.ward R. Stettin:1,.us, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians. !h!, Yalta 
Conference (New York, 1949), p. 237. ------ · 
1-'united States Department of State, Fore;,gn Relations !?l_ !h! 
.United States. !h!, Conferences ~ Malta !!E. Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 
19.55). p. 770. 
16Ibid., P• 566. 
l7stettinius, p. 50. 
for British Burma and did not hesitate to express his views to the 
Bn.tish. Thus: 
I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly ••• that 
I had, for over a year, (ilxpressed the opinion that Indo-
china should not go back to France, but that it ehould be 
admi.n~tered by an international trusteeship ••• The only 
reason they seem to opP9se it is their fear for the eftect 
it would have on their own possessions and those of the 
Duteh ••• Ea.ch case, of course, must stand on its own feet, 
but the °',Se of Indochina is perfectly clear. France has 
milked it for over one hundred yea.x-s. The people Qf Indo-
china are entitled to something better than that.l~ 
However, by 1945, Roosevelt was finding it dif:t'icult to contend 
1With both the British and the French opposition. During a press con-
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ference, he reiterated his views on Indochina, but asserted that it was 
necessary to avoid too much talk on the subject, lest Allied unity be 
impaired.19 
It was not unt:U the closing year of the War that any decisions 
were ma.de as to who should receive the Japanese surrender in Indochina •. 
Although during most of the War, Indochina had been pa;-t of the Chinese 
Theater of Operations, at the Potsdam Conferences, it was decided to 
place the southern halt of Indochina under the jurisdiction of the 
Southeast Asian Co:m?Qand and the British. Whether this decision was 
motivated by any high level political considerations is difficult to 
ascertain; the decision seell3$ to have been taken on military grounds, 
but the United States could not have fajJ.ed to realize that once in 
Indochina, the British would do all in their power to aid the French 
to return. By the time this decision was ta.ken, however, Roosevelt was 
18aoosevelt, p. 1489. 
l9Samu.el I. Rosenman, ed., Ia!. Public Papers and Address of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, ~-~ (New York, 1950), p. 562. 
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dead and Truman does not seem to have shared his views as to the desir-
ability or ;feasibility of a trusteeship for Indochina. 
Truman makes no mention of Indochina during the closing year of 
· the War. except insofar as military operat.:l.ons were concerned~ 20 He 
was, perhaps. wil]J.ng to leave the question of trusteeship to the San 
Francisco Conference. His prilnary interest was that Americans in 
. . 
Indochina do nothing to prejudioe the political situation. 
Postwar Po;l.ioies of the United Sta....._s.t.waz.d Indochina: 194.5-1949 
United States policies toward Indochina immediately after the War 
were shrouded in ambiguities and were never very well defined. As pre-
viously mentioned, in the closing days of the Wart the United States 
had dropped her de:niand that a trusteeship system be established in 
Indoolrl,na. To what extent this idea had represented the thinking of the 
State Department and to what extent it was a personal project of 
Roosevelt's isdiffiQU.lt to ascertain. Secretary of State Hull earlier 
had expressed misgivings as to the feasibility of a trusteeship system,21 
and it may be that even Roosevelt would not have pursued the idea had 
he lived.· In any event. immediately after the WaT, the United States 
seemed comm:itteq. to a pQliey of "w~t and see''·· No serious attempt was 
made to influence the course of events in Indochina. Had th,e United 
States desired to influence the future status of Indochina, she could 
easily have secured a foothold ther~, by employing American troops in 
m . . 
No statements by Truman are to be found in his Memoirs, the 
Dep.µ-tment of State fulletin,. · or the Pllblic Papers of the Presidents, 
nor are any attributed to him. 
21HuJ.l~ p. 1.597. 
the Japanese surrender; however, no .Amer:i,.~ns participated in this 
surrender. Tram.an personally did not ma,ke any official reference to 
the future status of Indochina in J.945, anc;1. up until February, 1947, 
there were alJaost no offioial statements on Indochina from the United 
States government. 
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The only official statement of United States policy toward Indo-
Qhina in 1945 or 1946 expressed a determination to remain uninvolved. 
It was •tated that the United States would respect the legal authority 
of the Frenoh in Indochina, but would not "assist or participate in 
forceful measures for the imposition of control by the territoris,l 
sovereign." The United States was, however, willing to help settle the 
dispute between the indigenous population and the 11J,Other caqntry, if 
France sought .American a.id, and would coD'lDlit herself to the eventual 
independence of these oountries.22 Although.the United States felt 
bound to ;l"espect French rights in Indochina, she did not relish doing 
this and would not aid the Frenoh in re-establishing their prewar posi-
tion. If the French, however, would follow the example of the United 
States in the Philippines and work for the eventual independence of 
these peoples, the United States would then try to be of service. If 
not, she wished not to get involved. 
During 1945 and 1946, the United States did nothing to pressure 
the French intp allowing some measure of independence to the Indoohineseo 
Even after an agreement had been signed between the Vietminh and the 
French, "the United States Gover:nment made no serious attempt to persuade 
22Jobn v. ~arter, United States Department of State, Bulletin, 
XII (October 21, 1945), p. 646. . 
France to live up to its 1946 Agreement, with the Republic of Vietna.m. 1123 
Yet, the United States ha.d no desire for a. French return to Indochina.. 
In essence then, during the critical a.nd formative yea.rs when the sit~ 
ua.tion in Indochina wa.s still fluid, and the position of the parties 
to the conflict had not been polarized, the United States ma.de no effort 
to try to influence the course of events. 11It is a significant indi-
ca.tor of the American role during the first postwar years that one will 
search in vain among the many analyses of the problems of the area for 
a reference to American policy ••• 1124 
Thus, immediately after the Second ·world Wa.r, the United States 
lacked well-defined policies toward Indochina. On the one hand, she 
opposed colonialism, particularly in Indochina; on the other hand, she 
did not want to antagonize the French by pressing them to grant indep 
pendence to the Indochinese. In these early years the war in Indochina 
had only local significance and the United States was too concerned 
about European affairs to involve herself extensively in the Indochine~e 
question. 
By 1947, howeve;r:-, United States interests in Indochina. began to 
develop, even though no real policies are in evidence. In the fall of 
1947, William Bullitt was sent on a fact-;t'ind:i,.ng mission to the Far 
East. While there, he spoke with Bao Da.i, ex-emperor o;f .Annam. In a.n 
article published in~. Bullitt reports his impressions. 
Ho Chi Mj,nh, the Communist leader of the Anna.mite fight ;for 
independence, is followed by millions o:f' Anna.mites who 
23oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc 
in Southeast ~ (Washington:-15'. c., 1962), p. 51. - -
24Lawrence s. Finkelstein, American Foreign Polio¥~ Southeast 
~ (New York, 1950), P• 5o 
disagree with his political vi~ because he is the symbol 
of resistance to France••• Yet the worst disaster which 
could befall the French, the Annamj,,tes, and the civilized 
world would be for the French, in wearines~~ to surrender 
to Ho Chi Minh and his communist comrades.:; 
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Bullitt's report renected the dilemma of .American decision ma.leers at 
the time. The United Statei, recognized that within Indochina there 
exi.sted an indigenously supported war directed against French colonial.-
ism; and the United States was, in fact, sympa.tbetic to the desires of 
the Vietnamese for independence and wished that the French would im-
prove the position of the Vietnamese moderates by granting some real 
autonomy. Yet, the United States wae coming to view Ho Ch;i Minh as 
basically an agent of international oommu.nispi and to fear a commu.nist 
takeover of Vietnam. The overall deterioration in relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States resulted in a hardening of 
.American attitudes toward communism, Ho Chi Minh was viewed as a oomu.~ 
· nist rather than as a nationalist. This same deterioration in relations 
quickened the desire of the United States to maintain unity with her 
European a.Uies and to avoid giving offense to the French by pressing 
them on Vie~. 
In spite of her laok of oonorete policies towa~ Indochina during 
1947 and 1948, the United States was not completely detached from the 
struggle, because France ~sallowed to use lend~lease material left 
over from World War II in Indochina.26 The :f'ailu.re of the Marshall 
Mission to bring about a reconciliation between the Nationalists and 
1;,he Communists in China caused a growing apprehension in the United 
2.5William Bullitt, "The Saddest War," Life, Vol. XXIV (December 
29, 1947), PP• 64~5. --
26 · 
.Fj,nkelstein, p. 10. 
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States oonoerning all of Asia, including Indochina. United States poli-
oies, however, continued to v•oillate between granting support to the 
French, so··that a co.umm.nist take-over might be prevented, on the one 
hand, a?19- trying to exert press'Q.re on the French to grant some measure 
of autonomy to a moderate govermnent within Indochina, on the other. 
Early in 1949, in his Inaugural Address, Truman put forth what 
came to be known as the Point Four Program, which was meant to have some 
application to Southeast Asia, including Indochina. Truman called for 
a program of .!E!ct.~,W and ··=e£9J!,~$?_,_J!~J!;l,~;,:t_ap..Qg~~\C?,,,1c.~~r11~~1:~1RI?:~-.._,. 
~~ .. _,:, ¢:...X-io.~~~~~;,..,.-i:....~~--::-..... · • .:..:.;~~~-~ 
~ to strengthen them against communism. But the prerequisite 
of this p;i-ogram was the existence of stable governments in those under-
developed countries that were to receive aid, so that the assistance 
could be e,ffeotively utilized. In Indochina., there was of course no 
stable government and thus this program (which did not become law until 
J;une 5, 1950 anyway) could have had. little effect on the Indochinese 
situation. _The United States was, however, throughout the spx-ing and 
Sumtller of J.949, watching.developments very closely in Asia. On June 
. . , 
21, 1949, three months after the signing of the Elysee Agreements and 
the proolamation of the State of Vietnam, the United States issued a 
statement commenting favorably on the establishment of the Bao Dai 
· Government. 
The formation ~f the new unified State of Vietnam and the 
recent announcement by Bao Dai that the future constitution 
will be decided by the Vietnamese people are welcome develop-
ments which should serve to hasten the re .. establishment of 
peaoe in that oountry and the attainment of Vietnam's right-
ful plaae in the family of nations. The United States 
Government hopes that the agreements of Mareh 8 between 
President Auriol and Bao Dai, who is making sincere efforts 
to unite all truly nationalist elements in Vietnam, will 
form the ~sis for the pro~essive realization o27the 
legitiJIJate aspirations of the Vietnamese people. 
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Perhaps the key to this statement is th.e "hope" expressed by the United 
States that Bao Pai would be able to rally his oo'Qlltry around him, and 
that the Frenoh would grant to him genuine autonolJ.W• Still, the United 
States did not try to aotively involve herself in the politios of Viet-. 
~am, nQr offer any aid to the new state or to the Frenoh. She wanted, 
again, to wait and see if Bao J)ai would prove to be an effeotive leader. 
Tbus,.even after the outbreak of the Indochinese War, although the 
Vnited States displayed an inorea1;1ed interest in the Indochinese sit-
uation, she neither tried to push the French to foster a real national-
ist counterpat't to Ho Chi Minh nor actively supported the French effort 
1n Vietnam. .Although her concern with the situation increased, United 
States policies, up until the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists, re-
mained rather ill-defined. United States vital concerns lay elsewhere, 
and she wa.s evidently neither suf;t'iciently interested ip nor worried by 
the Indochinese situation. 
?he Re-evaluation of United States Far Eastern Policies 
The defeat of the Nationalists in China aa.used the United States 
to re-evaluate her entire Far Eastem policy, including her.policy 
toward Indo(ihina.. · For ''Nationalist China ts· collapse and the establish-
of a Colilm.Unist Government on the mainland in late 1949 bad even further 
weakened the Western position in Asia, for it had gravely shifted the 
27united States Department of State, Bulletin, XX (July 18, 1949), 
p. 75. 
\ 
debaole led, to a be1',ted attempt on.the part 0£ the United States to 
\ 
£ol'IIJQ.late a more precise .policy for Indochina. \ 
\ 
' \ . 
Throughout World War II, the United State$ had coi,lnted on a strong 
. I . 
govermnent in China, friendly to the United States• and: able to support 
,. ' ' \ 
the balance of power in Asia. The maj,ntenanee 0£ the F~r Eastern power ------------~---:-------- -- - --- -
~ilf~riUDJ. -~~;:Jt~?-~ been an Amerio~ goal, a.net· World War II 
' ' further convinced the United States that her own vital :µiterests de-
. . . I 
l!landed the re-establishment ot this balance of power,. .China was desig-
nated as a key nation ·1n this structure. Disturbed ~ civil war in 
China prevent her from perfol'llling her role, and £earful that the mu.tual 
animosity between the Communists and Nation,aiists would lead tq con-
flict, the United States sought, both during and a,!ter the War, to unify 
China by reconciling the Communists and the Nationalists through the 
establishment of a coalition goVE1rnment. Immediately after the War, 
General Marshall was sent to Asia fol" the e;x:press purposes of working 
out a political settlement for China. For a tinle, it appeared that he 
might succeed. He success£ull.y negotiated a tru.oe between the 
Nationalists and Communists and s_ot them to engage in political disaus-
·Sions. Bu.t each party to the conflict used the truce to its own advan-
tage and neither was ~eriousJ.y interested in compromise. By early 1947, 
Marshall was compelled to return. to the United States and to a.c1mi.t the 
failure of his mission; the Chinese Civii War entered its decisive 
stage. 
I, 
28John Spanier, .American Foreign Policy Since World !f!:I. II (New 
York, 1962), p. 71. 
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:With the breakdown of political discussions witllin China, the 
' ' ' 
United States devoted i~elf to supporting 8.llQ. strengthening the 
Nationalist Regime. Chiang Kai-shek was urged to make some long-needed· 
social reforms and then to try to gradually extend his control.through-
out China. Approximately two 'billion dollars in grants and credits 
were ~nded to China. between V;...J Day and the summer of 1949.29 The 
~eriean_military na,ssion in China attempted to advise ·Chiang on the 
mili,tary strategy needed to win the war. But Chiang was unwilling or 
~ble to effect major reforms needed to win him popular support and 
he refused to follow the advice of the American military leaders. 
Meanwhile, by early 1949, the Nationalists had lQst 80 percent of the 
Ame:rican military equipment furnished to them during and after Wol"ld 
War II and it is estimated that 75 percent of this fell into communist 
hands)O The growing fear, within the United States, that a(d;~ey-~· 
. . , .. _~ -··--~~---_.... ... 
was illlminent led, in the summer and fall of 1949, to a re-examination. 
of the United States policies toward China. ln the course of this re-
' ' 
assessment, the United States came to the conclusion that further sup-
port· of the ._Nat:i,.qna.lists was futUe. 
;However, American Far Eastem polieies still demanded a Cbj,.na 
friendly to the United States.and willing to act with her to keep the 
balance of power. Thus, in the immediate months after the re-
establishment of the People's Republic of China, the re-examination.~£,. 
United States policies that was undertaken involved a readjustment of 
policies t~ward Chiang Kai-shek rather tha,.n · a departure from tr.aditional 
29united States Department of State, United States Relations )Tith 
China, Far Eastern Series (Wal3hington, 1949), p. J5. 
JOspanier. p. 83. 
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policies. The United States hoped that China, under Mao Tse-tung. 
might be somewhat friendly to her and a positive agent .in the preser-
vation of the balance of power. Acheson emphasized rather optimisti ... 
cally that Mao was a potential Tito, beoause Russian ambitions in 
Manchuria would alienate Mao from the Soviet Union. Acheson predicted 
t~t if Mao accepted a position of subservj,ence in relation to Russia, 
the Chine&!!e people, given time, would come to view him as a foreign. 
puppet and would rise against him. The thing for the United States to 
do then, .if she wished to retain the friendship of the Chinese people 
and continue to focus on China as the key nation in the Far Eastern 
balance of power, was to disengage herself from the Nationalists toward 
whom the Chine.se had already displa~ their antipathy. To do just 
this, the.United States issued·a statement that she·would no longer aid 
the Nationalists with money or equipment 4'Jld that .Axnerican forces would 
not be used to defend. Form.osa.31 The United States had eve1;'Y expec-
tation that without American support, ForI11osa would quickly be taken 
over by the communists and that then, since there would be only one 
claimant to the government ot China, the United States could recognize 
the new regime. Th.us, even after the defeat of the Nationalists, the 
{Jnited Stat~s.oonti,nued to view China as the fulorum of the Far Eastern 
balanoe of power. 
As Ameriaa,n optimism in respect to the new Chinese regime began to 
fade, the entire Far Eastern policy~£ the United States, ineluding 
policies toward Indochina., underwent revision. Late in 1949, Phillip 
. . 
K. Jessup, United States ro,v-ing ambassador to the Far East, was sent 
31tJnited States Department of State, United States Relations with.· 
China, Far Eastern Series 30 (Washington .• 1949). · · · 
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to Southeast ~ia on a fa.ct-finding mission. Subsequently, he met with 
. American diploma.ts at Bangkok, where it was agreed that the United 
States ought to support the Bao Dai Government and the French in Indo-
china. Then in January, 1950, in a speech to the National Press Club, 
Acheson announced a new policy in respect to Asian underdeveloped 
countries, whereby the United Sui.tes would grant aid to those countries 
to secure them against internal subversion. He also outlined the de-
fense perimeter of the United States in the Far East. Acheson empha-
sized, 4owever, that certain conditions must be met within these 
countries if aid were to be effective. Indochina did not fulfi.l.1 these 
conditions nor was she included within the defense perimeter of the 
United States. 32 
The diplo?Qa.tic recognition by the Soviet Union of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam further convinced the United States that Ho Chi Minh 
was a communist agent. Almost immediately after the Soviet's recogni-
tion, the United States granted diploma.tie recognition to the Associated 
States of Indochina;33 and on the same day, Jessup was quoted as saying 
that the United States would regard an armed aggression against lndo-
ehina as a very serious matt~r.Y+ -Subsequently, The New York Times 
reported that American diploma.ts meeting with Jessup had agreed that 
the United States ought to commit military and diplomatic aid to Indo-
china, if the people would fight communism.35 Then, on Febru~ry 25, 
32Dean Acheson, United States Department of State, Bulletin, XXI 
(January, 1950), p. 291 .... 292. 
33Ibid., February 20, 1950, p. 294-295. 
34The New York Times, february 7, 1950, po 140 -----
35Ibid., February 16, 3f50, P• 12. 
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the United States announced that it was raising its consulate in Saigon 
to a legation and that United States warships would visit Saigon in the 
near future as a gesture of friendship.J6 Early ;in March, a mission 
headed by R • .Allen Griffin arrived in Saigon to consider the possibility 
of economic aid to Indochina. and the rest of Southeast Asia. On April 1, 
it was reported that President Truman had approved in·principle a commit-
ment of military aid to Indochina,37 and in May, the Griffin Commission 
proposed that tweri.ty-three million dolla;rs in economic aid and fifteen 
llliUion dollars in tnilitary .a.id be granted toindoohina.38 
It is surprising, however, that as late as Nay, 1950, although 
military and economic aid had been decided upon and the funds were 
available under already allocated funds to be used in the general area 
of China, nothing had been sent to Indochina. This seezns particularly 
surprising in view of the haste with which the United States had 
granted diplomatic recogni ti.on and the favorable reports of both the , , 
(') \I 
Jessup and Griffin Missions. The United States seems to have been....,,,." 
~J!l,~~gJ ... ~~~~!he mi~ht ha.ire beE3n.\~wg,i:.~ e,xert pres~1:1re on the 
· French to grant more au tono:my to the Vietnamese. The ~ York Times 
reported on March 10 that "in the highest French official circles 
apprehension was expressed that the United $tates may insist upon a 
greater measure of independence for Bao Dai's regime by giving it 
greater authority. 1139 Again on March 12, it was reported that the 
36Ib"d i ., February 26, p. 36. 
37Ibid., April 1, p. 1 • 
.38Finkelstein, p. 44. 
39The ~ York Times, March 10, 1950, p. 13. 
------ , 
Frenoh were worried tha.t the United States will make the complete inde-
pendence of Vietnam a condition for aid.40 
Finally, in Paris at a meeting of the Big Three, Acheson announced 
formally that the United States ha,d. decided to graz;i.t military and eco-
nomic aid to France and the Associated States "to restore security and 
develop genuine nationa.J.ism.n41 Later in the month, the Saigon 
Legation announced the establishment of an Economic Cooperative 
Administration to develop a program of economic aid.42 Robert Blum, 
director of the ECA, announced in Paris on May JO that the first install-
ment of economic aid would be twenty-three million five hundred thou-
sand dollars to be spent by June 29, 19.51.43 On June 11, the first 
shipment of United States arms aid was shipped to Indochina. 
Thus, shortly after the defeat of the Chinese Nationa.lists, the 
United States made the decision to aid France in Indochina. The 
choice for ~erican policy makers at this time seemed to be either 
support for Bao Da.i, regarded as somewhat of a French puppet, or com-
(J,t-. _.-j:>:l:Ef-te··ab~tion fro:m a conflict which might well result in another ,._ _ __.".., - ' 
co:mmunist takeover. The United States felt bound, in the face of the 
growing spread of oownunism to adopt the fi~st course of action. Still, 
she Jid not like aiding in what appeared to be the reim.position of 
colonialism in Indochina., and stalled in her actual delivery of aid to 
the French, in the hope of compelling the French to grant more 
40ibid., Ma.rah 12, 1950, P• 4,. 
41To"d M .. 9 1 1 ., ~ , p •• 
42Toid., May 26, P• 1. 
43The New York Times, May 31, 1950, p. 11. 
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concession$ to the Vietnamese. 
The outbreak of the Korean War sent the United States in search of 
a new overall policy toward the Far Ea.st, a search which had actually 
been underway since 1949; it forced the United States to develop a com-
prehensive.policy for Inclochina., rather than merely to rely on ad hoe 
responses to new developments. Korea triggered the conviction, long-
growing in .American minds, that the United States could not afford to 
write off Indochina and that a new strategy for Asia would have to be 
developed. Thus, the combined effects of the fall of China and the 
outbreak of the Korean War on the Far Eastern balance of power led the 
United States in search of a new means for balancing power in Asia. 
Indochina. became one place where the United States sought.to influence 
events so as to stabilize the Far Ea.stern balance of power. 
CHAPTER IV 
UNITED STATES POLICIES TOWARD 
, INDOCHINA: 1950 ... 19.54 
. j I' -E:Jv._ rO """"C i ('-' h ~ 
a: . -1tV,/ (.A>~l · ~~ f'l_.,,.,,Hl""~ l~~ ... 
o , 11. t • 
,- I - -~r~H.v~ 
__...-........... ..-- ................. _.--~--- ~· . 
To United states decision )llllkers, the Korean War €~ed the ( ;;=~~ ~ 
deteriorating situat.~on in the Fq East. After WQrld War II, the \ ~ _k'*'· 1l _-'---e -: . ( ~.,.....,,. 
United States had co:r:i.centrated, primarily, on the problems of Europe, v;;.i .. 
and had relegated the Far East to a secondary position. The defeat of 
the KuoJQinta~ in China~ the Korean War awakened the United States 
to the serious prQblems of instability in Asia, and led to a growing 
concern with a possible cQmmunist tueover in that region. B;r June 
1950, the Asian situation had developed to the point of being extremely 
unfavorable to the interest~ of the United States. China was hostile 
and seemed bent on expanding her in:f'luenoe into some of the surrounding 
areas. North Korea. ~~-~!~~~~-~9~tl'!J~J>J'~~---:Y'Li,lJ.,,..a.t:t.empt,.,tQ_ .. t;1.Pi+Y.=~!~.-"~t ''"'~~ 1-,j.i••+-: 
of Korea under ool1ll1ll.UP-st rule. This invasion had the ta.cit ap;prova.l, · 
if not the overt sponsprshi~, of the Soviet U~on. Japan, economically 
undermined by World War II, the American occupation, and the poliey of 
. ft~\c(wvb 
reparations, wai unable to exert any great power influence on Asian 1,,ri t't"l 
events; and Indochina seemed to oe on the t\rer"@·~,of._suc(~ ... g to ·-Ho. Chi· ----
- ''- J ----.:......_ ,..,,,,.,:J-"~ 
:t1;1.nh' s communist movement, ~ere by opening ~e q.oor to ~,,~~•ilis-t-,.. h,,.;"-lo:::.. 
entry into all of Southeast Asia. 
During the Seeo:nd Wo:rld War, the United States had directed her 
energies to~rd restoring a balance o! power in the Far Ea,t; she had 
hoped that China, with. JUl,erican support, would be able to balance 
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Russian ambitions in the Far East and to a.at as a stabilizing influenoe. 
Nowt howeve:r, with ~=1:!!3~,-~9!.G,~lLiJ..J,,L..~:ru,"'..BP..E~J.l~\!gJ.t 
!&S extr~e~~'!:2_~~i~=·~~Jl!1!~,~.-"~~!!~,0~"'j~~~t~,..~~!~~9:,.~±;:ft.!,+2 .... 
~!J~r. e~tabJ.illaiPL ia,\~"J=>alan.Q~,,gf .. pp.we:r tb: .. ~._,!lni;l~~<;l ,,S,t@it§l~ . .,-,;ante.s;l. 
Several polioy alternatives existed for the United States. She could 
commit herself actively to the defense of the status guo and announce 
that she intended to prevent, by military means if necessary, any .fur-
ther communist expansion. She would thus have to commit herself to the 
defense of eaob and every nation of East and Southeast Asia. The 
United Sta;~.es could withdraw oompletezy- from the Far Ea.st .. ~<~~~~~~t ~e: . ~~t:t""d .. -
lines of defense, and leave Japan and the Ph:i,lippines to(fe~ for them-
, ~-., .. ~·,=---=_,,,.......,.,:.,:i:.,.:..#i•0';'-""W,:.J;~~'t~.~::~i.,,"":-:::, 
selves. Or, she oould try to establish a.(corcfon sa.nitaire .. }o o~in .. ,,.ke o\ ='f\;;.~''\; 
..•... ·~-.~=.,·=··"·", ... _.. ......... .c,,./'"' '"a., .;,,,;f.,T'e 
oo~ism, by extending financial, material, and moral support to thos~ J~ ... 1:1,L,, 
nations engaged in oonfliots with forces supported by the ao:mmu.nist 'v\. .. j;.:1'•'vll l. · 
Ii, .. ""., s.) f'>A ;>, ·e "'""'··~· _,, ......... 
Camp. r~~- ~i_~,,.,,__ Dlfl' 
J....JP , 
It was this la.st policy alternative that was most in keeping with .· ·./\~ _e•-~41-i' 
Jv-<). ~,...,JL.z~~.)::.. 
tne tr~d1tional Far Eastern policies of the United States. The United 
States has always been coneerne4 w;i.th power relations in the far ~a.st. 
Long before a single communist state existed in Asia, the United States 
had tried to deter the expansion of any nation in that area. that eould 
upset the pre-Wcrld War II balance of power. Prio:r to World War II, 
however, the United State, had been unwilling to assume the military 
responsibility tor the defense of this balance of power. Diploma.tic 
instruments, al.ong with the pe;,riodie willingness of other nations to 
use their military ~Sena.ls in defense of the balance of power, had 
long been the means relied upon by the United States. By 1950, the 
traditional. balance of powe:r no longer existed; if the United States, 
~' 
58 
however, wanted to continue to concern herself with the power relations 
of the Far Ea.st and wanted to pursue her traditional policies, 
Co:mm;unist China and the Soviet Union had to be contained, but the 
United States ha.d to find means other than its own military forceso 
This decision to try to prevent the expansion of communist powers 
in the Far East led the United States to formulate a different polioy 
in respect to Indochina. No longer could French Indochina be viewed as 
the battleground of a. colonial war with only local signi:fieap.ce, but 
rather it became one of the testing grounds of "co:mnmnism'' vereus 
ttdemocra.cy'' or, more realistically, of the Soviet Union and China versus 
the U~i ted States. Ju~~-~-~ .... ?~E~~.~~E:!'. .. ~4 .. thELpreveIJ.~:i9!1. ?f .. ~::~ !1::.:_~···· 
the r deteriora. tion .;ln th~ pe>wer §t:r,-3:1,Q.'!;,:t;!.tit.$iema.nded .. the ... ~.Q~~lllent, }?.! . . ,=····-""'_.,,,_~-~-_.. .. ., ,·,. ,· ' 
.American troops to Koreat se>::j.J:l Indochina these .. PQliqie~L required that 
~x-,..- ,...,...,.~°"'' --, __ ,_,,...-....,,- '• , .... -· .- . -,-.,,,._ ... -•-.-~ •.. , ·- . , --. , -,- -.,,,.., .. ·· •. ,,, ,-.•,-- _. '"""'"-"''~'-""'';',.;-'- .. ·-'~ ·-·" ··- ·- -.. ·- ' . - . - ·- . ' ' ' ·- ·-~., ... ,, ·--··-.·- .. ·,_.~-'-<' ,•"."'r:,,,- ~~--> - . '-~~.-· .. :~ . , ... : - -: ,-_~--:..·;;_,.._, 
the United States extend moral and material support to the Frenchl!---,f_qr 
-----''-"'•,..,_,.,.,,,.,...,,_..,,,,-o,_.._.,C-O.._•~<,·~-•'>>'><'-'~<,,,,c.,._ ... .",, . ._,,, •. ,_,., .. ..,-,...£;.,·:."~"-, .•· • <,,.,. -• ···.,.,J.~-_,.,.,,:,..,·.,:..-.:_-- or·-<..~.,~ .• :; .. ,, .. ~ .'. ... ,·,a:;...,··,._.;_.: ,_,.~;-~,7 · ·--- , .. , .. , 
the French now represented an American instrumi;mt for th;~. contai..'l'll!'lEmt 
_,._,,_ _,,_ --c:- ' _,.,.~ -·~·c, ··--~ ., .. • 
of communist influence~ the Far Ea.st. 
,L- ~ ';.,,.._, .a· 
Truman-Acheson Policies 
I . ( 
There is evio.ence to suggest that the:contain:ment of communist 
/-----·-~,--- .. -· 
power and influence in ~doehina dj,g,_n,~t.J;,~g1:;m1~Lfil.,,S~.i~!tstJi.2'.1l2¥.,"g9~.,._ 
=:--~-=-••"-- ':"'" -<,· .. · -··· · ,~·.T · _..,_-,. ·.·~0.x,,.>, - '"''-··'~·•. <"' 
unti.1,,aft.eF. ~h!_ O'Ut.1:>:re~~ }?,"'. ,~b,~,-- J.{;q:r~sm .h<?.~Ji~~.:~:;§,§~ Al though the 
United S~tes had been moving in this direction since late 1949, 
Acheson, as late as January 1950, did not include Indochina within the 
defense perimeter of the United States.1 In addition, although the 
United States promised economic ~id to the French in Indochina in the 
1nean Aeheson, ''Speech Before the National ;press Club, 11 United 
.states Department of State, Bulletin, XXII (January 15, 1950), Po 1.580 
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spring of 1950, actual deliveries of this aid were held up, possibly 
!or political reasons. 2 However, iiumedia.tely after :r;-eqeiving news of ..... . 
~,~"-"'='-''""""·'""'"'"'"fle•··~,·· ... ,.·,,-=~>-~·.~,!,,.-._,:,_,r,, ,. .. • ,,,,·,.:;.o-c;-,·.·. j•,.'>-.<',C·o-C.,l,-~-..,.,.,.·:,· .• oi>.f',,i#<.-!\>)<ci,.c,~:, ; •• _;_:,,,,,··.,;-c, :,, •\~'-'.:•.·; ... _, .. _.-, ..• · ·, .. ~~ 
the North Korean aggression, Truman took steps to provide the French 
,,. ,.,,,,. • ..I:;c,.·.c,.•-;•cto.,.c-.,~.--·'· '"'·'·r·,,,c_·_ ·-_---·-·.. ,.,.;,,;,.~ -:;:--,..-.c,._:-.: .. ,,~,. .. ::~ .• ,:,·· ,.,_.,, .. , - , • • ··•••·•·•·•••·• , .• >••~e.c.c•·•· •. ,. 
with economic and military aid for Indochina. The Korean crisis se§ms _ 
_____ ,_....,,,.,.,..,...,~,..,_.~<'1"'"-"~''-'"-'"'.iO;'"'-"-:c<,,~~-~---.-,··c . .-: .. -.-,;.•."',-.,.,. ... ;~ .. ,.,_;,,:,,.-,-,.cc, , ;.c-.,::,;~''.; ,"!-?"i,;,;·-::-··.~-c,·: .. '.'i;:!•,'?'·-· _. -,-.;<,·,_,c_.,<,r,,\·,.,,c.cch.:.c.': ,~,..._-.:,;.~.:-:.•.'C' .. ','""; ~t-.;-,,.•,-.,c.-•c •. ·.,,_.,•,.-~~?-.-""?"~0• .. • ---
to have orystaJlized in Trwns.n 1s lll,ind the decision that the United States 
~-'"""""-"'<1<-~=--~~"':"";--,.,,_,_"<.:,,,...,,..,<-~'-"""-=,~,-,--,""~"~"~~•-~=-'"''·•·•.·"'-,. .... --,, ·=-······---·-··. _... ,_., __ . ., .•. ,, .. "--~-"-<"·"'""""""""'''7'..,,.,_",_.,.._,_,_,~·e-·,.,.-1.,,.--~..,.~-·;..-..•~.·c•=,.,<-,,"-"""-'•i:..=•-"'"---.,,W,-:.,;,,""'.""'·.f.•~='<,:;.•,,,,,-~.:-,:..,,:::·,..,,--s,°"''""'"'"-"'""'''•C-,c:..·>.1~-, .... ,,,""'··~,,.,,.,,_,c .. .,.,,;,..._;,;:,:;-,•:,•,•0-S·"""'-''" 
ntUst · s,~;eport the · French in Indoofl:~~"~lLJ>:r9-,!.!: ,,J<t P!'~Y~:t}'.k,,,~g~;§l~ "' , 
r""""''=---~- """"·" ·"""''"'«'<',,-""""~•-., '"""'""~~•··,·· ,-···· •. ~.,r..=,~:· ,-, ..• -. -···-,,.-.. · .. ;,~-.· .- ',- .. . . . . 
leaders.11;,1?,,w!!~~,,,~!~~~~- ,c;l,~~,~!~~}~. In his first public statement on 
the situation in Korea, Tru.xnan anno'Ulloed that he had ordered General 
· MacArthur to go to the aid of the South Koreans; t}),at he had requested 
the stationing of the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and the Chinese 
:mainland. and the strengthening of defenses in the Phil;tppine Islands, 
!!!!_ had ordered the acceleration of mil~:ta,nr aid to Indochina. He also 
ordered the establishment of a United States mili~ry advisory mission 
for Indoehina.3 Truman's reference to Indochina seems quite significanto 
This was the first time since the outbreak of the Indochinese War that 
he had :made any publio reference to the politiqa.l situation there. 
This a.lone sttggests that Korea: PJ:'.!OiJ2i~t~~ ~ inorea.sedAmerica.n 09~:- .. 
·~;,,,-,:,>;,~""-""""~;=~:S<><>:f<i•~C-e•·-·.c,!.!;'~.;--:s.'c,.l-.O._,~.._:,c"c•,,.,i;,\-,O.C"'-:;;c\,•':.,c·.,,:•:-.,~-,,.,~C"•;,c;a.:, .. ;,,,.,, • . :,., >• -0 · .. ·.T-•.J;~-,."~/.:,:~~_,,,.,.,; '"'--'·' ., .. "'~•.•~•-•. ',.t'.•-><«:,:,;c.c: .. s,,;~·-.. ·.;, .. ,,.~,.e.-,, .~.,__,_.,.,.,~"'·,a• ··" 
cern with Indochina.. The simultaneous concern With KoJ;"ea, Indocllina, 
..,.._,,_,,,_.~ """"'""""'·--,-,,._-,,,,.,.,,.~=·.·Y.,.?. ,;.y~_,.,....:·:, -~·---;--c,:>:c .. ,•,,_.--c7•-
and Formosa suggests that events in Indochina were beipg viewed in a 
total Asian contextt which was, in fa.ct, influencing the policies of 
the United Stat1;1s in Indoohina. Shortly a!ter Truman's announcement, 
concrete steps were taken to provide Indochina with American aid an~ 
a military miss1Qn was ~spa.tched to investigate the needs of the 
2There is some indication that the United States w:tthheid actual 
deliveries of this aid, in order to apply p~essure on the French to 
grant independence to the Vietnamese. 
3Harry S. Truman, ''Press Conference," United States Department of 
State. Bulletin, XXII (July 3. J.950), P• 5. 
6o 
F;-enQh. '.t'.!i~reatt~r, 4 ,la:rge=_"'qua.n;t?;~ies_.e,f.tx>~~,,.~~.:~':~l""',~?~."'~con,?!e:~.,!',~~.,,, ... *'"'~'"··· 
were q'!liok!ly dispatoheq.. 4 " 
,-------·'"-"""'-•~...-.e,.1!£,...::.,., .. HJS..,:,,~,n:-=.~~·'.'."·t.·,•"'i'""'~,-,~,·.~,_,...,c:.·. 
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Truman wa.nt,d to prevent oommqn~st expansion anywhere in Asia, bttt 
Indochina had a s~gular valu,. Sino-Soviet power was ~eatening to 
break through into Indochina. The danger was immediate $.lld it was 
imminent.· IndoPh.ina.was also viewed as betng of qritical strategic im-
portance to the United States. Trupian repeatedly emphasized ~hat the 
loss of Indochina nwould mean the loss of freep.om for DJillions of 
people, the loss of vital raw m.aterius, and the loss of points of 
critioa}. strategic,im~tance tg the·:(ree wo~g. 115 lf Indochina re-
mained. llfree", it Qould ac~-~.~"-~At,,.,ta.~!~!!,~~~~~L=,.~.-
of S01iY1~J1§,t~,,As.ia..; it could act a.!_ a !o.c~~t,.h,..!~~.,2!,:A~~l'!ti~t.M1~,,,., .. , 
the ~o~ists, it oould then serve as a staging Srrea for communist 
attacks o~ almost all of ~he otp.er countries of So~theast Asia. 
Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, even the Philippines, would find 
the:mselves more open to communist expansion, if Indochina ca.me under 
communist rule. Truman did not contend that the "fall" of Indochina 
would necessa;-ily lead to the ''fall" of all of South,ea.st Asia., but he 
did fear that a. communist Indochina would menace t~ese other countries 
of Southeast Asia. Thus, i;he. defeat of the French in Indochina would 
only further disturb the power st?;'Uotur• within Asia and could make it 
4m ~arly July, 19.50, a military a.id mi~sion was sent to Indochina. 
to assess the needs o{ the French and on August 10,. the first shipn,1ent 
of American ar:iru, aid arrived in Saigon • 
.5onderlined by the author of this thesis for emphasis. Public 
Paper~ .2f. ~;b.e Pr~sidents of the Upited States. Ham§.. Truman, !2.2-
. J1U (Wash~gton, l.966), p. 186. . 
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even less favorable to the United State$. 
In addition, as Truman stated, Indochina and the rest of Southeast 
Asia possessed raw materials necessary for both East and West. South-
east Asia had long 'been regarded a.s the 11ri,,eet:::}lpwl!' of the. Qrle?J,:t. The 
.- ;·_~•/( -:- ?).;: •. _31,.~-"'-_-,;:,;~--:~.,y;_;..;;···~:.-, .. ·._p~,,..,..e....,:- .. 1-·' .. · -··- •· "· 
nations of this region w~re among the few of the world who exported 
rice. The riee-def;lcd,ent nations, illclud;Lng China, were dependent upon 
Southeast Asian produ~ts. The region also contained valuable deposits 
of raw 1114terials: five-sixth.s of the world'fii supply of nat"Q.:ral rubber, 
one•hal:t,' of the internati1;mal supply of tin, and two-thirds of all co= 
conut products originated in this region. Tb,e area was also a major 
supplier of quinine and lc4pok. These raw materials were necessary for 
. .America's European allies, many of who~ depended, to some extent, on 
triangular trade with this region to speed up their own economic 
i,ecovery.9 
The United States, however, 4id not want to asSl..Ulle the primary 
responsibility for preventing the eo:rnmunists from taking over in Inda-
china, and for this reason she vigorously supported the Freneho As 
Virginia Thompson has pointed out, 11in Southeast Asia the United States 
has tried to devise policies that would stop the Co:rnmunists, without, 
however, involving itself extensively in affairs of that area. 117 Truman 
emphasized on several occasions that the primary responsibility ;for the 
War rested on French shoulders, just as the prilnary burden in Korea. lay 
6w:\,J.liam Henderson. New Nations of Southeast Asia (Headline Series 
#1.lO. March-April, 1955 (New York, 19.551), p. 5. -
7 Virginia Thompson and Richard .Adloff, Empire I s §!E, ~ .Sou the a.st 
Asia (New York, l.949), p. 8. · · 
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with the United States.8 The United States thought it necessary to 
support the French, out of fear, perhaps, that were France to divest 
herself' of the Indochinese burden, the United S4tes might then be com--
pe~ed to intervene. With war raging in Korea, such intervention would 
have been hi.ghly undesirable, and contrary to the way in which the 
United States tradj.tionally tried to effect policy goals in this region. 
However, Indochina. had a sign_;f~~!!~!L!hl~h.~i£~El!P.4~JJ,.,J?,~Y:9n9- .. ~_;\.fJl,,.,,p., .. 
-----~----·, .. -~.,,,_-,_._ • , .. ,. _,..,..".-,,.~ •• ,~-~~v.-•·<;; ·«•v"'"''~'""" .. 
~!.~· The Indochinese War was burdening Fra.p.ce with a costly and 
frustrating conflict. By 1950, the French were spenq.ing $1QQ,QQ9"°00;0_--
or approx:i.mate].y_35 percent of their ent;ire mi;l.itary and defense 
budget-.. on Indacbina.9 By the end of 1949, French casualties had 
. · 10 
reached the staggering total of 100,000. These expenditures of men 
and :rr,.oney seriously' ~~:,'::P,J~~ .. ,.!!!:E~~.!!.!:~fh!jit.J~,<? ... !?~.g~h~.!'..,.e~~~ .... ~J .. 
European defense. As the war dragged on, France ~eca.me less and less 
~ '"~-«~-. < ' ,-- ' 
able to fulfill her NAro obligations, and less and less willing to ratify 
the European Defense C()llJ,lJlU?lity (EPC), to which the Vnited States had 
11 . 
heav1,ly committ~d herse~. Thus, first Truman and subsequently 
Eisenhower d;i,seovered that unles~ .Ame:i:-ican aid to France was forth-
coming in ever-increfl.sing amounts, the French Il4ght jetti~on the EDC. 
Ed,en reports t~t du.;cl.ng a three power meeting in May, 1952, the French 
811Joint Franco-Atlierioan Communique, June 18, 19.5;2," Council on 
Foreign Relations, Doo:!Y'!ents of .blerican Foreign Relations (New York, 
1953), :P• 284. · · _ 
91'.h! ~ ~ Times, January 28, 1950, P• 4. 
10penis Warner, .ll!! Last Confucian (New ?ork, 196.3), p. 37. 
11The French were unwi,lling to participate in the European Defense 
Community as a Junior partner to Germany, yet their preopeupation with 
Indoch:i,na prevented them from assuming a dominant role in the EDC. 
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made it known that unlress the United States_ increased its s.upport for 
- ' 
th«t IndoQhinese War, the Frenoh migl,.t not ratify the EDC. "The impli-
cations o~ th~ Inch>china problem now extend_ed · tar beyond SQutbea,st Asia. , 
· ~------·---·---...... --· .. "--;,..~"'~o-~Jta . ,,. ~•-
;rn view of the_ French anxiety to mainta:1,.n m.ili tary pa~~ . with Gennany, 9 ,,.Jt_t1 
,' - ll 
the fate of th~ EDC was, 1n part, dependent on its solution." '!'hus, 
:,.t see• that the Indochinese War lla<i an adverse eff'eot on .American 
poltoies 1n Europe, as well as in the Far East,because of the deleterious 
Wluerice it was having on the French ratification of the EDC. 
'l'he T~-Aoheson polioies tow~l."d Indoohi;na oontained. at least oN. ,{ .. H".\. 
two separ~te and distin~t <it~. ~--;~-~~;~;d~--;:~··u;i~·;:;·;;~~~~ "~t~-ji 
. "-.. . ._.__ . . I '<"'°i C-"!,\~,;\'t!lff4:-wfi, 
W1',S d,etermined to hold the linfl ae,aipst 00JDD1U?1ist expansion in Indo.. 1 :l'{:{t~r--~·-"'· 
china. This•• necessary 1f a. cordon sanita.ire within Asia was to be 
• • jj I · 
established and the poweJ" strc.oture prevented from fu.rther d,eterio• 
rating. The ~ochinese contliat ~s viewed. as an integral part of 
oom,munistio expansion in Asia, .an expansion which, in the view of the 
United Sta;tres ,_ llad to be prevented. -
Soviet intentio~s in_ th~se countries are unmistakably 
.elear ".. The Kremlin has already reduced China to a 
,atellite ••• commµn1st rebellion is raging in Indochina. 
In all these countries they are tr~g to exP].oit deep-· 
seated eoonolllic di:f'fiQUl.ties, poverty, illiteracy 4lld 
d:).sease.13 -
0~ the other hand, the United States wanted to foster in Il1,doop~ 
... 
sooW and 90QD011P,.O institut:i,ons which would generate political 
stability. She also wanted-to prove herself a friend ot Indochinese 
nationali_sm. Tru.ma;n, in J\.u~(!lt, 1950, testified to ~is dual.purpose 
1~ ' Anthony Eden, lB1!. CiJ;"ele (Boston, 1960), p. 94, 
l.3Po.pl1.o P!Wrs !£. the Presidents 2! ·w. United States. Harry 
s. Trulu.n, 195l, P• 309. --
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of United States policies in a speech over Radio Free Europe. Accord-
ing to Truman, the pirpose of United States econonii,c and military aid 
wa.s: 
to help the people achieve indepenq.e~oe within the French 
Union. The United S~tes Economic Assistance Program is 
designed to stiJllulate conditions under which tpe people o~ 
Indochina may develop inst;itutions compatible with their 
religion and o~¢ tu:i;-e which will best serve the interests 
of the people. . 
The negative aspect·of Truman's policy was to keep Indochina withiµ the 
French Union, so that France could help shoulder the l;m.rd.en of eon~ 
taining th;e eQlllll:lllnist movement in Southeast Asia. The positive aspect 
of this policy was to help Indoc~4 develop institutions which would 
satisfy the aspirations of the people and thus reduqe the danger of 
The tragedy of United States policies toward Indochina was that 
these separate policy goals often proved ;i.nqom~tible, The instruments 
and policies neeq.ed to contain the communists contl~cted wi,t4 the 
policies neeeSSB.fY to demonstrate United States friendliness to I:n<fo ... 
chinese nationalism. Ho Chi Minh enjoyed the support of :many Vietnamese 
who did not consider themselves colYlJllUnist, wh:U.e l;lao Dai conunanded 
little POP\l,lar support. Yet, the United States thought that in order 
to contain communism, she had to support the Frencp and Ba.o Dai; in so 
doing, she alienated many true Vietnamese nationalists. 
In. addition, this positive aspect of United States policies was 
inappropriate to the Indochineise situation. Acheson h,imself had empha-
sized t~t in order for aid to be effective, certain conditions would 
~veto exist within a country. The United States eo~d not c;reata 
14 · 
Th,e New York Tin,.es, August 13, 1950, p. 14. 
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· prosperous politieally stable goverJ1111ents where ;tQ&nY of the f'aotors nee- . 
. essary to~ blild1.ng a viable poli tioal SY1$t8Dl wer$ laoJ,d,ng. It could 
supply only the ''missing oomponent''. "The United .states cannot fu,rnish 
determination, it c,mnqt furnish the will, and it cannot ~rn1sh the 
loyalty of' a people to its goverlU!lent. •11.5 Where these factors ~:x1sted, 
aid could 1:ie effective. Wttb.in Indochina, these other oq,mpon,nte were 
simply not preesent. The gove~ent of Bao Du did not e~d popular 
support, while many of the IndoQh;i.nese viewed the War as colonialist 
:ln na~e and thus had little incentive to support the French or tjie:1,.r 
own government. Alth~h France ~e oonoessio;ns to the Vietnamese de-
sires.to~ "1C)re ~ependence, these conoessions alway1;1 se~med to be too 
little~ too late to have any.l'eal effect on pPpnlar ;morale. Although 
TruiJan paid lip se~ce to this positive aspect of American policy, dur• 
ing most of the war the United St.tes .eonoentrated. on QontaiJiing the_ 
C9JIJll1lilllists and supporting the Frenoh, Tb.us, most of the support.given 
to the French was to be used primarily tor inUitary purposes. 
United States .Aid. to Indochina 
In vi.- of the fact tha.t the prima,ryinterest of the United States 
· ill Indo~hina was to ;Prevent a conmunist victory, most of . the .American · 
. f.id had a ~itary purpose. In July, 19,50, TrtUn&n appo;inted a military 
aid mistion heade<,i by John Melby to make an on the ·spot 1Jtwly of French 
mUitaey' needs in IndoohiriBt and to dr~t plans £0:r.- a resid,ent advisor, 
111Uita,ry mission. 'l'he GrU"fin Mission had alr8'Ay reoolllJl1ended 
$2,,,500,000 in eoono~c aid, of which $6,000,:000 was to be &Uoea.ted 
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for :public health projects. In late July, fou,r American publ!c health 
· 16 · 
officials were sent to head antj,.malarial. teams.. The Melby Mi~sion 
coapleted ita J,"eport in early August and recommended $100,00P,OOO :1n 
mili;tary aic;l, a.?1(J soon atter, m•bers of. the perm,.nent mili~ advisory 
Jllission began to arriye in Saig~n. The function of this mission was to 
· obser~ 8'lcl advise on the use of .berican mil~;tary equipment.17 The 
. t~st fhipaent of anus ~id, consisting pl'imal"ily of military veh1oles, 
arrived on Au.gust 10, 195Q, and was ;received with pomp and oeJ;"elll.Ony, 
. l8 
though mar:red by the continued al:)senoe of Bao Dai fl"@ his country.· 
Tlle French, however, we:re unhappy ~th ~e rate ot deliveries and 
· pres,sed fol" spe~ier shipments $.nd addit:lonal supplies. ,At a three 
pe>wer :ineeting in September, .the French brought pressure to bear on the 
United States and sho:rtli thereaf'ter, 'ijle United States announof)d that 
it -.s accelerating a.l'mS shipments to Indoc~, to meet the threat 
of the anticipated October offensive.19 Wb~ther the Unit,ed States w•s 
lagging in·it~ deliveries or the French were t~ to shift the major 
burden onto 1\merica.n shoulders is not el.ear, but in spite of the agree-
JQ.ept procluced at the three power meeting (Great Britian, France, and 
· the United States), i,n mid. September, th~ French defense minister flew 
to the United Sta.tel:$ to requ•st accele:r~ted shipments. As a result, 
20 Melby was aga:i,p sent tQ ln(ioobina to reassess Frencm needs. Subseq~ent 
16The New .!2£k.Iimes, July .30~ 1950, P• 9. 
17Ibid., ~g11st .3, 1950, p.a •. 
l8Ibid., August 10, 1950, P• .1 
19lb1d., September 21, 1950, :p. l •. 
20 
Ibid., Sep~er JO, 1950, P• 12. 
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, . 
to bis.· journey, a F:r:-anco-.Ameri~ communique ,xmoun,eecl tbat France was 
to receive $2,~00,000,000 in arD1$ and equipme~t during l9.5l for use 1n 
· Euro~ an4 ~ lndooh1na. It is reported that the· French ori~inall;y" re'I'" 
·quest~ a toW ot $3,170,0PO,OOO, of which $3QO,OOO,OQO was to· 'be ear• 
· 21 · I )l!Qked tor lndoc~. Although the coJllllWlique. did not specify how 
au.ch ot the totai SUlll was 1;o be ufed in Indochina, there is evidence to 
· . · 22 . suggest that the total was around $200,000,000. _ 
The Question ot ~itary I,nvol~ent 
'rha,t the United States intend~d to furnish military and economic 
aicl, but no ~n was emphasized on several ooca,1;1ions by .American offi-
Qials~ In Juzy, Melby asserted that there~ been "no request~, sug-. 
ge~tions, npr plans tor sending United States millta.ey uru_ts to Indo-
2,3 . . 
china." Agaj,n in Octo~:r:-, AQhesona.nnounoed th4t there was 11no con- iriJ!L 
siderait:lon, fJ! sending t~oops" to Indochin~. 24 These remarks p~~"'ed-~-~~:J.}.:i"· 
. ~-
'the patte:rn of .American a,id to Indo<:hina! for even after F'?tenQh "sug-
. . ' : 
gest1on$ and requests'' had been rec~ived, the U;i:iited States continued 
to.shu:n ~ita,ry involvement,~ was always careful tQ :make this elear. 
Although in late 1950, two United States B-26 bombers we;r:-e J(?nt to 
lndocb:µia, along With four }>J'ivateer patrol bom,bers. the erewsw1;9re 
civ:ll,ian ,ather than mil.1tary ~ersonnel •. 
. 2l ·. . · . . 
Ibid.; OotoQer 13, 19.50, p.· 14. 
22 · Ibid •• SeptelJlber 19. 19.51. p. 19. 
23Ib:i,d., Jµ.~ 1 •. 1950, p. 4. 
24 . 
Ibid41, September 19, 19.51, p. 19. 
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The Chinese intervention in Korea resurrected French fears of out-
side ooxmnunis.t j.n,tervention in Indochina and the FrenQh sought an 
~ericana1?surance of immediate action, in Qase China intervened in 
Indochina. In January, 19.51, Prime Ministei, Pleven approached T:ruman 
directly on this subject. No American pro~se was forthcoming, however, 
and Pleven had to be contented with the promise of more and speedier 
aid.25 Truman was never willing to comnµ.t ~elf to mili~ry support 
of the French, in spite of continued and increasing pressures on the 
subject from the FrenQh. The Truman A~nistration was only willing to 
furnish arms, military equipm~t, supplies, and economic aid,. Ail.y' 
commitment to send American military forces --ground or air -was 
another question entirely. 
The pattern of A:m,eric~ cOlJllllitments to the French ip. Indochina 
thus was rather consistent with the traditional pattern of American 
involvement in Asia. The United St~tes wanted to contain the communists 
in Il\doohina, in order to prevent any further we~ening in her power 
position in the Far East, but refused to ooDllllit herself militarily to 
the defense of these policies. She aided the French materially and 
financiaJ.ly, but continued to rely on the French to bear the major 
burden of the War. She continued to believe that France could play her 
histori.c role j.n Southeast Asia and that the United States could further 
her polioi~s by reliance on indirect means. 
In spite of the American assistance, the Vietminh continued to be 
a formidable force without any overt Chinese participation. Early in 
1951, Hanson Baldwin reflected the pessimism felt by many in the United 
2.5 Ibid., January JO, 1951, p. 18. 
States when he questioned whether there was any c~nce of saving Indo~ 
china from the OQ~:i,.sts,26 Th,rougho~t l951, the llq.lita;-y situation 
seemed oritieal and the United States continued to press the French to 
grant more independence to the Indochinese in order to rally the people 
in support of the War. The French, on their part, oont:µiued to look to 
the United States to save the situation. In September, 1.951, General 
Jean de La.t~re de Tassigny visited the United States and, along with a 
request for a speed-up in tp.e del:i_very of aid, he asked for an ,American 
guarantee of ~ediate military action, if China intervened.27 The 
United States again agreed to speed deliveries, but would make no prom• 
ises on intervention. The furthest Truman was w;i.llillg to go was to ex-
.press "grave concern" if China shol}.ld. intervene. Chinese aggression in 
Southeast Asia would "be a inatter of direct and grave concern which 
would require the most urgent and Ei)arnest consideration by the United 
Nations. 1128 
United States a.id to ;Indochina. continued to mo~t. By January, 
1952, the value of military equipment thus far delivered was est:i.ma.ted 
at $228,ooo,ooo.29 The one hundredth shipload of American supplies 
arrived in Indochina, b:-inging the total. of Amerio~ supplies to 
100,000 tons. By the en4 of fiscal year 1952, it was reported that aid 
totaling JOO million dollars had been granted to the French for fiscal 
26 Hanson Baldwin, Ibid., January 5, 1951, p. 4. 
27Mirl.a.m s. Farley, United States Relation$ with Southeast Asia, 
19,0-19,2~ (J;Jew York, 1955), P• 267. · --- · · -
28 . · The !!!· ~ 'I'j,mes, January 29, 1952, p. l. 
29 · Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World At!airs, 
~ (New York,- 19.51), :P• 201. - ·· · ....... · · 
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1952 alone~ The tempo of three power d.1seu.ssions on lndoQll:1.na. also con-
tinued to increase. A three power Jnilitary meeting was held inearzy 
. , . 
· Jam14ry • but no qol1Jl11\.1,n1que was issued. Two days later• General Juin 
was :1,n Wasllim.gton to dis~uss again the posdbility of Chinese inter-
venUon and to request .Amertoan air and naval ,ul)port in ease of this 
event~ty. Ju.in later reported that he "was confident ~the would 
· g~t what was necessary if' the Chinese shquld make W&J;" •. · lb t n9 oonmu. t-
ments were ~e ••• n.30 By mid 1952, it was reported that the United 
-----.._..__.,.. _ _...,.,,,..-.-.. ~-:c-r-c..-,;:,;t.,~--·-"t·:--:~:;;,.,..~:::r,..;,,·.:;1;.,,;,::<,v,.W-"'~<!'l<'<'i'<"';_., 
States was ~M~.1111:!~-.'!~!,,~~ct_~!J•,h_!~,!<ai'!*,hgg,~~~-,}~f""~-~~2!~~!~ .. 
""-~eratio~~-.. ~~ a~~'Q.~--.!~~!P:9.~.!!nt ,~J ... ~e~~?!,~!~.~f.,.~!~"~~~;l';~~!1:P~~!!,is. ... 
. Jl 
:in ;:cmoc~a!.,.~--
Thus, 'by the close of tlie ~,-~s_kJ!.:!ii9!l._J:J1! .. JJ~g,,_,§:!i~i:t.~.~-. ------ . ~--.. -•~><--·-~----~-~~~-
had heayily committed herself to a eOJ1J111Untst deteat in Indochina, yet 
' ~'-""G:i~-:,,,~~,_-,.,..,,,,.,..,._,,,.,.,,:,..,:,.w-;;.,;;m.4;.~;;~._,=,,..~\h-~..:.~;.\..,l.-..,t,n.,;:~.;:..,,.~""';,µ,~~;);r;:.(.j~'>''-'*"";<'lf1~:~a=*,,~~":.:.:....::;..,:,,~~~-T>:t·:r~:.-;;..~@~"".cA-t~-!";,;:.''~;1-..:,::..:;,;:,-.~.!'":;::s1·,·~ 
witlwut hersel£'beooJ11ing militarily i,Jivolved. Sh$ cont:1,nu~d t9 r~ly on 
~~>...t'.r-;,:;i:;:..,."'l).-:,:-.,r·-:,,:'.l'-"l!.~.::.:..•r··;7_ -:.:-,~-·~·,:;; .. .._ _.-.,· ..... :,:<.···-· · • .:- ........ ·.,·:,,!-"'!l.:.;.,.._.,,;,..,..·,;.."l",:;.:--...::::..1,j',t":":.C:,!.,...>t-~--:~i~::~.·_:.,:r:, .. :> 
the French to s~bilize internal condj.tions there and to contain the 
communists. In so do~, she may have failed to reali,ze that a France 
which was unable to defend herself on the.continent of Eu.rope could 
hardly be expeotec:l to carry a ;major burden of checking the communists 
in Asia. Had China ~i:ried prQ-western in its outl,ook, the United 
States ~t we:J,.l have continued to regard the Indooh1nese W~ as 
.essentially colonial i,n nature ~d of only local significance. With the 
scramble ~o contain COJDil!lll.nism, hQWever, J:ndochina became part and paroei 
of United States efforts to re-establish a ·f'41,voraple Far Easte;m bal.ance 
of' ·power. 
JOTbe New York Times, Ja.nuary 14. 1952, P• 1 • ..,.._. .......... ~ . 
31 . . . 
Ibid., July 1,3, 19.52, p. 1. 
Eisenhower-Dulles Polictes 
The Republican ~nistrat~on during its first year in office 
adhered to tbe basic poli,Qies establishe4 by its predecessor. Policy 
,ta:tieae:rits continued to stress the total Asiatic significance or the 
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Wa.r and empha$1zed that Il,.doehina was a major obst.ele to the Soviet de .. 
stgn or conquest in Asia. The United States continued to ·give the 
French military assistance, teohnioal aid, and moral support. 
However, \?eg:Lnn~ in late 19.53 Mld continuing into l9t:• some k~ 
att•pt seems to have been made to use Indochina as the e(~~,-;~;-~·~- 'J..~;..{ =tf,\/ 
a far more ambitious American po~Qy in ,4\sia. Policies were verbalized 
warning C~ or dire consequenoef:l ·should she interve~e in Indoohina. 
T1',ere was talk of the ~eed to stnoture arq-µnd Indochina the nucleus or 
a new organization which would deter Soviet and C~ese expansion in 
the Asian area. The assump"tionwas that the United States ought to 
. . 
~ the initiative in :respect to COJIJ11WliSt expanstonistic th;rostf, she. 
ought not siluply react to sti.ch thrusts, but rather she should try to 
deter them. This might be c;ione by ~g a finn. stand with the 00:mmt,1.-
nist:,, and by structuring a new defense alliance in Asia. TAis def'e:n,_~e 
--.... --~,~.-..;i..."ll,=~-.i.:.,-,~'L'Y,,a,"'4"....U.;tlCo'i:;~,i,-~,t<.tt,..-i,.-;:t:.,«~J.l?Jf,!'¥'"...,.,.,. 
allianoemight resto~e th~ b~ance of. PC?W~·~ It was intended to $erve 
.........._ -~-.. --~-=-:;o,.-..,._-._........,~.1,.-,;:e•,;\:t:ot,,',l.;--~ll"-""~'),.---~~,<.:.W,..:.=-< . 
. . 
· as a col,Ulter-weight to Sino-Soviet power j,.n .As;i.a and to ca.st a.n umbrella. 
o.r protection over all of the developing :!l&ti<:ins whioh were too weak to 
resist the commu.nists individually. It c;,ould sei,ve to restore the bal-
ance of power, relieve the Un~ted States of some of the responsibility 
· tor the region, and per})aps, stabilize the Asian situation mo;re favorably 
to the interests of the United States, Whereas TrwtWl responded to 
attempt15 to disturb the sta.tus quo, the Republicans wanted to pursue 
policies that would ~eter any su~h attempts before the:yr got underway. 
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A power bloc created arc;,und +ndochina, $Upported by some of tjle new ~a .. 
ttons of As~, and baoked by Great 13:r'itain, Fx-ance, and the.United 
States =.ght do tlu,s. , ,,., 
However, serious inconsistencies seem to exist between the policies 
advocated 1n this respect .and those actually acted u~on. Verbally, the 
United States threatened the communists with ma$si~ retaliatton, called 
tor the roll~ back of communism, and opposed yielding o:ne l!lore A$ian 
country to communist ambitions. Yet the aQtual record of polioies wr-
sued during these two years ot the Eisenhower Administration shows 
great continuity between the Eisenhower policies apd the Trqman poli!)Y' 
of qo~tainment. Eisenhower and· Dulles continued to rely on France--!. . --~--~-·--.....-....---....---~-"""'~-~11'9"""_..-wP>,..........,~t" .... T.:(L,"'?,_ .... ~ .... li,l'".J:I'~··· ... 
~weajc_ins~~!.~!~"::~£<,'~09.~~~~~mJtt~=·~'-':WJlQ~,~~m .. c,!,ct,,,,, 
~t,,_~~~~.gf,t~t~.£~~t:;,9~ ~::i~!t . .Yi~,.,Mim.acP9li~ •. ~1~-Ri~!',!• The 
United States did mot involve herself' direetly in the War, nor <lid she 
succeed in establishing a defense all::i,.ance, before Indoc~a was p,9.l'ti-
tioned,. In spite of her concern With the Far Eastern power structure 
and. her desire to re.-eE:;~blish a favorable balance of power, she would 
not commit her military arsenal to aQaomplish these.goals. This unwill-
µigness toas~~ direct involvement suggests great continuity between 
the traditional policies Qf the United Stat,s in .A.$ia ~d those pursued 
in Indo~in,. 
The Nature of. Republican Interest in Indochina 
The. attit~de that Indochina was QrUeiB.i to the power relations in 
the F~ ~st and that any policy tor lJ;ldoohina :inu.,t be part of an over-
all Asian policy was a major theme in the addresses and writings ot 
many key members·of the Eisenhower AdJn,inist:ration. · Even before he 
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became Secretary of State, Dulles ha.d viewed the War in Indochina as a 
critical ''test" between the Soviet Union and the United States. He 
b~lieved tha.t many of the new nations were closely observing the develop:-
ments in Indochina. and for.this reasQn, among others, the West could 
not aftord to fail; .failure in this critical contest could lead to de-
feat in all of Southeast Asia. By reoogniz:1ng the Bao Dai regime 
shortly after the Soviet recognition of the regime of Ho Chi Minh, the 
United States ha.d set the s~ge for a test of influence in Asiao Dulles 
commented: 11 , •• we must help the nation we back. Its defeat, col!ling 
after the i,everses suffered by the Nationalist Government of China, 
would ha.ve serio1,1s repercussions on the whole situation in Asia and the 
Pacific.n32 Here was the crux of the problem--the juxtaposition of a 
defeat in Indocl:µ.na on the defeat of the American-supported government 
in China could have a bandwagon effect on all of ,the remaining count;J:"ies 
of Asia and could signal an ir~esistable tide against the West in the 
Far East. Such a defeat, ~twas th.ought, could force the United States 
to completely withdraw from the Orient,. To Dulles, the defeat of the 
Kuomintang had seriously or;ippled the United States position in Asia.I' 
l'That disa.E;1ter would be compounded if the;i:-e were added to it the loss 
ot ••• Southeast As~ and. the Pacific Islands. 1133 
In the eyes of Eisenhower and Dulles, Indochina was th~--~~!9 ~~~'"~.~,,.,,··-"·· 
of Southeas.t Asia; lose Indoobin,a and you lose Southeast Asia. To 
~""--~"""='~-,:.-,.·.:cc·-,""~'' ~-..,_;;.,.,.,;.,.-.~,,-,;: .. ""';.t:,:;: :·:~,.;-i".;'-;/.:;:,,:; .. -,,:}C:c;;,,.;,;_-:~_, · .. ;t .. c. '-·-·~ c .. , .. ,.,,,:.~;;,,_;:._,,.~~.c:·,i::;:>'-.::.c.-:~~,. ·;,,.,_;,i~.;:,'.·;,"""'""'"'"'·''·"~"-'1'-'e-;.:.;,.;~.~-=---.,,.-, . .:..~ •. ~ __ .:,_ ,o!,~-, .. -:··,:,c:;,;'G.-,:::.--,·,.~:. -:,;,_,.,;:~--::;.,. ·,· . >---~-:~.,-,,::,,·:~·,s,.,;c;:,":;,·::~·.;,:,r,,y,,:-~:.•--=r:.~ ,.r 
illustrate this position, Eisenhower introduoed the notion of the f'a.11-
illg domino. nyou have a row of dolll,inoes set up, yo1.1, knock over the 
32John Foster Dulles, liS, £!: Peace (New York, 19,50), p. 231. 
:Dibid. t P• 232 •. 
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first one, and what will happen to the la.st one is the oe~inty that 
it w;Ul go over very q,uiokly ••• "34 lndoob.:lna was the i'~st in the row 
of dominoes, the rest being the various countries or Soutp.east Asia. 
I£ IndQ~ £alls; ·ThaUa,nd :i,s put in an almost impossible 
position. The s~e is tru.e ot Malaya with its ru.bber and t1n. 
The same :i,s true of ::tndonesia. It this whole part oi' South-
east ~ia goes under Communist d~on or CoJJlll11lllist in-
fluence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in 
ol'der to ex:i,.st must iiievitably be oriented. towards a. 
Communitt regime. 'l'hat indicates wlly it is v1ta.lly~1mpor.,. 
tant that Indoohina not go belrl,nd the Iron ~rtain • .,1} · 
So vital was Indochina tQ ,t\merioan interests in Asia and the PaeU'io 
that Dulles asserted that a o~st takeover in Inf:i.oehµia. would 0&1,"ry 
a gi,Lve threat to the PhiUppi.nes, .Australia, and. New Ze~d,.36 and 
Ei,enhower stated.that it would turn. the island defensive c~iii c;,f 
Jal)&ll, Fol'Sllosa, and the l?hilippµies southward.37 
Thus, the Unit~ Sta~s belteved that tlle loss of In~oc:pina eon-
tainecl within it a lllllltiplier effect which could disrupt the status 
suo within Asia and lead to a pennanent oommun:1,st hegemony in the 
region. .Analyzed in this way, Indochina be~e the 4st bastion for 
the prese:r:-vation of the power relations in the Far East, for :Lt the 
. United States wanted to prevent e~~t expansion ~here in Asia., 
she had to prevent it in Indochina.. "~!&e.~ .• :i~~!,.,~k4,Q!~,i,,,!2-.[!!!,..,, 
Asia," ~.so went Amerioan thinking during the erit:5.oal yea:rs of the .-----~- . . . 
· 34Publio Pafs.J;.8 ~ .!m:! Presidents £!~United States. Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, 1 · , p. J8~. .... . 
.3.5Rieha.rd Ntxon, ''Adc!ress on T.v. and Radio, December 23f ~~J, 11 
U~ted States Depa.;i:-tment of Staie, "'ailletiu, . XXX (~anuary 4,9 ~ p. 12 • 
.36John F. Du,lle111, "The Threat of a Red Asia," United States 
Department of State, Bl.lletin, XXX (AprU 12, 19.54), P• ,540. 
J7Ptlblie Pa~iq;8 ~§!_Presidents of~ United States. Dwis;ht 
D. Eisenhower, 19· , P• J82. · ..,... . ' 
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Indochinese War. 
Indochina. was also considered to be of great:3ignifieance economi ... 
. ~--~. :,...,,.___,<,s::cC~:::;~~-, .. ,:::,··- J;.,:,., ':.,.,...,,,...~v;,-:,,,~~='>''·<m,!~c.,·x::,~:,-:""c.,;--"'~'-'"af. .~ 
_ o:J.-li>,:tc:> the United SU!,tes and to the West. As Truman had realized, 
· Southeast Asia had great agricultu~al importance, because of its sur-
pluses of rice. If lrl,doe$a was the key to all of Southeast Asia, 
politically it was also the key to the rice surpluses in this region, 
surpluses which were so vital to many nationa of Asia. This could ha~ 
)'<"~:k1fl;-=~-JY0-p;f~~ged sig:pifioance. .QE._~~--~~~~! it was important to see 
/~~·/' to it that the ''free nations" of Asia contµiued · to have aceeas to thil:3 
f ...,,.("'' 
Ii OM 
_...t, · rice; ,..Q!L:!;.h~ .. ._Qib!t-,,~~ it c~uld be· equally as illlportant to· see to it 
J-~ that food'r'starved C~ was dep;r-ivecl of these badly needed supplies. 
\ 
The loss ... -to the West--of these food supplies could be a double loss--
a loss to the nations which :needed the rice, plus a setback to the West 
.because China aequil;'ed the rice. Because of its economic resources, 
Indochina was ilnportant to the power structure in the Far East .. 38 
In essence, Indochina. was believed to have great significance for 
overall power relationships within all of Asia, That simplistic cause-
effect relationships were predicated for events in Asia can best be 
understood in the spirit of the times. Everywhere .Americans were seek~ 
ing such simple relationships. The rise of the Col~ War was explained 
by the sellouts of the Democrats at Yalta an~ at Pot~dam. The loss of 
atoJ!lie 1110nopoly was the fault of the spies li,ke the Rosenbergs. The 
CQllllllt.µlists took over :\.n China because a few State Department offic;,ials 
had E:!Old out Chtang Kai-shek. Everywhe~e complex probl.elllS were seen as 
having simple causes. It is in this context, it must be remembered, 
38Dulles, "Tbe Threat of a Red Asia, 11 p. 539-.542. 
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that, Indochin.~ was viewed as the last remaining ~ginot line in Asia. 
It mu.st also be remembered. that the Republicans had promised to 
prevent future COnlDlUllist expansion anywhere in the world,~ had lam-
basted. the Demoerats for theil;- failure in China. No Republican Mmni;.,. 
str,tion could countenance disinter,st in Indochina, nor could. the 
Mministrat1~n notpledge,all-out support to the French. The eampai,gn 
slog~ which Q&rJ:'ied.the Rept'l,blicans into power would be remembered 
long after the War in Indochina had ended; the Republicans could not 
afford politically to turn their backs on their own promises. 
The United States had a more positive interest in Indochina as 
well. Indochina ha.cl critical impoi-tanee for the 11New Lo.ok" that· Dulles 
'had promised to give .to .American fox-e~n policy. For he hac;l lQng 
argued that the U.ni ted State, ought to prevent co:rmmuiist expansto11, from 
ever getting u.nderwa.y in Asia, rather t~ simply resisting it after it 
:µdtiates its assault •. l)ulles was seeking to re-establi~h a balance of 
power in Asj,a that would be favorable to American µitere;:1ts. Indochina 
· was of cJ;"llcial i.n,.porta.noe to thts more ambitious policy. · As· early as 
19.50, Dulles had suggested the creation of a new organization in South• 
east Asia, one which would serve as a. counterweight to Sino-Soviet powero 
Incloehipa was the fulcrum of this new qrgarq.zation. Dulles had argued 
that the. Un;i.ted States should: 
help establish a pe::rmanent association of the free nations of 
.Asia. and the Paoitio. It would not, a.t least in the.beginning, 
be an essentially military alliance, a.s the North Atlantic 
'l'r~aty Organization turned out to be ••• (It would start) as 
a qonsultat:i,.ve council of those who have a c2pon eo:pQern 
to~ national independence and hu.man freedom.J~ 
This o:rganiza.tion beoam.e one of the personal oause celebre's of Du11'3s 
J9Dulles, !!.&, s:. Peace, p. 229-230. 
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and received :qew attentiQn in the eai-ly months of 1954 when the situation 
:1n Indochina became critioal. He reintroduced his i.dea in a speech be-
fore the National, fflSS Club in i,1arch, 19.54. by calling £or united action 
in Indo~.lto Eisenh,ower, ~laborating on what.Dulles had.·~ inind, 
said it would constitute "the establishni,ent of a new grouping or coali-
tion oompoi,ed 0£ natio;ns wh,toh havy:, a vital concern in the checking of 
· 41 
o~ist expansion in the area." What Dulles wanted was more th~ 
"'.""::= . $:i;/J'm#~~~~q .. ~~~~~,J..~~ 
china, £or he sought a new permanent organization for collective seem-
.- - =- ~..S,-~~~-"Or-"'"1:,.IJ;,•-.:.,"°'J.~:._~_(;-~~w«.:"~J:-;.,.l'~'-,~•-::..;;'-"t";;,~.~~-':"'>1>·.'o;;~.,.'-J;!: .. ,/:>J:,,;",:;,"''·';"; •~·.:..,l"S:;....~-,712f,•,!;f...0 '.~·.;)t.k~\Y4t'l:~<;;:;c.;<:.~.-~,.;•~"'! ~ .. -;;--.;;.~'f'ff:,l""• 
rity in Asia which would prov:i,.d.e for defense aga:j.nst commun~st subver-
_____ ,__..,..""1--...,_,.,,.,...,.., __ ..,,.~ .... ~.,,..,.. ... ,.,,.. • .-ro....,.·~-··-"~"..,,...r~;;.:t:'i=~=;;,·~--... -~~~=.,,;.,n;.~~C.'!J!ic::'J,>/>..l,";,;<:;"!~:;:~,.·.~,._---.-""""-""""'-
. · 42 
i,ion, as well as defense against the expansion of communist states. , 
This new org~zation--to consist of the United States, Great Britain, 
France, the Associated States of Indochina, the Philippines, Thailand, 
AuJtrai1a, New Zealand, and possibly others--would cast a protective 
umbrella over the tree states Qf Asia. Its purpose was to allow thEn!l 
to d,velop politically and economically w;i.thQUt b~ing pla~ed by 
40,Dulles, "The 'l,'hreat of 4 Red Asia," P• ,540. · 
411etter; Dwight D. Eisenhower to wtn,ton Churchill, April 4, 1964, 
in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate fE£ Cha.pge (New.York, J.963), P• .3460 
~ . . .. · .. · . 
Dulles' lao:j:c of concern with the :immediate crisis in Indochina is 
illustrated by a conversation that oooured between Dulles and.Ely. 
· While :ifly attempted to ~ess on ~~s the seriousness of the French 
situation ~t Dien Bien.Phu, Dulles was not interested; instead he 
elaborated on his thesis tha.t a Southeast Asian organization must be 
formed to stop the expansion of the o~ists. "••• le secretaire 
d'Etat etait surtout visiblement preoeoupe'des condition~ politiques 
auxqualles devrait suborcionnle une plus large participation amerioane a 
· la defense du Su.d-Est ai:i,.atique ••• C1etait une allusion. au ~cte 
po11i1que couvrant tout le Sud-Est asiatique qua le_secret~e d 1Etat 
entrevoya.it et dont il souha.ita~t l.a conclusion." in Paul Ely, 
Memoirs (Paris, 1964), p. 66. . 
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coil1lllWlist threats. It would, add a new power dimension to As~an affairs--
a power bloc designed to eounterbalance Russia and China. This organi-
zation would also lll4ke clear to the Soviet Union the likely consequences 
of any possible aggression, for it was Dulles• belief that aggression 
could be deterred by threats of reprisal. "If aggressive events are 
likely whieh wi;Ll in fact leac;l. us to fight, l1;1t us make clear our in-
tention in a.d;va~ce, then we shall prqba.bly not have to fight.n43 Thus, 
a collective security organization would warn against aggress:i,.on or sub-
version and by so doing, hopetully would fpresta).l it'" In essence, it 
would strengt~en the overall position of the United States in Asia • 
. Indocl'tj.na, considered to be the key to Southeast Asia, was the focal 
point of tp.is organization. Once such an organization was established, 
Dulles thought the Onited States would be in a position to implement 
"lds long standing foreign policy goal of rolling back qo~ism in all 
of Southeast Asia. ,AA 
That Dulles sought to establish a collective security organization 
in Asia and viewed it as being capab;Le of altering the balance of 
power more. in favor of the United States was consistent with his atti-
tude toward the policy of containJUent. He detested containment as 
"negative, futile, and ;i.nimoral. 1145 His argu,ment was that all of 
.American energies, all of .American sacr~ices and spending were going 
not toward defeating comtmUlism, but towE/,rd enabling the United States 
to }4ve with coil1lllWlism. 
43John F. DuUes, "Mdress Before the .American Legion," United 
States Dep~tment of State, Bulletin, XXIX (September 14, 1953), P• 339~ 
44,Fa.rley, p. 275. 
45The New York Times, October 15, l95~, P• 2. ~-~, 
We are not working, sacrificing, and spending in o:rd,e~ to 
live without this peril, but to be able to live with it, 
presumably forever. (Containment represented) tread,mill 
polioies which, at best, might4rrhaps keep us in the SaJne 
place until we drop exhausted. · 
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'What Dulles had emphasized was that the United States ought to devote 
itself to el:!JJ4nating the oommunist menace rather than trying to live 
with it. His longstanding interest in develop:µig a collective defense 
al.l.ianae structure in Southeast Asia constitute~ a first step. 
F:inally, the Eisenhower Administration was eoncerned with the 
effeot the Indochinese War was having on its European polieieso The 
French continued to temporize on whether to rat;ify the European Defense 
Community. By 19,i,, many Amerio.an officials feared that the French 
might reject the EDC, if they could secure a Soviet promise to help end 
the Indochinese War. Fear existed that Moscow, in order to disrupt 
the Western Alliance, might ta~e the initiative in offering the French 
some kind of settlement in Indochina, in exchange for the refusal of 
t~e frenoh to join the European Defense Community.47 So interwoven 
were the issues of the EDC and Indochina that shortly before leaving for 
the Berlin Conference. the French let it be known publicly that the 
Government had agreed to make no dea+s with the Soviets in respect to 
the EDC in return for an "illusory'' promise of peace ip. Indochina,., 48 
46Ibid., P• 2. 
47Ibid., January 24, 19.54, pQ 2. 
48Harold Callendar, The New :(ork Times, January 2J .. 19.54, p. lo 
-~~
8') 
The Navarre Plan 
Based on the considerations which have been set forth, the Eisen-
hower Administration continued to support the French in Indochina. 
Speaking to the nation in July, 1953, Dulles announced that Jndochin~ 
was the second largest cost item in the Mutual Security Program bud-
get.49 
The French were 'Qrtable to hold their OWll in Indochina, however, 
and by l953 were militarily in a worse position than they had been in 
1947. The Vietminh continueq to escalate the level of military ac~ivi-
ties and, in early 1953, invaded Laos. As the situation deteriorated, 
the Mayer Government fell, to be followed in May, 1953, by the Laniel 
Government. Henri Navarre was soon thereafter appointed to head the 
Indoc~ese Command an~ was given instructions to work out a plan to 
bring the War to a satisfactory eonQlusion, 
Navarre proposed that Fre~ch l!lilitary operations be divi,ded into 
two distinct phases. Do.ring the campaign of 1953-1954, the French were 
to Qoncentrate on "mopping up11 operations in southern and central Viet-
nam, in order to avoid a general battle with the full forces of the 
Vietnd,nh, ·. especially in t,he north. In the north d'q.r:l,ng this period, the 
French should maintain the defensive. During the campaign of 19,54=1955~ 
the French were to asstUne the offensive in the north and to engage the 
49 John F. Dul],es, 11Report to the Nation,'' United States Department 
of State, Press Releases (July 17, 1953), #387. 
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Vietminh in a decisive battle.SO 
'I'he united States registered satisfaction with this new plan in 
the fall of 19.5.3, by a.nnou,ncing that she wo-u.ld give Franee·a.n ad~itional 
J8.5 lllillion dollars to support it. Mueh of this additional aid wast~ 
be ~sad. to train and equip the Vietnamese ·krroyr and to cover the costs of 
temporarily increas~g French troop level~. 51 The United States, how~ 
ever, seemed to believe the Na.var;t-e Plan promised total victory in 
Indochina., a victory which might indeed lead to negotiations, but nego-
tiations in which France would impose a victor's peace on the Vietminh. 
Thus, at the Four Power Ministerial Conference at Berlin in February, 
19.54, Dulles was dismayed to find the French earnestly talking about 
a negotiated settlement that would accomplish mueh less t:na,n this. 
Dulles beli~ved the Navarre Plan coul,d still achieve a military v:1,ctory 
and that negotiations with the communists, at, this time, were both fu-
tile and ~ecess~y • .52 Bator reports that to conv:inoe the F~ench to 
nake an aU,Out effort under the Navarre Plan, DulJ.es told the French the 
United States would supply all necessary military equipment, assume al-
most the entire financial burden, and would train the Vietnalll,ese army, 
if they would push for victory • .53 As late as April, 19.54, he described 
.50Na.varrehimself denies, however, that this was his plan and 
states that it was the plan of his predecessor Salan. "Cette id,e ~ta.it 
la bases du pla~ que le gen~ral Salan m'avait laisse en heritage. Elle 
devint celle du mien." Whether he .actually conceived it or adopted it 
from Salan, he presented the plan to the. French government and the:re-
after it wa.s called the "Navarre Plan," Henri Navarre, Agonie de 
l'Indochine (Paris, 1964). p. 81. 
5111Joint Un;i.tE;id States-French Communique", September .JO, 1953. '' lmted 
states Department of state·e Bulletin, XXIX '(October 12, 19.53), P• 486. 
52John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles {New York, 19,57), p. 111. 
53viktor Bator, Vietnam;. A Dimma.tio '.J,'raged.y (Nl;lW Yorlc, 1965), P• 17 • 
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1:.he Plan a$ Qne to break up o~anized communist activity and reduce the 
War to smail-soale guerrilla operations bl' late 1955. I,n testimony be-
. fore the House Fo:reig:n A:f.'f•trs Comittee, he· asserted. "There is no rea-
son to question the ess~mtial soundness of the Navarre Plan • •. Nothing 
has llappened to c;,hange the basic estimate.of rflative military power 
for 195.5. 1154 lnyreported tb,at he oould not c,,onvince 1,)ulles tha.tthe 
Na~rre Plan was neither ~eJigned to bring about a n,d.litary solution 
nor was tt·oapable of' doing so. He ~ggested that the .Americans had 
been mistaken in th.inking the Plan contemplated total viotory • .55 
The Frenoh inte:r,-preted the Na~re Plan ~ifferently. subsequent 
to the close o;f the !¢oohinese War, they argued that the Navarre Plan 
was never designed to b;ri.ng about a final milita:ey victory, but rather 
to place the French in a position of mj,J.ita:ey strength, so that they 
might then negotiJte to end the War with theVietniinh. Navarre wrc;,te 
t~the believed bis misision wa.s to oreate military·cond.itions con-
. duoive to an honorable political settlement and that he neve» promised 
victory in Indooh:.1,na..56 ii_y subsuuitiated this and asserted that 
Nava~re•s ~s~otions h$.d been only to .create mili~ conditions oon~ 
duoive to a favorable political solution.57 
Which is to be taken as ooi,rect-the French interpretation or the 
.American one? A time element may constitute a problem~ answering 
the question. The French, when they first presented the P4n to the 
54John F. Dl,ill~s, "Not One of the United States Alon:e,n United 
States De~rtment ofState,.BsJ.letin, XU (Al)ril 19, 19.54), P• 582. 
55{1y, p. 25 and 78. 
S6Navarre, p. 72. 
57EJ.y, p~ 24. 
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United States in the fall of 195;, may well have presel'lted it as de-
signed to bring about a Frenoh military victory in Indochina. It seems 
liktly that the Uni,ted .States would not, at that point, have been will-
ing to grant an ~tional .38.5 million doUars ~o the French :for a plan 
that prom:Lsed less than victory. It seeJIJS uniikely that the French 
would. lulve made clear at that time that, victory was not foreseen, in 
view or their desire to obta~ additional aid £rQm the United States 
and their k;nowle4ge that the ~~stration was opposed to any eompro-. 
lllise with t~e Qommunists. Thus, although in the fall ot 19.5.3, the 
Adm;inistt-ation may well.have wanted to believe victory possi,ble, and 
would have read ~s·:tnto any plan, it ·1s likely that th~ French would 
n9t have disabu.,ed the,i of thie notio11,,. 
At the same t~. it 1, unlikely that the French theuelves ser1-· 
ously anti~i:pated total victory. The War had grown incre~ingly un"" 
popular i,n France, was regarded by DJan1 as la sale gµerre, and was 
. . . I 
politically a great liability •. It was obvious l;:>y the,i that no matter 
what happened in Indoch;i.na, Indochina would not be returned to her pre-
World War II status as a French oolo;ny. Whereas the French had entered 
the War to preserve their Empire, they had beEim eo:o,.pelled to acquiesce 
in more and more autonol1;\Y' for the Indochinese and qonse~uentl:y lost 
most of their o;rig;tnal motivation tor fighting. The French thought that 
if the Up;j,.ted States was so interested in containing conununum.·in Indo-
china, she ought tQ sha:r;-e th~ military burden with them by committing 
American t:roop~. 
By March, 19.54, the Frenoh were explicitly. telling their .American 
ally that victoiw was not possible, but the United States seemed unw:Ul-. . 
irig to believe this. Se'V'eral factors~ be inv9lved here. If the 
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~enoh. negotiated with the communists, tb,eywould probably have to make 
some ocmeessions. Yet, domestically, tbe United States bad oo:mmited 
· herself to a policy or no concessions to the o~ists. In addition, 
the Navarre Plan, tr suocessfu;l., would prevent the expansion or commu-
niSlJ,1; thus, the .Administratiqn oont:Lnueq to advocate adherence to the 
Plan, even after it was evident tha.t the French we;re unwilling or unable 
to tight on. 
l'he Nature or the War 
Interwoven with the policy or containing the communists in ln,do ... 
oh:ina was the insistence or Eisenhower and ~es that the Un:j.ted States 
have no pa.rt in a colonialist or neo-colonial:j.st wa:-. This w~ a domi-
nant policy them.e or the Eisenhower .l\dmli.nistration, one whioh embroiled 
it in perl.odio dii'fioulties with the French. The United States oon-
ttnually pressed France to "perfeqt" the independence. of the Indoohinei;;e 
so a~ to remove any quest:j.o:n as to the t:rue nature of the War. Dulles 
believed that the "United States lllUSt be very caref'ul to allay suspi-
cions in these ;ountries and. not make them think of the °V1'ited States 
as imperialist. Th:j.s what the Soviets play on. (.Any .American policy) 
should.reinforce not undermine the independence of the new nations.n58 
. The Ur4ted States must prove herself a friend to nations struggling for 
independenQe, prove that she who had fought her own War £or Independence 
understood and sympathized with the aspirations of people throughout the 
world for polttiaal freedom. Throughout the War, pressur~s were exerted 
on the Frepoh to ~ke it a ''rea.l" war of independence. When the French 
. ,58Dulles, "ljar £!: Peace, P• 229. 
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annwnced, in July, 19.53, their d,eciision to grant full independenoe to 
the Associated States, the United States qu~okly congratulated the 
Frenah on their deo:Lsion • .59 · The United States, however, continued to 
worry a.bout the nature. of the War and its implications for .American 
policies in Southeast Asia.. As late as September, 19.53, Dulles 
asse;rted: 
There has been danger that resistance to oo:mmunist aggression 
might collapse with resulting jeopardy to our vital interests 
in the West Paoifio. Many of the people ot Indochina. had 
been persuaded that· .their choice was between colonialism and 
OOl1ll1lll.nism. A ahoioe between two tol'l11S of ~bjec1D.on n,ver 
gives rise to Dlllch enthusiasm or lllU.Oh willingne15s to sacri-
fice and die. Now, the French, by Peolaraticm of July 3, 
have made clear·their intention to grant full independence 
to the Associated States as these states desire it••• Thus, 
tjie oha.raoter of the war becomes transform~ and the United 
Swtes, can in gocid conscience, eontr;.bute su.bsta.nt~ ••• 
to the suooessfu.l oonc~usion of the War. It has become 
genuinely a "war £or independence" and the aggressive char-
acter of the communist warfare now stands eXl>osed.00. 
Implioit in this statement is the .American belie£ tha.t prior to July, 
195.3, alegitilllate qu.estion existed as to the "true" nature of the War. 
These doubts plagued the Administration continuously even after the 
French Declaration. When in May, 19.54, the question of .American mil.i-
t~ intervention in Indochina. arose, both Du.lles a,nd Eisenhower empha-
sized. that Qne ot the preconditions for such intervention was a French 
promise to grant the Indochinese full independenoe.61 Thi~ agitation 
lest she appear in the role of a ooloni$list power also influenced the 
United States in its decision as to whether she ou.ght to intervene 
59:sator, p. 200. 
60John F. Du.ll~s, ".Address Before thl' New York Herald Tribune 
Foru.m," United State,s Dep$rtment of State, Bulletin, XXIX (November 2, 
l9.53), ~- 588. · . 
6lchalm.ers M. Roberts, The Wash;,ngton Post, Jv.ne 7, 19.54, P• 17. 
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militarily over Dien Bie;n P);lu. The U~ited States insisted that she 
would not respond alone to the French plea, lest she inau.r criticism as 
a colonialist, "The strongest reason for all for the United States re-
:fusaJ. to respond by itself to Freneh·pleas was our tradition of.anti-
~~qr~i.1¢~ .... ~ 
eolon~li!JU..,.!'62 Ii' Ei!iJenhowe,;-•s statement is to be ta.ken at face value, 
then one of the major polici;,.~:-~~~,,-~~~~~---,~~~~!~- ·--~~~~--~~~=~.;:';;.'.~J:~.r ~ 
ehinese War was to avoid ·any\_~~ of neo-oolonial.ism. So overriding... ~)~tt::: 
wa.s this concern that it might have 1,nfluenced a decision to let the 1 ~ · 
military situation in Indochina collapse rather than take the risk of 
being aoouse~ of being a colonialist state. 
;en all probability, the "colon:j.a.J.11 issue was a convenient pretext, 
which served the policy goals of the United States at this time. For 
the United States had supported the h-enoh with military aid and finan-
cial su:pport, even though she se~ed to think the war was colonialist 
in nature. When a French defeat appeared imminent at Dien Bien Phu, ;1-t 
hardly seems credible that the United States would not inte:rvene. simply,' 
/ . 
out of fear of beine; labelled a col~nialist power. However, anti-
colonialism was a position long propo"Q.nded in American policies in Asia., 
starting from the time when.the United States insisted on the preser-
vation of the independence and territorial integrity of Ch.inao In this 
respect, the applj,.cation of this position on aolonialj.sm to the Indo-
chinese situation indicates a continuation of a traditional Far Eastern 
62Eisenhowe:r; Mand.ate fo;; Change, p. 373. 
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The Question o! Chinese Intervention in Ind.ooh.in.a 
Although during 1953, Eisenhower adhered. to most of the policies 
la.id down during Trulnan•s Administration, the Repiblioa.ns took a stronger 
position on the question of Clµ.nese ;,µitervention. Throughout the period 
of the armistiee negotiatiqns ~ Korea, the French were fearful that an 
armistice in Korea might tree Chinese foroes for direct intervention in 
Indochina. The Frenoh Gover?U11ents repeatedly sought to obtain American 
.assurances that if China intervened directly, the United Sta.tea would 
come to the immediate aid of the French •. As has been pointed out, 
Truman was loathe to make any direct oo-1.tments on this score, and the 
fUJ;"thest the Unit~ States had gone was to state in thf.'J United Nations 
that she wouid be grave'.cy' concerned should Cb;ina intervene. Hopes for 
an ar.m.istioe in Korea were increased in 1953, and with these hopes went 
more oonoern, on the part of the French, of direct Chinese involvement 
in Indochina. Dulles was willing to give such guarantees and to give 
them pij.blioly, because of his belief that w~ a potential aggressor 
deters a.ggressic;,n. Dulles consistently emphasized that: 
The Korean War began in a way in whi,ch wars often begin--a. 
potential aggressor misoaloula.ted. From tha.t we learn a 
lesson wbioh we e;,q:ieot to apply ini the interests of future 
peace. The lesson is this: If events a.re likely which 
will in fa.et lead us to fight, let us make clear our j,n ... 
tention ~ advance; then we shall probably nQt have to 
f:i,ght ••• ' . 
Du:i;-i.ng a visit by President Auriol to Washington in March, 1953. the 
United States announced that if China took a.cl.vantage of an armistice in 
Korea to pu.rs'lle war 1n I.ndoehina, this would have "serious cop.sequences 
for the efforts to bring about peace in the world. and would confiict 
63nu.Ues, "Address Before the American Legion," P• 339 & ;41. 
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directly with the undefta~g on which a:ny armistice in iorea would 
rest. 1164 Shortly thereafter, Dulles ~lained that this statement 11was 
part of our effort to anticipate what may happen rather than to catch 
up with what has happened."6,5 
These warnings were reiterated on sever~ occasions. In September, 
Dulles told the Al!lerican Legion that: 
There is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China l!light send its 
own army into Indochina. The Chinese Communist regil)le should 
realize that such a second aggression could not occur without 
grave conseguences which might not be confined to Indochina. 
I say this soberly in the interests of peace and in ~ge hope 
of preventing another aggressor from :miscalculating. 
Dulles later elaborated on some of the possible consequences to China, 
should she intervene in Indoohin,a. Testify~g before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in Ma.rah, l9.54, Dulles explained that "the best way 
to deter aggression is to make t,he aggressor know in advance that he 
will suffer damage outweighing what he can hope to gain.1167 
The. means the United States would rely on in the event of such · 
overt Chinese a~gression were never ma.de clear. The Republicans had 
promised a tougher policy toward communism, but at the same tillle, had 
promised outbacks in military expenditures. Thus, it was necessary to 
de~se ;means to reconcil~ these two opposing promises. Finallyt in 
January, 19.54, Dulles expounded on the ''New Look11 of Republican foreign 
policy, specifically relating his comments to the situation in 
6ll-united States Depa.rtment of State, Press Releases ~ (March 28, 
1953), #160. 
65Ibid., (April 18, 1953), #200. 
66underlined by the author of this thesis for empha.siso Dulles, 
. 11.Ad~ess Befo:re The American Legio:p., 11 p. 342. 
67The New Yox-k Times, Maroh 25, 19.54. p. 1. 
Ind,ochina. 
Local defense will always be ~portant ••• it must be rein-
forced (however) by the further deterrent of massive retal-
iatory power••• The way to deter aggression is for the free 
community to be willing and able to respona6 .. vigt>rously at 
places and with means of its own choosing. 8 
In effect, the C~ese WE)re warned that the nuclear arsenal of the 
United States wou].Q. rain down on them in the event of their direct 
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intervention in Indochina. Here was the more ambitious policy that the 
Republicans had been form.u.l,ating. :fut an immediate outcry against such 
a policy was raised in Congress and by United States a.llieso Subsequent 
to Dulles• speech, an .Adtninistra.tion spokesman had to oonoede that the 
"New Look" would not be an appropriate way of dealing with the situation 
in Indochina..69 Thus, although .Americans continued 1;,o threaten against 
Chinese intervention, conflicting statements emana.t~d from the Ad.min-
istration as to what means would be used against such interventio~o 
In any event, the Chinese did not intervene directly in Indochina, 
although duripg late 195;3 and early 19,54, t1;ley stepped up their aido70 
Soon the problem confronting the Un~ted States was not what to do if 
China. inte;rvened, but what to do against the Vietminh to prevent the 
complete collapse of the French in Indochina.. 
A question :may be raised as to whether Dulles, by his policy state-
ments, intended to commit the United States to direct military involve-
ment, should China intervene directly. On the surface, this is what 
his statements indicated. Yet, the striking feature of Dulles' warlike 
68Text in The!!:! York Times, January 13, 19.54, p. 1. 
69Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, r~ported in !h2. New York 
Times, Febru.ary 9, 19.54, p. 1. 
70 Hammer, p. 135. 
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statements is that he hilllself continually emphasized that the mere warn~ 
ing of China would suffice; that if China were warned not to intervene, 
she would heed such warnings, and hence would not involve the United 
States in war. In eii,oh a.nd every instance where China was publicly 
waJ:'?led ag~st intervention, Dulles also emphasized that we would pro-
bably NOT have to involve our military there, because the warnings 
would deter Chinese aggression. Dulles may have emphasized the unlike= 
;l.ihood of American involvement to soothe publi,c fears; or he may have 
been so convinced that threats of reprisal deter aggression, that he 
believed the eventuality where the United States might have to intervene 
would never arise. Thus, one cannot necessarily conclude that Dulles' 
statements were the expression of a f~ United States policy to inter-
vene in Indochina should China do so. The United States, in fact, may 
not have had a real policy conunit:ment relating to the contingency of 
Chinese action. Both admirers and critics of Dulles have suggested that 
his words could not always be taken at face value and they w~re often 
more complicated than a surface examination indicated. 
The Question of Political Settlement 
The early months of 19.54 found the French in a worse position 
militarily than they had been since the War began. The Vietminh were 
preparing for-a large scale offensive, the one thing Navarre had planned 
to avoid in the l9S3-l9.54 campaign. The French~ earlier entrenched 
themselves at Dien Bien Phu, an isolated fortress in northern Vietnam~ 
accessible onzy by air, especiallr if attacked; there were growing in-
dications that the Vietminh intended to lay siege to Dien Bien Phuo 
The French people were tired of the War and urgently wanted peace. At 
the Three Power Ministerial Conference held in Berlin in early 1954, 
both the British and the French sought to include lndoohina on the 
. Agenda of an inte~tional conference to discuss Korea. The United . . 
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States opposed seelq.ng a negotiated settlement. She still believed in 
the ef';fioacy 9f' the Navarre Plan and thought that victory was possible, 
if the French would give their full backing to the Plan. Dulles was 
oonv1.noed that scheduling a political conference on Indoohtna would 
only lead the conmmd,.sts te step up the pace of their 1JQ.11ta;,y activ-
ities. 71 Further, Dulles believed that if Indochina were scheduled on 
the Geneva Agenda, OQmpromises would have to be made with the coxmnu.nistso 
Also, the United States may have feared that the Frenoh would sacrifice 
·the EDC• in order to get a satisfaeto:ry politic~·solution in I11doohina. 
Another thought tha.t might have concemed the United States was that 
since France had ver:y little to Qffer theeo~ts, the United States 
lllight be called ti:pon to make concessions, e;,ither in the f'ol'lll. of an 
. .Aaerioan reoo~i t:1.on of the regime of Mao Tse-tung or in the .form of 
permitting Communist China to (l)Coupy the Chinese seat µi the United 
Nations. Dulles' position was that if .the Chinese displayed a willing-
ness to ~top their agress:i,on in Korea,~ the time nu.ght be ripe for 
discussions on IndoQhina, but not before. 
I do.not think that I have ever said that these political 
talks would n,eoessarily be l.imited exclusively to Kox-ea. 
We have said that the oon;f'erenoe, a.s originally set up, in 
our opinion, shou.ld be limited.to Korea. But also I think 
I have made it olear that, if :matters at the conference go 
weu,· and the Chinese Co~ists show a dispo1ition to 
71 · Beal, p, lll. 
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settle 1n a reasonable way sue~ a question as IndQe~, 
· we would not• . just on technical grounds, say I No 1 ••• 7 
'-
· Thus, at Berlin, strong press1UTes bad to be exerted on Dulles to 
conv:1.noe·him.that talks should be scheduled. Eden reports that Du.lies• 
oppo$ition to ta.lk:s wai, one of the major stum't;>ling blocks to scheduling 
them.73 Dulles may have been warned that unless the Laniel Government 
eould hold out some hope of peace in Indoohina, it would fall, and a 
new government CQmm.itted to a ur,iilateral withdrawal might take office.74 
The French insisted that if the United States considered Indochina vital 
to her national interest all,d opposed a negotiated 1;1ettlement, she ought 
to $.id the French more extensively and more directly. France O'Q.ght not 
to be expected to bear the entire military burden for co~tainillg the 
oommu.nists in Indochina. 
The British were committed, also to a political settlement in Indo-
ohina. Fden•s position was: 
We fully share United States desires to see Indoehina pre-
serveq. from col1111'1llllism and agree that, so long as there i~ 
any hope of sucoess, the French should be urged to maintain 
their present effo;rt.' Bu.t after earnest study of military 
and politioal faotors, we feel that it would be ·unrealistic 
not to faoe the possib~ity that the concU.tions for a favorable 
solution in Ir,id.oom,na no longer exist ••• 75 · 
The United States was, thus, in an anomolous position nth respect 
to a negoti,.ted settlement. France, who had been bearing the major 
burden of.the War.and who the United States insisted bore the primary 
72John F. Dulles, "Press Conference," U~ted States Departwmt of 
State, Bulletin, XXIX (September 14, 195.3), p, 342. 
7.3Fden, p. 98. 
74Beal, P• lll. 
7%den, p. uo. 
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responsibility for the War, was no longer willing to fight alone. The 
British were convinced that a military solution by the French was no 
lon~er tenable and thus were p:ressi:Qg for a conference on Indochina.. 
If the United. States continued to refuse to disouss Indoc}lina 1'1ith the 
Oolllmllnists, she risked a Jllajor split with her allies, which could be 
detrimental to her overall foreign policy. ln addition, a refusal to 
go along with the Laniel~Bida.ult Government might cause the fall of that 
Government and its r~placement by a pacifist ~over~ent. The new 
government might not support the EDC, a~ Laniel had. Yet agreeing to 
pla9e Indochil;la on the Conference Agenda. was bound to lead to domestic 
reperoussions and cries of "sellout'', ''Yalta", and "appeasement!!. The 
only other alternative fo~ the United States se~ed to be to go to the 
direct milita~y aid of the French. 
However, the .Administration had had. occ,;1sion to measure congres-
sional su~port for involving .American troops in Indochina and had found 
Congress very unsympathetic. Sometime in late J~nuary or early Feb:ruaryo 
in response to a French plea. for help, the United States had sent 40 
B-26 bombers, along with two hundred American mechanics, to aid the 
French at Dien Bien P);lu. ~ uproar resulted in Congress, and Mike 
Mansfield delll&nded to know if there were any plans for sending Am.erican 
troops or atomic weapons to Indochina.76 Shortly thereafter, possibly 
to silence congressional criticism, Eisenhower announced that he had 
sent the meoha~ics to maintain the planes, because there were not sut= 
ficient skilled mechanics in Indochina, and that he saw no opportunity 
76Reported in The New York Times, February 9, 19.54, P• 1. ~-,,.--
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of these mechanics beoom;ing involved in any host~ities.77 When queried 
on congression(U unrest as to possible mUitar;v involvement in Indochina, 
Eisenhower stated"••• I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for 
.America than to get heavily involved now in an all~out war in any of 
those regions •• :78 Thus, had the .Adlllinistration been consider:1.ng the 
possibility of military involvement, the minor incident with the me-
chanics convinced ~t that suoh involvement would not have congressional 
backing. 
Dulles, thus, had little choice at Berlin, bu.t to .1+gree to the 
placing of Indochina on the Geneva ~enda; he had nothing else to offer 
to the French. Cognizant, however, that his agreement might touch off 
a barrage of Cl'itieislll, at home, he insisted that although Communist 
China would be present at the conference, she would not be l;!.n r1j.1:rviting 
party" and th.at in no way would the United States meeting with China be 
construed as implying recognition of the Col11Iiluni$t regime. Dulles re-
ported that he specifically told Molotov that he would not meet the 
Chinese unless it was speoifiQally agreed in advance that no United 
States recognition would be involved.79 The position of the United 
States was that the West was meet:;i.ng with China to ma.keher aecount be-
fore the bar of world opinion for :tier aggressions in Indochina and in 
Korea.BO 
??The Public Papers of the Presidents, :pw;ght .!k. Eisenhower., 12,ilo 
p. 250. . . . . -
78roid., p. 250 • 
. 79John F. Dulles, "Press Conference, 11 United States Department of 
· State, Bulletin, XXX (March 8, 19.54), p. J46. 
80Ibid. , p. .346. 
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As Dulles ~d feared, upon h,is return to the United States, he wa.s 
greeted with an onslaught of OJ:.'itioism, espec:.,.ally by IQ.embers of Congress 
who thought that ~e :nieet1ng would in effect grant de facto recognition 
to the Chinese ColJ1l111lllist reg~e. Memoers of the President's own party 
were among the most vooal of erities, with Senato:r Knowland, the major-
ity leader, publicly cr~tioi;ing :OUlles and·the Administration,81 
Dulles was compelled to· •1exp1ain himself11 to Cong~~s and the Am,erican 
publ:i.o in a radio broadcast and to·promise again and again that the 
United States w9Uld not reoogniae ~ed China in return for a settlement 
in Indoqhina. And long after it was obvious that negotiations were 
inevitable, Dulles and Eisenhower continued to express doubts as to the 
wj.sdom of negotiating. They continued to hold out hope that military 
. victory might well lll&ke these negotiations unnecessary. 
Crisis Over Intervention 
However, soon atte:,:, the Berlin Conference, the United States faced 
a. far more e:ruoial policy question. March, 19.54, brought with it the 
portent of a French military disaster in Indochina ~d involved the 
United States 1n the ma.J.q.ng of a vital pc;,licy deeision as to whether to 
intervene directly 1n Indoehina, in order to p;revent this disaster .. 
The French were faced with a critical military situation. Navarre, in 
spite of his earlier decision to a.void a major confrontation with the 
Vietminh 1n1953 ... 19S4, had taken up a. posit:i,on at Dien Bien Phu, and by 
early February, l9.54, it wafl evident that the Vietminh were preparing 
for a Jnass1ve a.ss~ult upon the fortress. Navarre decided to meet this 
81The New !ork Times, Febru.ary 9, 19.54, p. l. 
~.~~-. 
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as~ault rather t~ abandon Pien Bien Phu. On M4reh 13. the Vietminh 
· launched a major attaok uppn the fort?!'ess a.nd within two hours, two 
fortified outposts £ell. French effort~ at counterattack were totally ~ 
f'oilE;td and·by March J.5, the fortress was·under siege. The heavy artil ... 
lery attacks.prevented planes from landing and made impossiole the sup-
plying of the outpost. Within forty-eight hours, Navaz,re had cabled 
faris that the situation was seriqus and requested America~ aerial 
interivention to raise the siege.82 . 
On Ma.reh 19, in responise to an invitation from General R4df'ord, 
Chail"lQS.ll of the United States Joint Ch:j,efs of Stai'!, General ~y, French 
Chief of Sta.ff, arrived in the United States for talks on the situation 
. , . 
in Indochina. Ely bore several messages. He ha.d been ordered to re-
.quest additional American a.id, to Worm the Administration that the 
French no longer hoped for a favorable military solution, and to obtain 
an American gu.a.rantee of immediate air support if the Chinese intervened 
in the air over Dien Bien Phu. In addition, he conveyed a request from 
Navarre for a United States aerial attack on the Vietminh positions to 
raise t~e siege at Dien Bien Phu.83 
For the first time. the .Administration Wall confronted with a re-
quest for military action not against t~e Chµtese but against the. Viet-, 
n4nh. Ely's request presented the Administration with its most oruoial 
polioy decis.ion to date on the Indoehinese War. Intervention bore 
several d~gers. It could embroil the United States in war with China; 
it could possiblY activate·tbe Sino-Soviet Alliance and lead to general. 
82Nava.rre. p. 102. 
83' Ely, P• l,6. 
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war. Non-intervention, on the other hand, could result in a resounding 
de!eat for the Fren• at Dien Bien Phu, with suoh. disastrous psyoho-
logical effects on French morale a~ to cause a ooml)lete with~awa.l from 
Indochina. It could 41,so force France to enter Geneva as a suppliant 
at Canossa. It would make inevitable a negotiated settlement and even 
perhaps the loss of much of Indocb1na. 
, . . 
l;lu.t Ely's request was not official and policy dee~sions are not 
~eon the request of a general. Racli'ord., however, told fu that if 
the Fre~oh Gove~nt fo~ly requested .American air inte~ntion at 
Dien Bien Phu, the United States Gove~ent would give serious consid-
eration to thu request. In fact, according to~. Radford took the 
, 
initiative with him, and made thi,s statement even before Ely had £or-
~ requested such aid. Prel.im:inary plans for· an Amerie.a.n aerial 
· attack were diseussed. at this time ii A plan was worked out which con-
temp],;ated use of American B-29 bombers based in the Philippines. along 
with planes from aircraft carriers attached to the Seventh F1eet. A 
nUIJiber of raids, in the ooUPse of one ~>:r several conseoutive nights, 
were to be made on the Vietminh positions at Dien Bien Phu, in order to 
break up the attack. The opperation was dubbed Vautour.84 
, , 
When Radford and Ely parted• EliV understood that U' the French 
Government formally requested .Amerioa.n a.i.l- intervention, Radford would 
, 
strongly suppor~ and recommend this to the President. Aeoording to Ely, 
Re.c:ltord "quite visibly" expeQted to obtain Eisenhower's approval of 
this plan. It was also understood that the plan would be a "one-shot" 
a;f'!air which would not involve the United States in war in Indochina, 
84 . ' 
Ibid., P• 38 
) 
but would be a form of "inoreasl'd aid" to the French, aid which would 
stave off military disaster and allow the French to enter the Geneva 
I 
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Conference undefeated in the battlefield. Ely has reported that Radford 
was so confident of Eisenhower's approval tllat he expressed more concern 
as to whether the French would request such aiQ. t1'a,n he did over whether 
the United States would grant it.85 Radford's estimate l!'JB.Y have been 
based, in part, on the fact tp.a.t Eisenhower, during a meeting with Rad-
~ . 
ford and Ely, had ordered Radford to do everything possible to aid the 
French at Dien Bien Phu.86 When Ely expressed fears th.at Dulles might 
not support this plan, he received the impression from Radford that 
Eisenhower an:d Dulles might not see eye to eye on this issue.87 , 
Subsequent to Ely's departure and before thE! French formally re-
quested American air interve;ntion, it seems the Administration gave 
serious consideration to this plan for intervening in the ~ir over Dien 
Bien Phu. Between March 25 and April 4, the date on which the French 
fol"ll'lallY requested this aid, it seems that a n'I.Ullber of high level dis-
QUssions took place and that the ~stration tentatively decided to 
adopt some plan fo;r intervention. Many- indications exist to support 
this hypothesis. On April 29, Dulles in a speech before the Overseas 
85Ibid., p. J9. 
86 Ibid., p. 25. 
87El.y reports that he expressed lrl,s concern to A,dmira.l Radford that 
Dulles di,d not seem to realize or appreciate the French plight at Dien 
Bien Phu~ He also el[;p;ressed fears that Dulles might not favor the 
Radford•Ely Plan. filydoes not report B,a.dford's r~ponse, but he does 
say 1;,hat Radford gave him the ilrlpression (and he (ElY) may ha·ve :mis-
tnterp~eted but he thought) that Radford's expressed opinion that Eisen-
howe?'I might ,a:uthorl,ze American intervention, even though Dulle.a did not 
favor it. Ely emphasizes, however, that this was only an impression he 
r~eeived from Radford. 
Press CJ.u'o of .America, stres.sed the importance the United States 
attached to lndoehina and asserted that: 
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast 
Asia of the political system of Colll,mlll1ist Russia and its 
Chinese Communist ally, bX whatever means, would be a grave 
tllreat to the whole free community. The United States B~els 
~hat that possibility should not be passively accepte<io~ 
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Up until tflis time, possible United States action had always been pre-
dioated on the direct intervention of the Chinese. Here, for the first 
time, the United States stated that rega;rdless of how it was to be 
accomplished, the United States should not stand by and watch the com-
mur,tists take over in In,dochinao lmplioit was the assertion tha,t if the 
Vietminh threatened to drive the French from Indochina, the United 
States would intervene to prevent this. On March 30, James Reston re~ 
ported in the~~ Times that the United States :p,a.d taken a fu,nda-
mental policy decision to use its air force over Dien Bien Phu to raise 
the siege and that Dulles was supposed to lay the political groundwork 
for this intervention.89 Also, Eisenhower, in a strong message to the 
President of France on March 28, asserted that the soldiers at Dien Bien 
Phu were defending the cause of human freedom an,d were exemplifying the 
qualities vital to the survival of the free world.90 
Ba.tor lends support to this hypothesis in asserting that prior to 
Apr;il 3, the National Security Council met and decided on .American 
88underlined by the author of this thesis for emphasis. Dulles, 
flll'he Threat of a Red Asia," Po ,540. 
89James Reston, The New York Times, J.V,[arch 30, 19.54, p. 26. __..,.....-~ 
90Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Tribute to the Commander and i,1en of Dien 
Bien Phu Garrison, 11 United. States Department of State, Bulletin~ .x;xx 
(April 12, 19.54), p • .542. 
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inte;J;'venti<m over Dien Bien Phu, 91 Chalmers Roberts also maintains 
t~t between :Ma.roh 25 and April 3, the National Security Council had 
met and thrashed out the problem, agreeing finally that intervention 
ought to be supported.92 Reportedly, it was deoid~d to use two hundred 
earrier based aircraft, from the aircraft carriers Essex and Boxer, 
along with Philippine ba1:1ed planes, in a single strike over Dien Bien 
Phu. In any oase, some meeting must have been held and a tentative 
~ecision must have been taken, for on April 3, a secret meeting was held 
with key oQngressmen to discuss such intervention. 
Although a decision seems to have been made to intervene in Indo-
china, Eisenhower appears to 4ave been unwilling to assume sole re-
sponsibility for .American action and wanted congressional support. On 
April 3, Dulles, Radford, Undersecx-etary of Defense Roger Kyes, Navy 
Secretary Robert B. AndersQn, and Thurston B. Morton met in a secret 
session with five Senators and three Representatives in aeoordanoe with 
Eisenhower's desire that these leaders be sounded out on the possibility 
of a joint Qongressional resolution authorizing or supporting the use 
of air and naval power at Dien Bien Phu. At this point, the tide was 
turned. The Congressmen expressed strong misgivings and asked Dull~s 
it .America's allies had been sounded out ~nd would participate in such 
a strike. Dulles answered in the n~gative. Radford, in response to 
questioning, admitted that the plan did not have the backing of the 
other chiefs of staff. At the end of the meeting, the Cong~essmen 
declined to support a congressional resolution and sugge:;ited that before 
91&.to~, po 49. 
92 Roberts, p. 17. 
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doing anything, Dulles oug;b.t to se~Qh £or allies and eonsider.maki.ng 
,,.ny intervention a joint Allied venture.93 The next day, Radford and 
Dulles met with Eisenhower in a late lll9eting ·in the upstairs study of 
the White House and decicted that the United States would grant aerial 
aid to the French, but on the condition that it was a joint vent~ 
supported by Great Britain, Australia, N,w Zealand, and possibly the. 
fb.Uippines ¥Ci Thailand, and further that France promise to see the 
War tbroug;b. to a satisfactory conolusion and grant full independence to 
the Associated Sta.tes.94 
This ,writer suggests that, contrary to appearances, there were in 
tact two distinct plans on the drawing bo~. The first--<iiseussed be-., 
tween Radford and ElY and sponsorec;l QY Radford was a plan .for a uni-
lateral Am,rioan air and naval attao~. con.fined to the area o.f Dien Bien 
Phu. It was this plan which received the attention or the National 
SeetU"ity Council, ~nd which was presented during the April 3 meeting for 
congressional apl)l'ova.l. This plan envisa,gec;i a carefully limited and 
eiroum.soribed Amel'ican intervention, e~euted quickly and "quietly"tt for 
the sole purpose or preventing the fall c;,f Dien Bien Phu. The second 
plan, supported by Du.lles, ha.d a much more long range objective. It 
was a, plan which represented Dulles' lc:;,ngstanding intet"est in establish-
ing an organization fo'l;" eplleetive seaurity in Southeast Asia. A..s has 
been pointed out earlier, Dulles, as e~ly as 1950, was ma.king references 
to and supporting such an orga.nizatien. This second plan seems to have 
' ~ 
originated even before Dulles learned .from Ely that the French position 
93:sa.tor, p. 50 • .t\lso Roberts. p. 17. 
94Bator, p • .5].. 
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at Dien Bien Phu was ~ritioa.J. and. was designed to do much more than 
ward off a Frenoh disaster at Dien Bien Phu. In tact, Du.U.es seems to 
, 
have opposed t,he Rad.fol'd-Ely plan on the gr9unds that aerial interven-
tion wO'llld not sut~oe, ground £or~es would be inevitably neeessa.ry, 
and further that t}le President did not have the constitutional. authority 
to order such intervention.95 'l.'he Du.lles Plan involved the establish-
ment of a eol.leotive seourity agency in Southeast Asia, the groundwork 
for which. would be laid by a joint Angio-Amerioan military intercession 
in Indochina.· Th;i.s organization would ensure, he thought, an eventual 
French viotpry :;Ln Indochina. It would, he thought, vitiate the neces-
sity for political settlement at Geneva, or, minimally, strengthen the 
negotia.tj.ng positic»;1 of the French at Geneva, so that a very favorable 
political settlement could be obtained from the oonununists. It would 
provide protection against communist subversion as well as against 
oommunist aggression from without for ea.oh country involved. Poten= 
tially, he thought it might do £or Asia what NATO had accomplished in 
Europe: deter communist expansion. In essence, he seems to have 
thought that such an organi~ation had the potential to restX"Uoture the 
power :relations in Asia., and. to estabU.sh a balance of power that would 
be favorable to United States interests. 
" There is evidence to suppor.t this two-plan hypothesis. Ely under-
stood the plan was a one shot affair involving only the United Sta.teso 
He a.11:10 reoognised that R,a.d.t'ord and Dulles did not see eye to eye. be-
. ~ 
oau.se while Radford S'\lpported .American intervention, Ely found that he 
could not even get Dulles to listen to the seri<!>Us:ness of the French 
9.5Bea.J., P• 
103 
situation at Dien Bien Phu, because Dulles was more interested in talk= 
1ng a.bout a possible Southeast Asian organiza.tiQn for eolleotive de-
fense. The plan which was conveyed to .the Congressional leaders could 
not have envisaged allied action because this was precisely one of the 
major objections voiQed by the Congressmen: that the allies of the 
United States had not been eonsulted and included., Had Radford or the 
National Security Council, a.t that time, oontempla.ted joint action, 
Dulles would have reassured the Congressmen that this was the original 
intent. Th't,1.s, there are indications that one plan envisaged only 
American action limited to Dien Bien Phu. This certainly was the under= 
standing of the French when they requested .American aid, because when 
they learned that such aid was conditional on British support, the 
F):-ench were taken aback and dismayed.96 
Evidence also exists to support the position that Dulles sponsored 
an alternative plan. Even before the time element allowed Dulles to 
know of the seriousness of the Dien Bien Phu situation, he asserted 
that: 
The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a 
collective system of defense. They clearly cannot achieve 
security sepa.ratel,y ••• The threat we face is not one that 
can be adequately dealt with on an emergency basis., It is 
a threat that may long persist. Our policies must be 
adopted to this basic faot.97 
Dul~es went on to warn the Chinese against intervention in Indoobinao 
; 
Thus, before Ely's visit to the United States, Dulles seems to have been 
layj,ng the groundwork for some new organization of collective defense 
6; . 
9 Ely, Po 72. 
97John F. Du.lies~ "Policy for Peace and Security," United States 
Department Qf State, Bulletin, XXX (Ma1!'c;h 29, 19.54), p. 459-4600 
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in Southeast Asia. These statell!,ents ma.de shortly before the fo:rma.l 
French request for intervention reflect on Dulles• state of lUindo They 
suggest that he opposed emergency, short-range actions, and that he 
sought to lay the basis for a comprehensive attack on the problems of 
So"Q.thea.st Asia in the organization of collective defense. Next, on 
March 19, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles 
again ma.de reference to the :need for collective defense in Southeast 
Asia.98 Again, on March 29, in his Overseas Press Club ~peech, he indi~ 
oated that the communist threat to.Indochina should be met by united 
aotion.99 
Thus, if the National Security Council decided, or tenta,tively 
decided, between March 25 and April 3, to intenene in Indochina,, this 
decision nmst not have .been p~edie,ted on a joint allied ventureo 
Otherwise, Dulles would 4ave made this clear on April 3 to the leaders 
of Congress. And if the National Security Council did make some such 
decision, then in all probability, Dulles, when he spoke on April 29 on 
the need for collective action was expressing his own views, based on 
his own plan .. 
These events suggest that up until April 3, two :plans we:re being 
considered: the one sponsored by Radford, the other by Dulles. The 
Radford Plan was easily realizable and addressed to the specific problem 
of Dien Bien Phu. It seems to have had some approval from E;isenhower, 
since Eisenhower wanted. Dulles to sound out oongressional feelings on 
such a. plan. However, Eisenhower's very decision to consult with 
98Farley, p. 10. 
99Dulles, "The Threat of a. Red Asia. 11 p. 539-.542. 
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Congresst a decision pe:rha.ps motivated by Dulles• conviction that Eisen-
hower did not have the constitutional authority to order intervention 
without ao:ngressional approval, spelled the death of the plan, As 
Chalmers ~berts }w.d ptit it, AprU .3 JQaY llave been the (iay the United 
States did. not go to war, because the leaders of Congress had qual.Jns. 
Dulles may not have argq.ed c;,onvincingl1' nth them for a plan he did not 
support. personuly, especially.when the alternative suggested by the 
congresSlllen was very mu.ch in keeping w:1.th the plan Dull,es had in lllind. 
Also, Radford h$.d to admit to the congressmen that Jti.dgeway did nQt 
sµppo:,;-t the plan nor the other Chiefs of Staff. Tlle meeti:\'li ended with 
congressional insistence that the United States seek allied support. 
The congressio~l qua.J..ms, l)Q,lles' opposition, General Ridgeway's belief 
that an air attack would not suf:tiee and that the cOlllJ1littnent of ground 
forces would. be necessary (which. would inevitably involve the United 
States in another Korea ... tn,e war), convinced Eisenhower to 4bandon the 
Radford Plan. Atter April .3, j,t was no longer seriously considere~. 
At a White House meeting on A}'ri.l 4, the .Du.J.les P4n emerged in 
outline form. It w-.s ~reed by Eisenhower, Raqi'ord, and Dulles that the 
' 
United States would support the Fl'ench, provided it were a joint Anglo-
.American ventu.re, as a minimwrl reqv.irement, and. provided that the French 
would agree to certaµi conditions, one of which was to see the War 
through to victory. J.mmediate~ after.the meeting, Eisenhower wrote 
Churchill to request that Dtllles t:cy to Londo11 to discuss plans tor a 
joint allied intervention 1n lndoobina; he offered a proposal for the 
. esta.blish;ment of a. new grov.ping ()f states in Southeast As:\.a to contain the 
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oo:mmunists.100. Th41,t Dulles was anxious to intervene in Indochina to 
save the situation is not in doubt, bu.the contemplated a different 
kind of :,.ntex-vention than Radford had-.-a far-sighted, long-range oper-
a.tion. 
The existence of two distinct plans for inte,;.-vention is of oon-
siderable significance. The Radford Plan was designed to help the 
French oµt of an immediate military cr~sis, to avert disaster a.t Dien 
Biep Phu, and to stabilize conditions in In<;iochina, so that France 
could go to Geneva undefeated and able to get a. satisfactory political 
settlement. Its political implications were overshadowed by the mili-
tary ones. The Dulles P:J.an was primarUy political. It envisioned~ 
allied venture into Indochina. and tile establishment of a collective 
security organization for Southeast Asia. It was not confined to get ... 
ting the F~nch out of the Dien Bien Phu predio~ent. By marshalling 
the ''free world'' forces against the Vietminh, it might perhaps cause 
the Chinese to lose face and perhaps DJllke th~ unwilling to negotiate 
at Geneva: they might feel a neceasity to continue the war until they 
could get a more satisfactory settle:inent. Both the French and the 
British, who opposed the Plan. thought that ~stead of' creatin~ con-
ditions favorable to~ political settlement, it could escalate the con-
fliot and nullify the chance for a political settlement. 
On the other hand, Dulles had opposed negotiatio:ns fro;m the begin-
ning and believed that allied intervention might make negotiation~ both 
unnecessary and impossible. Dulles' plan would internationa:;Lize the 
conflict. maldng it clearly a case of colDXllUnist aggression against 
lOOLetter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Winston Churchill, AprU 4, 1964 
· in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate 'for Change, p. ,346. 
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the ":f'reE;i world" and would dissipate, once an4 :f'or all, the·oolonialist 
aura which hung over the Indochinese~. Dulles could. also s~tisfy 
domestic critics who were charging him with appeasement, His pl~ m:i.ght 
have made possible a change.in the o~ structure in Indochina., with 
the United S1,ates taking over the direction of the war. This ~ssibly 
would have been welQ~med. by the United States because the ~stration 
had been extre.ely critical o:f' the French c~c;iuct o! military operations. 
This plan also had ~re general. implications which were related to 
Dulles' desire to "roll back''· communism and to ,:struoture a new balance 
of power in Asia, one f'avora'bl.e to the United States. If' Ind9china 
provided the impetus fo;r a collective security o;-ganization, JDS,ny weak 
wills~ ns.tions wou,ld 'be replaced by a strong collectivity, concerned 
not only with, acts of extenia,l aggress~on, bu.t also with internal sub-
·version. · Hope£ully, it would provide the new nations of Asia with se-
cul;"ity necessary for current l)J."1ls of develol)D19nt. Dulles thought this 
org$.llization could force the communists to ~ease their ex:pansionistic 
efforts in 1\sia and woulq. relieve the United st.,tes of the exolusive 
'bu.rd.en ;f'er tl;ie oontaizullent of the communists. 
However, the plan was never realized • .After April J, talk of 
Amel'lican 1ntervention did not cease and the Dulles plan was pushed and 
l;>randi.Shed for JJJa?JY aonths, but it never~ ve17 JllllOh Of a chance to 
.be implemented. Both the French and the Br-it:i,sh, on wb,om the success of 
the plan depended, were op,osed to al).ied intervention. On April 4, 
the French otficial::\,y requested .American suppart and on April 6, the 
American answer was 0no", W'lder the conditions orig1nally specified. 
B.tt, the United Statea did assert that if it were a joµit venture and 
the French a~ed. to continue to fight to victory, the Un;ited States 
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would be willing to intervene.lOl The Frenah were dismayed by these 
new oonq.itions, especially since they thought this new plan would.only 
prolong the war and. prevent a negot~ted settlement at Geneva. The 
British too were unhappy. They were not pleased to reeeive Eisenhower's 
letter nor Dulles I plan. Dulleis wr:ote to suggest that the United States, 
Great Brita.~, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, 
and the AssoQiated States issue quickly a~ to China to the effect 
that tl;ley we~ ready to act against aggression in Indoqhina and con-
ClU'rently that they begi:Q to organize a oolleotive defense pact in 
Soutl;least Asia. Dulles further proposed that they should join in naval 
· and air action against the Vietminh in Ind.oohina. The British, though 
not enthusiastic about the proposal, accepted Dulles• request to come 
to London.l02 
Eden thought that aerial bombardment would be no more e;t'feetive in 
Indoohina than it had. been 1n Korea and that it might precipitate a 
world wa.r •. It would also harden Indian opinion,and Eden was cou;nting 
on the Indians to use their good offices to bring about a. settlement 
at Geneva. The British were 1;1ot opposeq, on principle, to the formation 
of a. ooll,9tive secu;t":lty agency for Asia.; however, they opposed doing 
4U1Ything which would jeopardize the Qha.nces for political settlement 
in Indochina. To them, this meant China ought not to be threatened, that 
there ought to be no aJ.lied venture into Indochina., a.rid that the new 
organization spould be postponed until after the Geneva Conference. 
; 
101Ely, P• 72. 
l02Eden, p. lOJ. 
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Talks were held between Dulles and the British from April 11 to 
April lJ. After Dulles realiraed that the British oppc;,sed any warning 
to China. he modified his plan and concentrated on trying to get a. 
collective security organization !o>;'llled priQ1." to Geneva.103 Meanwhile, 
in the Un~ted. States, Eisenho~r stressed. the c~tioal danger at Dien 
Bien Phu and e~essed.dou.bts as to the chances of a settlement at 
Geneva •. This all Jlµ!.y have been by way of preparation of public opinion 
for a joint ~ed iptervention in Indochina. 
It is almost impossible tQ unravel the conflicting stories of the 
Eden-Dulles talks. Dulles returned to the United States and an,nounced 
he ~d Br1t1sh (and French) approval to work toward the estal;>lishment 
of a Southeast Asian organization. He went ahead~ called a meeting 
for April 20 to discuss this new organization. The British exploded .. 
Eden insisted that all they had agreed to was to enter into very pre-
liminary discussions. privately, on a bj,J.aterai basis, concerning the 
possibility of settirl,g up an orga.ni~ation. The question of membership 
was to be left upon. and no formal meeting was to·be called thereby 
inviting certain participants and excluding others i.e. India. Eden 
eab~ed the British .Ambass~or riot to attend any meeting. Dulles was 
forced to convert the meeting into one concerned with NATO. A rain of 
criticism fell on Dulles• p.ead, With one congressman accusing him of 
being a liar or Eden a doublecrosser.104 Eden was furious and believed 
that Dulles had deliberately tried to present the British with a~ 
. acoom;eli. At this point Anglo-1\$eric8.rlr ;relations reached their lowest 
l0.3Ibid., ·p. 106. 
104Bator, p. 64. 
· ebb since the .Second W<;>rld War. E'.den wrote: 
.Americans may think the time past when they need to consider 
the £eel;i.ngs or difficulties of theil' allies. It is our con• 
viction that this tendency becomes more pronounced every 
week and is creating mounting difficulties for everyone in 
this countrn who wants to maintain close Anglo .. .America.n 
relations.l 5 
Dulles believed that the British had either gone Qack on their word, 
in response to pressures from Nehru, or that Eden had mis-qnderstood 
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him. Eisenhower mainta.ined, then and subsequently, that a nu.sunder-
standing had ocoured. Xt mai be that Dulles, imitating Hay•s response 
to the conditions impos~ on his Open Door Policy, hoped to ,force 
the .hand o;f the British and to compel them to act. The controversy is 
almost impossible to disentangle, since ea.ch of the principal partici-
pants blames the othe:r, more or less. Eisenhower, Dulles, even SherI1JB.n 
Adams, as well as Dulles' biographers, insist that Eden misunderstoodo 
Eden insists that any misunderstanding was Dulles'. 
Dulles, however, ~ontinued to promote his plan. At a N.A,'l.'0 meeting 
in Paris on April 22, he once again soaght to con~ce Eden to agree 
to discussionsbef'ore Geneva. Aga.j,.n Eden refused. On the evening of 
April 2J, Dulles sh<;>wed Eden a telegram from Nav~rre saying that all 
would be lost ,g.t Dien Bien Ph-q, unless, within 72 hours, aid were forth-
coming. The French General Sta.ff informed the British that the United 
States had offered sixty B-29 Qombers, based at Manila, to make several 
sorties over Dien Bie~ Phu and that Dulles had pro:mised to recomm.end 
that Eisenhower ask Congress for war powers to move t~oops, tf the 
British would act with the United. States. The British insisted that 
it was no longer possible to save Dien ~en Phu and such action would 
l05Eden, p .. uo. 
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QnJ,.y jeopa.rliize the Geneva Conference. Dulles in turn told Eden trua.t 
he was convinced the French would collapse, if some implediate aid were 
not forthco1'!ing. He finally agreed t~t there was not sufficient time 
for the United States to pa.rticipa.te in the Dien J;3ien Phu battle, but 
he asked that the British send some R. A. F. units into Tonl:p.n and said 
the United States would do something, otherwise the entire French mili-
tary effort would collapse. Ed.en disagreed again, and said he did not 
believe the French would stop fighting; he insisted that air power 
wo~ld be insufficient, and that such action might activate the Sino-
Soviet JUlia.nce, F~lly, however, Eden agreed to go 5,mmediately to 
London to discuss Dulles' proposition with the Cabinet.106 
Again, however, the British rejected Dulles' proposition. Mean-
wh~le, after Eden left Paris, Dulles conferred w:1.th the French and told 
them that if they would turn over the strategic collmlBlld of the W~r to 
the. United States and would convince the British to issue a joint 
declaration in support of United States intervention, the United states 
Air Force would go into action over Dien Bien Phu.107 Tlµ.s latest pro-
posal was colllllDlnioated to the British not by the American Ambassador 
but by the French, a~d a~ a re~ult a second oabj,,net meeting was held in 
London, on Apr:U. 25. The new proposal was that the United States, the 
United Ki~dom, France, the Associated States, and the Philippines 
pledge the:µ- common·~ to contain the communists in Southeast Asia. 
If the 1;3ritish agreed, Dulles would request approval for American inter-
vention and on April 28, the Navy would go into action at Dien Bien Phu. 
106 · Eden, p.,115-117. , 
107Ely, P• 95. 
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· Again, however, the ~tish rejected DQ.Ues• proposai.108 
The question or United States ~tervention still did JiOt die. It 
has been rep<>rted that Eisenhower tried once more to mu.star congres-
sional s"Q.pport for unilateral acti0n.109 Dulles spoke with Eden again 
on · AprU ;O, to t:ey to nay h1ni µi favop of joj,nt action. For a tµie, 
it appears the United States considered intervening with tts allies, 
but without the British.uo As late ais May Jl, the BriUsh Ambassador 
;1.n Paris r,;ported that the United States had a.J.most reached an agreement 
wi\h the J;i'rench on United States intervention.111 .And even after the 
fall of the l,aniel Govern,ient, Eisenb,ower indicated to President Aurtol 
that tb.e Un3,.tec\ States was still willing to enter discqssions with the 
new French goverpment on the question ot Am1:trican :µite;i:-vention.112 . 
'rhe 'bn.e:f but s:J,gnific::a.nt fiutTy over Amerioa.n, intervention in 
IndoQhina had·several co~equenoes. It led to a serious split between 
the United St~tes and her allie~, especially the British. It provoked 
a congressional storm, and ca~t a pal,]. over the Geneva Convention. In 
the end, intervention was not forthcoming. ';rhe United States policies 
at this time seem to have been the product of oop!J.icting and. incom ... 
patible tendencies. On the maximal level, the United Statei wanted to 
deal the CODmlllnists a ~so~ding defeat 1n !ndoe:hina and establish 
fo:r the region a defense alliance. On tht minilnal level, the U;nited 
lQ8Fid.en, p. ll.5-U?. 
109 Farley. P• 15:., 
110 Ibid,., P• ll •. 
. lllF.den, P• 143. 
ll2:r,,etter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Fresid.ent .Aunol of Fra.noe, June 
;L.8, J.9.54, Public PaJ?!rS gt the Presidents ~~United States, P• .58J. 
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Statee wanted. to prevent the tall of Dien Bien Phu. At the same tilne, 
howeve::r. the United States did not want to intervene $lone,. She wanted 
only to act as part of a coalition. The United States was unable to 
reac~ agreement with her allies; therefore, she could not realize her 
larger goals with resp,ot to ~doohina. She had aided the French with 
financial and material aid; she had given advice; but she bad depended 
on France to bear the major btu'den of the War. Now tba t she no longer 
thought France willing or able.to bear the direct military bu.rd.en of 
oon~ining the co:mnmnists in Southeast Asia, she was yet umdlling tQ 
do :1.t herself. The bi.story of .American involvement in Asi~ was oha:rao-
. terized, with few exoepttons, by this dependency c;,n the power of others 
to se~e r,olicy goals; in Inqoohi.na, the United States was not willin~ 
to go beyond her traditional mode of operatio11s to secu.J99 what she con-
sidered vital policy goals. Eisenhower and Dlll],.es were the viotµis of 
th,ir Qwn faoile campaign promises of rolling back C(!)lllIIJllllism, yet 
"keel)ing the boys at .home and out of Asian wax-s." Tlleil' denouncement 
of "presidential wars" and lanciw~s in Asia had not pl"epared. either 
th~ CongYess or the public to look with f~vor on an American venture 
into Ind.~ohina.. That Eisenhower's hapds may have been tied reflects 
1,ss on the British or the Congress than it does on an Administr4tion 
which sold itself on on, platforDJ and later fe"Q.nd itself without the 
neoess&l'y tlexibility of aot~Qn. Eisenhower and Dulles had tied a 
Go~ian ~ot and then, in a. moJil~mt of crisis, had gone in seuoh of 
an ally to untie it. No scapegoat could be found~ In the final analysis, 
domestic JX>litica.l oonsidera.ttons prevaiied over international concerns.· 
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The Cpup de Grice - G~meva 
As should be clear, the United States Qpposed hQlding political 
discussions on Ind.ochina. Although she had nothing to offer the French 
by way of an alternative, she oontinu~d to press them to give up the 
idea of a negotiated settlement. At the Geneva Conference, the United 
States delegation did not try tp facilitate discussions on Indochina. 
Various tactics seem to have been employed to impede the discussions. 
At one point during the discussions, no high-level .American official 
was present. Dulles had gone home and w;i.th him Undersecretary of State 
Bedell Smith. The .Administration announced that neither would return. 
It was only in response to the urgent entreat~es of the British and the 
French that Dulles consented to go to Paris to discuss the question of 
United States representation at Geneva. In Paris, Dulles asserted that 
the United States did not want to be represented at Geneva, because if 
the French ~de conoessionswhich the United States could not support, 
an open rift in Franco-American relations might develop. pu.lles believed 
that Mendes-France, who had taken office aftep the fall ot the Laniel 
Gover:runent and had promised to bring about a political settlement withi.n 
four weeks or resign, might possibly rrsell ... out" to the o.o:mmunists. He 
told both Eden and Mendes-France that the United States had certa:Ln 
minimal demands for a satisfactory political settlement and he feared 
the French would have to concede more than the United States thought 
desirable. He said that the memorandum, worked out earlier between the 
Bl:-itish and the United States, represented the minimal demands of the 
ll5 
United St$.tes fo:r;- a favorable political settle~ent.ll3 I! the French 
went beyond this ~morandUlll, the United States, if' represented at 
Geneva, would have to disassociate hersel:(' from the settlement. Mendes-
France, however, convinced Dulles that there would be no comJ;>romise on 
the demands of the United States, and agreed that ;i.f theUnitec;l States 
returned to Geneva, she would not be expected to guarantee any sett).e-
ment which resulted, nor would she be expected to give de jure recog-
nition to the settlement.114 It has also been reported that pa.rt of the 
bargain was that the Fren9h and British would join a collective defense 
orgallization !or Southea1:1t Asia.lJ..5 Dulles compromise¢t by agreeing to 
allow Bed.ell Smith to return to Geneva. The Un:;1.ted State~, however, 
continued to impede the con;ference prooeeding1:1, even after Smith re.-
turned to Geneva, possibly because the Conference was creating a diplo-
matically awkward situat;l.on fo;r her. Throughout the Conference, Smith 
re:f,'used to meet with the Chinese representativ1;i, out of fear, perhaps, 
that th:i.s would imply .American recognition of the Chinese Communist 
regil!le. FA.en repo;rted that be was compelled to run back and forth be-
tween the French, Amex-icans, and the Chinese, carrying proposals and 
co-µnterproposals. The Conference l!lAde little.progre1;1s in open session 
so it was agree4 to hold closed sessions. After only two days in 
1~3.AJ.legedly. included ln this MemorandUlll were t~e stipulations 
that (1) the xqa.intenance of nqn .. oollllllQ.nist gover:nments in V:l,etnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos; (2) if pa.rt:i,t;i.on occurs, it must be near th( 
e:l.ghteenth parallel; (3) if possible, Hanoi and Haiphong are to be j,,n-
cluded in the Freneh sector; (~) all Vietminn troops sou.th of the 
eighteE1nth parallel must be withdrawn; (5) populations must oe allowed 
to migrate south. Reported in The New Yox-k Tillles, Ju;Ly 14, 19.54, p. 19. ~~-..---
J+4:&ien, p. 160. 
115:sator, p. 190. 
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9lo1i1ed session, when it appea.:red that some small. progress :ud,.ght be :ma.de, 
Smith mov~ to ret-qrn to open 1$essions, much to the consternation of the 
British.116 
In part, American unoooperativeness may have stemmad :f'rom t4e 
personal animosity exi,sting between Dulles and Eden at the time, be-
cause of the British refusal to implement Dulles' pl~. The Adm:i.nistra'"' 
· tion also may h•ve feared the domestic re~ercussions of agreeing to a 
comprQmise settlement at Geneva. · Fear ex:i.sted that the Chinese might 
make political propaganda out of their presenc,e at Geneva., and !llight 
claim United States recognition of the Chinese regime. In a:n:y- event, 
the Unit@d States actions at Geneva appear to have done little to fa.cili-
tate a settlement. 
Dulles, during a news conference on June 8, reflected upo:n. the 
Amerioa.n position in reference to any final settlement. He stated that 
the primary re~po1;1Sibility lay witq the French and that the United States 
· was :presemt at Geneva .only as a friend who gives advice when asked.ll? 
';J.'hurston B. Morton, stated: 
The United States will not become a party to .any agreement 
which SJD.';I.Oks of' appeasement. Nor.will we acknowledge the 
legit~cy of Communist oQntrol of an, •egJl')Snt of Southeast 
Asia. any more than we have recognized the Communist· control 
of North Korea.118 
The ]Jlost the.United States would do, once a settlement was reaohed, was 
to agree not to use force to disturb the final settlement. When it oame 
llQF.d.E,nt P• 165. 
ll?John F. Dulles, "Press Conference," United States Department of 
State, Bulletin, XXX (June 8, 19.54), P• 365. 
ll8Thurston B. Mortem, 11.Ad<i~ess Befol;"e the Colgate University Con ... 
terenee on American foreign Polie;v, 11 United States Department ot State, 
1W:1etin, XXXI (July 26, 19.54), P• 121. · · 
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ti.me to sign the final agreements, the United States refused to sign or 
to directly as1:1ociate herself with them. As a result, the Chinese re-
fused to 1:1ign the settlement, and it was neeessary for Eden to work out 
a compromise whereby no participant except the DDJ.itary leaders of 
Franee and the.Vietminh would sign the conventions. Thus, the names of 
each pa.rtioipa.n,t country were only listed at the top of the doeUlllent.119 
1\.t tb.e end of the Conference, the United States took note of the 
final agreements and issued a unilateral declaration tha~ she wouid re-
frain from the use of force.to disturb the agreements and would view 
the renewal of communist agg~ession in Vietnam w:i.th grave conoern.120 
In ~eference to the prov11:1ion calling for elections in Vietnam by 1956, 
the United States set the stage for its later objeet~ons to the elec-
tions by saying ''we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free 
elections supervised by the United Nations to :i,nsure that they are con~ 
ducted fairly. 11121 The President stated that the Unit~ States was not 
a belligerent in the War and that therefore the primary responsibility 
for settlement rested with those nations who had participated in th~ 
fighting.122 For th;is reason, according to Eisenhowe;r, the United States 
was not called on to be a party to the settlement. However, this reason 
liltght also have been adopted by the Russians, Chinese, and British, none 
Gf whom we;re ''di;rect" parties to the W~r. 
ll9 Eq.en, p. 170. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
By 1950. tlle United States found herself' in a difficult situation 
in the Far East. The growing influence of COll1D1Ullist•oriented forces 
along with the poUtical instability prevalent in many of the newer 
pations of the Far East posed serious p:roblt;?ms fo~ United States poli ... 
aies. During the Second World War, the United States had ~ttempted to 
lay the basis ;f'or a favorable postw~.pOW$r structure in.the Far East, 
antioipating that China would become a strong power which would oooperate 
with her in realizing .Ame~oan interests •. The oonclu~ion of that War 
foqnd Japan thorQ'1gh:J_y defeated and China we~ened by oiv.i.1 war. A 
seriQus power vacuum, 1n t,he vi!;)w of t~ United States, resulted which,, 
by 19 .50, was filled by the Soviet Union in· alliance wi, th Communist 
China. ·The traditional bala.;noe of power which the United States hacl 
been dependent upon had ceased to exist. The North Korean invasion of 
. South !Corea ~ June. :t.950 served as a catalyst for a i,e..;exam:i.nation of 
.American policies towa.rd the Far East. 
This re-exaJD1n4tion resulted in a new policy aimed at preventing 
~ther damage to American interests by the establis~ent of a long-
. range .Amer;i.oan military commitment in SQuth Korea and Jap,»1, and by 
_aiding the Fren<Jh against the oom,munists in Indoohina. Essentially. 
the United State~ purs~ed a polioy designed to contain communist forces 
in.Indochina and the Far East. 
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This thesis is concerned prinla.rily with the policies adopted by 
the Unite~ States ::µi an effort to provide a oo~terforce to Sino-Soviet 
power in Southeast Asia during the period l950 to 19.54. The United 
States decision to aid the French was based, in par~, on the belief 
that commu.nist :force~ allied with·China were seeking to gBrin control 
of Southeast .Asia. Indocb.i?la was viewed as a barrier to the communist 
objective; thus, the United States sought to ~event the Vj,etminh from 
taking over in Indochina. A commu.nist victory in Indochina would pro~ 
vide them with a stepping-stone to the rest of Southeast Asia; even 
if physica+ conquest di,d not materia;J.ize, sucp. a victory would perhaps 
render other countries of the region more susceptible to communist in-
fluence. 
This study hypothesized ~t during the last four years of the 
Indochinese War, the United States attempted a continuation of its 
trad~tional policies in the Far East. Her policies in re&pect to Indo= 
china suggest that she was concerned with the power structure in the 
Far East and wanted to preserve the prevailing power structure in order 
to prevent further oommu.nist inroads which would endanger American 
interests. Since the success of.the Vietminh threatened to upset the 
power structure, it became necessary to prevent this success$ 
Diplomatically, an effort was made to encoura~e, if not force, an 
Allied power, namely France, to assume the ma,jor burden of achieving 
the United States objective. The United States was w:i.lling to involve 
herself to the extent of granting mil;i.tary and economic a.;j.d, but refused 
t9 assume t~e responsib:i.lity of an active military partnership with the 
French. Thus. although the question was frequently raised j,.n .American 
circles as to whether or not the United States would sen~ troops to 
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Indochina, the American response was always "n,0 11 • So unwilling was 
Tru.IJUJ.n to involve the military personnel of the United States in Indo~ 
china that he would not promise American milit~ry intervention even in 
~e event that China intervened. Al.though both Eisenhower and Dulles 
strongly warned China against intervention, when the French were 
threatened with imminent defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the United States re-
fused to initiate military action unless her allies participated. 
A marked relationship exists between these policies pursued in 
Indochina and those traditionally pursued by the United States :in the 
Far East where the United States had attempted to preserve a power 
structure that served her interests. TraditionaJ,.ly, the United States 
tried to insure that no natiQn would become powerful enough to establish 
its own Pax Asiatica and thereby threaten the strategic and ooilllllercial 
I , 
interests of ~e United States in the Paoi.fio and in Asia. American 
concern with the Far Easte~n balance of power was highlighted by 
Roosevelt's attitude toward the Russo~apapese War, the American re-
sponse to Japan's "Twenty one Demands", the ~rticipation of American 
troops in the Al.;Lied :intervention in Siberia, and even the United States 
willingness to cooperate with the League of Nations in the investigation 
of Japanese aggression against Clµ,na. Although t4e United States tried 
to preserv~ the balance of power, she relied mostly on diplomatic, 
rather than lllilitary instruments and depended on the willingness of 
other nations to employ their zrrl,litary .forces in maintaining the bal-
ance. Generally, although there were e~oeptions, the United States did 
not commit her own miU,.tary arsenal. Thus, ~ study of the tr$ditional 
foreign poli~ies of the United Stat~s in the Far East along with the 
polic;Les pursuec;i by the United State:;; in Indoohina from 1950 to 19.54 
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suggests a :ma.~ked continuity in .American policies. 
~· This thesis also investigated a second and related hypothesis which 
asserts that the Eisenhower Administration sought through diploma.tic 
means to create a new power stl'lJ.cture in the Far East, using Indochina 
as a fulcrum. ,The Republican commitment to rolling back collllllUllism 
suggests a co11JDO.tment to strengthen the position of the United States 
in the Far East. Dulles attempted to establish a regional defense 
organization in Southeast Asia. which would focus on Indochina as the 
most immediate problem. He strongly believed tl+a,t the United States 
llad to regain the initiative, and he emphasized the need for long-term 
planning as opposed to ad hoe responses to problems as they arose. In 
his view, a regional organization could restore some of the initiative 
I ~;c,.~."'(.•'~,,;;c..;~ • .,;'.'J"~~=•,ey"""-,,;..'1\-,',.~C.(,'.\,~1:~~~:.~'('fu'-..,$.'°"""""~<'J"i, 
to the West. This new ~gar4,~~~~~as to consist not onzy of the 
nations of Southeast Asia, but also of the United States, Great Britain, 
and France. One of its first tas~s would be to undertake a united 
~litary effort in Indochina to defeat the Vietminh. Under t~ese oiroum= 
stances the UnitE!(i States seemed to be prepared to engage its military 
forqes in the region. He believed that this organization would be able 
to deal suocess:f'ully with problems of internal subversion as well as 
external aggression. 
zation, as well as its proposed membership and its anticipated inter-
a oounte~e~ght to Sino-Soviet power in the Far East. The creation of 
~ 921l!liel"'!eig~t eQuld provide the basis for a new balance of power in 
the region, while at the same time, relieve the United States of the 
need to assume the burden alone for contain;i.ng the communists. 
,,,..,...._,_ 
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Although Far Eastern events were critical in determining United 
States policies toward Indoch,ina, European considerations al.so had their 
effect on United States policies. The French involvement in Indochina 
weakened France's ability to participate in European defense and thus 
adversely affected Unite4 States plans for the containment of the 
eo:mmunists in Europe. The United States supported the establishment 
of the EurQpean Defense Co:mmunity as a means for allowing Germany to 
rearm. and contribute to NATO, while quieting the anxieties of the French 
about a rearmed Germany. But the French Assembly procrastinated and 
finally did not rati!y the EDC. The United States feared that so long 
as France was burdened with the Indochinese War and was unable to 
ass'Ulll,e a position of leadership in the EDC, she would not join the 
organization. The French frequently applied pressure on the United 
States to increase her aid to Indochina, and implied that such aid was 
related to the w:lrllingness of France to ratify the EDC. Thus, for the 
United States there seemed little alternative but to support the French 
in Indochina, if she wanted French ratification of the EDCo 
The impact of American European concerns and European politics Qn 
th.a United States Asian policies should not be ever-stated, howevero 
In t~e last few months of the War, the United States would not mili-
tarily intervene in Indochina, or willingly support a negotiated settle= 
~ent, even though her failure to do these things jeopardized Anglo-
.American relations and perhaps the French willingness to join the EDC. 
Domestic politics also influenced United States policies in Indo-
china. The Repu.blioa.n victory in 1952 suggested, in part, that many 
AmeriQans supported a 11hard$r line" vis a. vis the communist forceso 
The Republicans had promised that communism wo~ld be rolled-back and 
12.3 
had argued that containment was a defeatist policy. Thus, the Admini-
stration was in a position politically where it had to 11do something" 
to support the French in Indochina. In addition, to have advocated a 
compromise solution would have resulted in accusations o! appeasement 
from conservative Republicans. 
It should aiso be remembered that although the United States was 
vitally interested in the outcome of the Indochinese War, she had con~ 
sidera.ble interest in other areas of the Far East. The United States 
had a ;firm military co:mmitment in South Korea. She was both vital;J.y 
interested and significantly involved in the Philippines and had both 
bases and considerable influence in Japan. Thus, at the same time that 
Dulles was seeking to use Indochina as a fulcrum for a Southeast Asian 
or~aniza.tion which might lay the basis for a new balance of power in 
the Far East, the United States was also seeking, in other areas of 
the Far East to consolidate her position and perhaps to encircle 
communist forces in the region. Thus, United St.ates policies in the 
Far East during the period 1950 to 19.54 did not center exclusively on 
Ind9china. United States policies i.11 Indochip.a must thus be viewed in 
the context of other American interests in the Far East, and as having 
European, as well as Asian, domestic as well as international sources. 
In analyzing the success of . .American policies it must be concluded 
that tll,e United States did not realize itE;i goals in Southeast Asia .. The 
French negotiated an agreement with the communists which gave them a 
substantial pa.rt of Vietnam and which anticipated, in reality, the 
eventual control of all of Vietnam. Also, Dulles was unsuccessful in 
est4blishing a truly powerful region£µ defense organization .. The 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization that was established came into being 
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after the Indoch:l,nese War was ended at Geneva in 19.54. Not until 19.54 
did the United Stat~s recognize a.nd accept the fact that France was ill-
eq~ipped to serve as an effective instrument for Vnited States policies. 
France was no longer the great power she had been and was u,na.ble to· 
defend herself, let alone her Empire in Indochina. It seems that the 
United States did not realistical.ly accept the implications of French 
weakness until France was lDilitarily forced to negotiate in 19.54. 
The Vietnamese supporte~s of the French were also not an effective 
instniment for containing the Vietminh. The War in Indochina began as 
a colonial W'B.l' on the part of France to preserve her Empire. As the 
War progressed, she acquiesced in increasing amounts of independence 
for the people of Indochina., however, always grudgingly and with quali-
fications. So long as independence was a promise rather than a reality, 
the Vietnaniese had little will to f;i.ght on behalf of the French. The 
communists, on the other band, had successfully become the champions of 
Vietnamese nationalism. The French were never able to establish a 
nationalist leadership that could successfully compete w:i.th the 
communists for nationalist support. 
United States policies were .further troubled by the lack of 
identity between the French and the .American goals in Indochina. The 
prill1ary concern of France was to preserve at least part of Indochina 
within the French community. The primary concern of the United States 
was to prevent the communists from coming to power in lxld.Qchina. The 
United States, however, would not intervene militarily in Indochina to 
contain the Vietlflinh; at the same time, she opposed negotiations which 
might leave part of Indochina in communist hands but would free the 
French for greater involvement in European affairs. She urged the 
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· Frenoh to greater efforts in order to oontain the co~sts, and in-
sisted that complete independence be granted to the Indochinese peoples. 
These were American NOT French goals. Thu~, .the United States failed 
to establish a oo:mmunity of interest with France in In,doohina, yet she 
tried to rely on the French :for the p-qrpose of realizing American 
·interests~ 
The United States also fa:il.ed to establish a hierarchy of interests 
in Indoohina. I£ her primary concern was to cont~in the communists in 
Indochina, then American intervention appears to have been necessary. 
If the primary concern was to free France of the Indochinese burden, 
the~ .American 11,lilitary intervention or support for a negotiated settle-
ment was perhaps called for. There was no determination of whioh policy 
goal was to receive priority. 
At the same t:iJne, domestic pplitios seellled to l!Q.litate against an 
American military involvement in Ind.oohina. Eisenhower had promised 
to keep the United States out of .Asian land wars; military experts 
believed that aerial intervention wo~d not be sufficient and it would 
. then be necessary to intervene on the ground. Having promised both to 
contain the communists in the Far East and eventually to roll them back, 
;yet wi,thout committing .A,me:t;"iean troops, the Administration wa.s the 
victim of contradictory promises. For similar reasons, a comprolllise 
solution was not acceptable. 
In evaluating United States policies toward Indochina during this 
period, there is, perhaps, a more fun~ntal isfue whiQh lllllSt be 
raised: given the situation within Indochina, indeed within all of 
the Far East,. could the status guo be preserved? Couid pommunist in-
fluence have been prevented from spreading, even had the United States 
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intervened militarily, assuming such intervention would take the 
form of conventional warfare? In short, the Vietminh had made many 
inroads into Indochina and had successfully stalemated the War; the 
Vietminh already controlled significant areas of the countryside. 
Throughout Asia, cownunist forces had taken the initiative. The United 
States, perhaps, overestimated the extent to which she could influence 
Far Eastern affairs without complete military domination in crucial 
areas such as Indochjna. 
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